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Abstract 
The United States has a long history of domestic terrorism, yet U.S. counterterrorism 
policy has focused almost completely on the threat from international terrorism. The gap 
in the literature was the absence of an empirical evaluation of U.S. counterterrorism 
policy on domestic terrorism in general. The purpose of this quantitative study was to 
describe the impact of 21
st
 century U.S. counterterrorism policy on incidence, lethality, 
and cost of domestic terrorism using data from the Global Terrorism Database. The 
multiple streams framework and the power elite theory were used. In this longitudinal 
trend study using secondary data analysis, domestic terrorism data were analyzed from 
749 terrorist attacks using descriptive statistics, visual analysis, and the series hazard 
model to examine any changes in the frequency and hazard of domestic terrorism in 
relation to the following 5 policies: USA PATRIOT Act, USA PATRIOT Improvement 
and Reauthorization Act, Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and USA FREEDOM Act. The results 
empirically supported the greater threat of domestic terrorism and showed that domestic 
terrorism changed in relation to counterterrorism policy. Further, the addition of the 
series hazard model in the analysis of domestic terrorism following policy 
implementation added additional depth to the results. This study contributed to positive 
social change by providing policy makers and counterterrorism agencies with an 
empirical, evidence-based method for evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy and for a 
non-partisan, non-political, evidence-based method for quantitatively determining 
terrorist threat.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Terrorism is a ubiquitous problem that has existed since antiquity (Hoffman, 
2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Domestic terrorism involves terrorism perpetrated by 
citizens of the nation of which and within which they are targeting. In the United States, 
the majority of terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by domestic terrorists; however, 
U.S. counterterrorism policies have focused on threats from international terrorists 
(Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; 
Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Elements of these U.S. counterterrorism policies focusing on 
international terrorism may have impact on the operations of domestic terrorists. In this 
study, I examined the impact that U.S. counterterrorism policy has had on domestic 
terrorism in the 21
st
 century by using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
This study contributes to positive social change by providing an empirical model for 
evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy’s impact on domestic terrorism. By relying on 
empirical data, this study offers an evidence-based approach to evaluating 
counterterrorism policy. 
Beginning with discussion of the background of domestic terrorism and U.S. 
counterterrorism policy, in Chapter 1 I build up the rationale for this quantitative 
longitudinal study by stating the problem, identifying the purpose of the study, listing the 
research questions and hypotheses, and describing the theoretical frameworks that were 
employed. From these elements, I continue Chapter 1 with a description of the nature of 
the study, operational definitions for key variables, assumptions of the study, the scope 
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and delimitations of the study, and the limitations of the study. I conclude Chapter 1with 
the significance of the study for creating positive social change. 
Background of the Study 
Research on terrorism has been increasing as data on terrorism have become more 
accessible. In addition, as governments globally combat terrorism, counterterrorism 
policies aimed at preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorism have increased in 
frequency of implementation (Abrams, 2006; Bassiouni 1988, 2002; Bazan, 2004; 
Berman, 2016; Bjelopera, 2017; Crenshaw, 2014; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017). What has 
been missing from these policies, which tend to be costly, is any suggestion of a way to 
evaluate the effectiveness of such policies. While examinations of the links between 
government policy and political violence (extremism, terrorism, etc.) have increased, 
much of the research has focused on the threat from international terrorism rather than 
domestic terrorism (LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Silva, 
Duran, Freilich, & Chermak, 2019). The studies that have examined domestic terrorism 
have not been conducted as frequently for the United States (Avdan & Uzonyi, 2017; 
Barros, 2003; Enders, Sandler, & Gaibulloev, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; 
LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Shor, 2016). Research that has focused on U.S. domestic 
terrorism has not included an empirical analysis of domestic terrorist activity in relation 
to existing U.S. counterterrorism policy, instead focusing on specific terrorist 
organizations or ideologies (Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Carson, 2014; Carson, LaFree, & 
Dugan, 2012; Despande & Ernst, 2012; Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005; Gonzalez, 
Freilich, & Chermak, 2014; Hewitt, 2005; Hsu, Vasquez, & McDowall, 2018; Klausen et 
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al., 2016; Klein, Gruenewald, & Smith, 2017; LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009; 
Lemanski & Wilson, 2016; Makin & Hoard, 2014; Miller, 2017; Norris & Grol-
Prokopczyk, 2018; Potter, 2013; Quinn, 2016; Subedi, 2017; Williams, 2018). 
The U.S. counterterrorism policies I included in this study are those that have 
provisions that may impact domestic terrorism either specifically or as an extension of 
provisions aimed at curbing international terrorism. In addition, these selected policies 
received major media attention, ensuring that information about these provisions was 
readily available. These policies listed in chronological order are: the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) of 2006, the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, and the Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline over 
Monitoring (USA FREEDOM) Act of 2015. 
The gap in the literature is that changes in domestic terrorism have not been 
evaluated in relation to the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21
st
 
century. This research fills this important gap in the literature by utilizing empirical data 
to examine the impact that 21
st
 century U.S. counterterrorism policies have had on 
domestic terrorism. This research provides policy makers with evidence on which to base 
policy development in addition to making decisions regarding existing counterterrorism 
policy.  
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In this study, I used two theoretical approaches. Kingdon (2011) introduced the 
multiple streams framework (MSF) in 1984 as a method of explaining agenda setting in 
public policy. Since then, researchers have extended and applied MSF to a range of 
governments, policies, and levels of governance (Zohlnhofer, Herweg, & Rub, 2015). 
Birkland (1997, 2004, 2006) has used MSF to explain policy following focusing events 
including natural disasters and acts of terrorism. However, MSF is unable to adequately 
explain the inconsistency between U.S. counterterrorism policy’s focus on the threat of 
international terrorism and the actual threat from domestic terrorism. Therefore, from 
conflict theory in sociology, I used the power elite theory developed by C.W. Mills 
(1956) and extended by Domhoff (1970, 1990) to assess the role that power plays in U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. These two theoretical approaches complement each other by 
compensating for each other’s weaknesses. 
Terrorism has been a form of political violence globally for centuries. However, 
identifying and defining what terrorism is has remained a challenge (Berkebile, 2017; 
Bjelopera, 2017; Carpenter, 2018; Crenshaw, 1995, [2009] 2012; Crenshaw & LaFree, 
2017; Enders, Sandler, & Gaibulloev, 2011; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007; Hewitt, 2003; 
Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Norris, 2017; 
Ronczkowski, 2018; Rummel, 1994; Sandler, 2014; Terrorism, 2011). Because the forms 
that terrorism takes are diverse and have evolved, developing one agreed-upon definition 
has been challenging. However, there are elements that are present in all definitions of 
terrorism: premeditation; intentionality; the use or threat of use of fear, terror, and/or 
violence; ideological, political, economic, religious, and/or social objectives; and its use 
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as a means to an end. Terrorism may be perpetrated by the State as a method of social 
control for its population, and it may be perpetrated by sub-national actors against the 
State, a collection of nations, and/or other sub-national actors (Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 
2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Rummel, 1994). 
Difficulties in defining terrorism have led to variations in approaches to 
countering the terrorist threat. In terms of non-State terrorism, a balance must be reached 
between national security and civil liberties (Abrams, 2006; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 
2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). In the United States, counterterrorism policy has 
focused on the threat from international terrorists even though most of the terrorist 
activity within and against the United States has been perpetrated by domestic terrorists 
(Hewitt, 2003; LaFree, 2011; Silva et al., 2019). Furthermore, by its nature, 
counterterrorism policy and approaches are costly (Brzoska, 2016; R.A. Clarke, 2004; 
Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Danzell & Zidek, 2013; Enders & Sandler, 
2012; McGuire, 2013; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Nash, 2017; Pokalova, 2015; 
Qvortrup, 2016; Ronczkowski, 2018). As such, it follows that there would be evaluation 
of such policies to ensure that the money invested is justified; yet, such evaluation has not 
been written into U.S. counterterrorism policy. Individual agencies that are part of the 
counterterrorism effort may evaluate their own agency’s effectiveness regarding the role 
they play in counterterrorism efforts, but those evaluations are only part of the larger 
issue of whether counterterrorism policy is effective.  
Attempts at evaluating counterterrorism policy have produced mixed results. 
Variation in approaches, type of data used, conceptualization and operationalization of 
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terms, and levels of analyses have complicated the creation of a standardized method of 
evaluating counterterrorism policy (Brzoska, 2016; Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & 
LaFree, 2017; Danzell & Zidek, 2013; De Lint & Kassa, 2015; Dietrich, 2014; Dugan, 
2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Enders et al., 2011; Freese, 2014; 
LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Lindahl, 2017; Lum, Kennedy, 
& Sherley, 2006, 2008; McQuire, 2013; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Pokalova, 2015; 
Qvortrup, 2016; Safer-Lichtenstein, LaFree, & Loughran, 2017; Sandler, 2014; Schwinn, 
2016; Shor, 2016; Van Dongen, 2011; Williams, 2018). With such variability in past 
attempts at evaluating counterterrorism policy, there is a need for a systematic, evidence-
based, empirical method to evaluate counterterrorism policy. 
With increased technological capabilities, more data on terrorist activity are 
available presently than ever before. Some of these databases are open access, while 
others remain classified. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) has several databases available regarding the issues of 
conflict, extremism, and terrorism. The GTD is a database of all non-State terrorist events 
that have occurred around the world from 1970 to 2017 (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 
2007). The database is updated annually and is organized such that researchers can use it 
in empirical analyses of terrorism.  
Researchers have primarily used the GTD to compare terrorism across nations or 
examine terrorism within a single nation. The GTD can be used to evaluate domestic 
terrorism within the United States, and Berkebile (2017) has offered a model by which 
the data from the GTD may be filtered so that only domestic terrorist events are included. 
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The GTD has been used in temporal analyses of terrorism (Hsu, Vasquez, & McDowell, 
2018; LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009) as well as in case study analysis of terrorism 
(DeLeeuw & Pridemore, 2018). In addition, researchers have proposed the series hazard 
model as a method of evaluating the impact of interventions on temporal changes in 
terrorism (Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Dugan & Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & 
Korte, 2009). Specifically, LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) used the GTD to examine 
the effect of specific British counterterrorism interventions on terrorism in Northern 
Ireland. I applied this model to the United States in this study. 
With the costs of counterterrorism policies, the balance of national security versus 
civil liberties, and the ongoing threat of terrorism, it would be useful for policy makers to 
have an empirical method of evaluating existing counterterrorism policy. By providing 
evidence upon which counterterrorism policy can be developed and evaluated, this study 
fills the gap in the literature regarding evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy with 
regards to the greater threat, domestic terrorism. The purpose of this study was to 
examine U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21
st
 century, focusing only on those policies 
that have elements that may impact domestic terrorist activities and examining what, if 
any, impact those policies have had on domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs.  
Statement of the Problem 
The GTD has logged non-State terrorism incidents from 1970 to 2017 and 
provides researchers the opportunity to quantitatively analyze terrorism by a range of 
variables (Berkebile, 2017; LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], 2018b). Although 
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researchers have used data from the GTD to evaluate counterterrorism policy in other 
countries (Berkbile, 2012, 2017; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009) and have been applied 
to assessing international terrorist threats to the United States (Hsu et al., 2018; LaFree, 
Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009), the problem is that the GTD has not been used to examine the 
impact that U.S. counterterrorism policies have had on domestic terrorism in general.  
Governments face difficulties in effectively preventing and responding to terrorist 
attacks. In the United States, terrorism had been treated like other crimes, with no special 
status or prosecution until 1990 when international terrorism was added to the United 
States Code (Antiterrorist Act, 1990; Federal Courts Administration Act [FCAA], 1992; 
Hewitt, 2003; Naftali, 2005; Terrorism, 2011). Since then, counterterrorism policy has 
focused on the threat of international terrorism including State-sponsored terrorism and 
foreign terrorist organizations attacking the United States and its interests at home and 
abroad (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [AEDPA], 1996; Antiterrorist 
Act, 1990; Hewitt, 2003; Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, 
2007; Naftali, 2005; Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act, 1986; Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism [USA PATRIOT] Act, 2001; Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline over Monitoring [USA FREEDOM] 
Act, 2015). It was not until 2001 that domestic terrorism was given special status for 
investigation (Naftali, 2005; Terrorism, 2011; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). Even though 
the focus of much of the U.S. counterterrorism policy has been on international terrorism, 
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elements of the policies passed following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks may 
affect domestic terrorism.  
Previous researchers have attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. 
counterterrorism policies but have not universally employed evidence-based evaluation 
using empirical data even though there have been suggestions that such analyses are the 
future of terrorism and counterterrorism analyses (Brzoska, 2016; Crenshaw & LaFree, 
2017; de Lint & Kassa, 2015; Freese, 2014; Lum et al., 2006, 2008; Sandler, 2014; Van 
Dongen, 2011). Because of the diversity of approaches to evaluating counterterrorism 
policy, the results of such evaluations have been mixed. The gap in the literature is that 
changes in domestic terrorism have not been evaluated in relation to the implementation 
of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21
st
 century. This research fills this important gap 
in the literature and via my use of empirical data to examine the impact of 21
st
 century 
U.S. counterterrorism policies on domestic terrorism. Policy makers may use the results 
from this study to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism policy and offer 
empirical support for or against the continuance of existing policies or for development 
of new policies. The social change implications of this study involve providing 
policymakers with an empirical, evidence-based evaluation and enhancing safety within 
the United States by identifying effective policies that reduce the threat of domestic 
terrorism. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to describe the impact of 21
st
 century 
U.S. counterterrorism policy on incidence, lethality, and cost of domestic terrorism. The 
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independent variable was counterterrorism policy. Counterterrorism policy was 
operationalized as U.S. legislation or policy aimed at preventing, reducing, countering, or 
responding to acts of terrorism, domestic or international. The dependent variables were 
incidence of domestic terrorism as measured by number of domestic terrorist incidents, 
lethality of domestic terrorism as measured by whether there were casualties, fatalities, 
and hostages taken during domestic terrorist incidents, and the costs of domestic 
terrorism as measured by the amount of property damage incurred, ransom paid, and 
monies budgeted and spent by the U.S. government for counterterrorism policy. I 
operationalized domestic terrorism in the United States as premeditated, intentional acts 
or threats of acts of violence intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian 
population and/or the government to achieve some political, religious, economic, 
ideological, and/or social objective(s) and perpetrated by a U.S. citizen or resident. A key 
element of the operational definition of US domestic terrorism is the use of terror and 
fear as a strategy of coercion. I analyzed U.S. domestic terrorism data from the GTD 
using descriptive statistics and the series hazard model to describe the risk of domestic 
terrorist activity (incidence, lethality, costs) following the implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. All data were analyzed using SPSS software. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This study addressed six central research questions (RQs). For each research 
question, there are five sub questions (SQs), one for each specific U.S. counterterrorism 
policy that I evaluated. The null and alternative hypotheses for each RQ and SQ are 
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included below. The first three RQs were answered using descriptive statistics. The last 
three RQs were answered using the series hazard model. 
RQ1: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
H01: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H11: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. 
SQ1A: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H01A: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H11A: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ1B: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005? 
H01B: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
H11B: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
SQ1C: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
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H01C: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the AETA of 2006. 
H11C: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
AETA of 2006. 
SQ1D: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007? 
H01D: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
H11D: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
SQ1E: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H01E: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H11E: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
RQ2: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following the implementation of 
U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
H02: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. 
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H12: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. 
SQ2A: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H02A: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of 
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H12A: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ2B: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005? 
H02B: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
H12B: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
SQ2C: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the AETA of 2006? 
H02C: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the 
AETA of 2006. 
H12C: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the AETA 
of 2006. 
SQ2D: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007? 
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H02D: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of 
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
H12D: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
SQ2E: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H02E: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the 
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H12E: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA 
FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
RQ3: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
H03: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H13: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
SQ3A: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H03A: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H13A: domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
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SQ3B: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005? 
H03B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
H13B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005. 
SQ3C: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
H03C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
H13C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
SQ3D: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007? 
H03D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007. 
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H13D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007. 
SQ3E: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H03E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H13E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
RQ4: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
H04: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H14: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
SQ4A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H04A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H14A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
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SQ4B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005? 
H04B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005. 
H14B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
SQ4C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
H04C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
H14C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the AETA of 2006. 
SQ4D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007? 
H04D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007. 
H14D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
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SQ4E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H04E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H14E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
RQ5: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of US counterterrorism policy? 
H05: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event increases following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H15: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event decreases following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
SQ5A: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H05A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H15A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ5B: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005? 
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H05B: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005. 
H15B: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005. 
SQ5C: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
H05C: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
H15C: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
SQ5D: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007? 
H05D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007. 
H15D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007. 
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SQ5E: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H05E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H15E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
RQ6: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy? 
H06: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H16: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
SQ6A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H06A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H16A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ6B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005? 
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H06B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
H16B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
SQ6C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
H06C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
H16C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
SQ6D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007? 
H06D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
H16D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007. 
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SQ6E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H06E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H16E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
Theoretical Frameworks of the Study 
 For this study’s theoretical frameworks, I employed the MSF from the field of 
public policy and the power elite theory from conflict theory within sociology. The MSF 
involves the convergence of three streams (problem, policy, and political) at a particular 
period of time (policy window) that influence the development and implementation of 
policy (Birkland, 1997, 2004, 2006, 2009; Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlnhofer, 2018; 
Kingdon, 2011; Zahariadis, 2007, 2014, 2015; Zohlnofer, Herweg, & Hub, 2016; 
Zohlnhofer et al., 2015). Conflict theorist C.W. Mills (1956) introduced his analysis of 
how power operates at the national level in the United States and described the United 
States as being under control of the power elite, which is comprised of the corporate elite, 
the military elite, and the political elite. Domhoff (1970, 1990) extended Mills’ power 
elite in terms of policy development and implementation in the United States, suggesting 
that U.S. policy is influenced by factors outside of national interest, specifically factors 
motivated by politics. Both of these theories were useful in examining how U.S. 
counterterrorism policy is developed and adapted and why there has been an emphasis on 
international terrorist threats rather than the most urgent of threats, domestic terrorists.   
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Nature of the Study 
I used a quantitative approach in this longitudinal trend study involving secondary 
data analysis. I compiled a chronology of U.S. counterterrorism policy to use when 
analyzing incidence, lethality, and costs of U.S. domestic terrorist incidents from the 
GTD from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 (START, 2018a). The U.S. 
counterterrorism policies included were those that have provisions that may impact 
domestic terrorism either specifically or as an extension of provisions aimed at curbing 
international terrorism. These policies listed in chronological order are: the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005, the AETA of 2006, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007, and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
My research methodology included a quantitative analysis of existing terrorism 
data from the GTD in combination with a chronology of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
The examined trend data were incidence, lethality, and cost of domestic terrorism in the 
United States from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017. To establish a baseline of 
domestic terrorism prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, and because 
data from 1993 are incomplete in the GTD, I used domestic terrorism data from January 
1, 1994 to October 25, 2001 (START, 2018b). Using SPSS software, I organized and 
analyzed the GTD data in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy by using descriptive 
statistics and the series hazard model. 
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Definitions 
The independent variables of this study were the following U.S. counterterrorism 
policies: the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (enacted October 26, 2001), the USA 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (enacted March 9, 2006), the 
AETA of 2006 (enacted November 27, 2006), Implementing Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (enacted August 3, 2007), and the USA FREEDOM Act of 
2015 (enacted June 2, 2015). The dependent variables were the following indicators of 
domestic terrorism: incidence, lethality, and costs.  
Definitions of terrorism vary based on the individual or organization defining it 
(Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 
2016; Ronczkowski, 2018; Rummel, 1994; Sandler, 2014; Silke, 2019).  
Terrorism is operationally defined as the premeditated, intentional use of or threat 
of use of fear, terror, and/or violence in order to coerce or influence an audience beyond 
the immediate victims towards a political, economic, religious, and/or social objective 
(Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 
2016; Ronczkowski, 2018; Rummel, 1994; Sandler, 2014; Terrorism, 2011).  
Domestic terrorism is operationally defined as premeditated, intentional acts or 
threats of acts of violence intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian 
population and/or the government to achieve some political, religious, economic, 
ideological, and/or social objective(s) and perpetrated by a citizen or resident of the 
country within which the acts or threats are aimed. For U.S. domestic terrorism, the 
perpetrators must be U.S. citizens or residents, and the attacks must be planned or 
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executed within the territorial boundaries of the United States (Berkebile, 2017; 
Bjelopera, 2017; Carpenter, 2018; Crenshaw, 1995, [2009] 2012; Crenshaw & LaFree, 
2017; Enders et al., 2011; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; 
Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Norris, 2017; Ronczkowski, 
2018; Sandler, 2014). 
To measure U.S. domestic terrorism, I evaluated three indicators in relation to the 
independent variables. These indicators are (a) incidence of domestic terrorism; (b) 
lethality of domestic terrorism as measured by whether there were casualties, fatalities, 
and hostages taken during domestic terrorist incidents; and (c) the costs of domestic 
terrorism as measured by whether property damage occurred, the amount of property 
damage incurred if available, ransom paid if applicable, and monies budgeted and spent 
by the U.S. government for counterterrorism policy (Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Bjelopera, 
2017; Brzoska, 2016; Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Danzell & Zidek, 
2013; De Lint & Kassa, 2015; Dietrich, 2014; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Enders & 
Sandler, 2012; Enders et al., 2011; Freese, 2014; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree 
& Freilich, 2019; Lindahl, 2017; Lum et al., 2006, 2008; McQuire, 2013; J. Mueller & 
Stewart, 2014; Pokalova, 2015; Qvortrup, 2016; Safer-Lichtenstein et al., 2017; Sandler, 
2014; Schwinn, 2016; Shor, 2016; Van Dongen, 2011; Williams, 2018).  
The GTD ranks property damage from a terrorist attack across four categories: 
catastrophic (likely equal to or greater than $1 billion), major (likely equal to or greater 
than $1 million but less than $1 billion), minor (likely less than $1 million), and unknown 
(START, 2018b). If there were kidnapping and/or hostage-taking incidents that included 
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the payment of ransom, I analyzed those expenditures. For ransom data, the GTD 
provides the confirmed amount paid, if known (START, 2018b).   
Prior researchers who have examined lethality have focused on measuring 
lethality only as the number of fatalities; however, casualties (injuries) and hostage-
taking should also be considered when determining lethality (Asal et al., 2015; Asal & 
Rethemeyer, 2008; Carson & Suppenbach, 2018; Caspi, Freilich, & Chermak, 2012; 
Edwards et al., 2016; Enders & Sandler, 2000; Nilsson, 2018; Olzak, 2016; Palfy, 2003; 
Phillips, 2017; Sheehan, 2009; Simon & Benjamin, 2000; Wilson & Lemanski, 2013). 
The choice to plan and take hostages increases the probability of someone being killed or 
injured; thus, I coded hostage incidents as lethal. Hsu et al. (2018) specifically noted the 
importance of utilizing data on injuries and fatalities for future research. Therefore I 
examined fatalities, casualties, and hostages taken to determine lethality. 
Assumptions 
My first assumption was that the selected U.S. counterterrorism policies have 
impacted U.S. domestic terrorist activities without accounting for other factors such as 
internal dynamics within the terrorist organization, changes in law enforcement practices 
and policies, availability of materials to execute an attack, and societal changes that 
addressed the motivating factors of the domestic terrorists. For example, increases in 
recycling, use of renewable energy sources, development and use of more fuel-efficient 
vehicles, availability of vegan options at restaurants and in stores may have addressed 
some of the motivating factors of some of the domestic eco-terrorists. Prior researchers 
have approached the study of terrorism by utilizing a subset of indicators of terrorist 
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activity in relation to governmental intervention, either through policy or military use 
(Avdan & Uzonyi, 2017; Barros, 2003; Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Carson, 2014; Carson et 
al., 2012; DeLeeuw & Pridemore, 2018; De Lint & Kassa, 2015; Despande & Ernst, 
2012; Dietrich, 2014; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Enders 
et al., 2011; Freese, 2014; Hewitt, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Hsu et al., 2018; Klein et al., 
2017; LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree, 
Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009; Lum et al., 2006, 2008; Martin, 2018; McConnell, 2010; 
Nacos, 2016; Nash, 2017; Quinn, 2016; Reed, 2013; Ronczkowski, 2018; Safer-
Lichtenstein et al., 2017; Sandler, 2014; Shor, 2016; Van Dongen, 2011; Williams, 
2018).  
I made two assumptions regarding use of the GTD. The first was that the GTD 
contains all U.S. domestic terrorist incidents within the time frame of interest for this 
study (1994-2017). The second was that the information about these U.S. domestic 
terrorist incidents are updated with the most recent and accurate information. The 
START researchers provide transparency in the GTD codebook so that other researchers 
have confidence in the accuracy of the GTD data as well as a clear understanding of how 
the variables provided were identified and coded (START, 2018a, 2018b). Furthermore, 
the GTD has been used in a range of studies examining terrorism either alone or in 
combination with supplementary data (Avdan & Uzonyi, 2017; Berkebile, 2012, 2017; 
Carson, 2014; Carson et al., 2012; DeLeeuw & Pridemore, 2018; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et 
al., 2005; Hsu et al., 2018; LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007;  LaFree, Dugan, & 
28 
 
Korte, 2009; LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009; Safer-Lichtenstein et al., 2017; Sandler, 
2014). 
Scope and Delimitations 
In this study, I examined the entire population of U.S. domestic terrorist incidents 
identified in the GTD from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017. Using the same model 
and analysis used by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) to analyze terrorism in Northern 
Ireland in relation to British government intervention, I used the series hazard model to 
examine the impact that five U.S. counterterrorism policies have had on domestic 
terrorism. Berkebile (2017) identified the specific method by which the GTD could be 
filtered to only include domestic terrorist events. The availability of the GTD, its use by 
other scholars investigating terrorism, and the transparency with which the database 
authors communicate their methods were the factors that influenced my decision to use 
the GTD as the primary data source for this study. The U.S. counterterrorism policies that 
I selected were a purposive sample of policies that included elements that may impact 
domestic terrorist activity and those that received media attention. Therefore, applying an 
established statistical analysis and model for evaluating governmental intervention on 
terrorist activity to the United States was a logical next step in examining U.S. domestic 
terrorism.  
There has been a recent trend in researchers’ attempts to apply criminological 
theory to terrorism; however terrorism is very different from traditional crime. Terrorism 
is a strategy for change and thus the factors that motivate terrorists are different than 
those that motivate most criminals. While there are some criminological theories that 
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may be appropriate or applicable to terrorism, such as deterrence and rational choice 
theory, my focus in this study was on the disconnect between the focus of 
counterterrorism policy and the problem of domestic terrorism (see Decker, 2015; 
Loughran, Paternoster, & Weiss, 2015; Ruggiero, 2006). Therefore, I did not use 
criminological theories in this study. The study of terrorism is an interdisciplinary 
endeavor which allows for a large array of theories to be used in its analysis. Because I 
focused on counterterrorism policy in the United States, Kingdon’s (2011) MSF was an 
appropriate theoretical framework to employ to address the varying factors that lead to 
counterterrorism policy development. To address the weaknesses in the MSF for 
addressing the paradox of U.S. counterterrorism policy and because of my emphasis on 
social factors leading to terrorism, I employed the power elite theory from sociology’s 
conflict theory. For the scope of this study, these two theoretical perspectives were the 
best options for explaining the results. 
For the statistical analyses of the data, time-series analyses and the use of 
estimators of data have dominated this area of study; however, these analyses have 
internal validity concerns (Dugan, 2011). In contrast, the series hazard model, which is 
intuitively more appropriate to examine changes in risk based on specific policy 
implementations while accounting for the passage of time, has only more recently been 
used to examine the impact of policy on terrorism (Carson, 2014; Dugan et al., 2005; 
Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). Because policy 
evaluation is an event, the series hazard model may be a more accurate statistical 
approach to other time series analyses (Dugan, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). 
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Limitations 
There were several limitations to this study. The GTD does not list perpetrator 
nationality in its public dataset, which required me to engage in supplementary research 
on specific terrorist events to attempt to determine if they qualified as domestic terrorism. 
The GTD does have codes to identify if an event was ideologically international, 
logistically international, miscellaneous international, and any international (START, 
2018b). However, these codes do not allow for clear understanding of what may be 
considered domestic terrorism or not. For example, Puerto Rican separatist groups are 
coded as not logistically international but ideologically international, which further leads 
them to be listed as international under the miscellaneous and any categories (START, 
2018a). However, Puerto Rican separatist groups are comprised of U.S. citizens engaging 
in terrorism against its ruling government, thus it would fit the definition of domestic 
terrorism. In addition, radical environmental and radical animal rights terrorists (i.e., eco-
terrorists) are listed as ideologically international and although technically they are, most 
do not execute attacks outside of their native country or country of residence. To address 
this limitation, for terrorist incidents that occurred in the United States but did not have 
perpetrator information associated with it in the GTD, I reviewed the sources listed by the 
GTD as well as additional open source data to attempt to uncover more detail as to the 
perpetrator nationality. Terrorist attacks with unknown perpetrator nationality were 
labeled as unknown and analyzed separately. 
In addition, there are limitations to using a database built on open-source data. 
Media reports tend to occur in real time with limited and sometimes inaccurate 
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information provided in initial reporting (Dugan & Distler, 2017). Therefore, there is risk 
that some of the events may include inaccurate or incomplete information. In addition, 
because media studies have shown that consumers are disproportionately interested in 
violent or sensational events, there may be selection bias in terms of which stories media 
outlets report and publish online or in print (Chermak, Freilich, Parkin, & Lynch, 2012; 
Dugan & Distler, 2017). However, it is precisely for those reasons that many terrorists 
seek to gain the attention of the media and use it to spread their message to the larger 
audience (Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). 
While there is variation in approaches to evaluating counterterrorism policy, 
policy makers would find an evidence-based approach that involves empirical data to be 
more useful compared to strictly theoretical assertions or the limited generalizability of 
qualitative research. While qualitative research would uncover a more in-depth analysis 
of each event, because of the longitudinal nature of this study, I preferred a quantitative 
analysis. By using the methods and models employed by other researchers who have used 
the GTD, I sought to contribute to the growing literature using the GTD for policy 
analysis via the series hazard model. In addition, because I used public and open-source 
data, policymakers who may not be affiliated with institutions that allow access to 
classified or otherwise proprietary information will have an easier time accessing the 
information that this study was founded on. 
There is the possibility that I was biased in how I selected the specific U.S. 
counterterrorism policies included in this study. I examined all policies related to 
counterterrorism for the time frame of interest and included only those that contained 
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elements that may impact domestic terrorist activities. It is possible that my interpretation 
of what elements may impact domestic terrorist activities may have been too narrow or 
too broad. In addition, because many pieces of legislation pass and frequently contain 
provisions and elements unrelated to the main focus of the legislation, the new laws may 
not be well-known to the general public and to terrorists. To correct for this limitation, I 
focused on high-profile U.S. counterterrorism policies and examined any challenges to 
those policies to identify areas of concern that may overlap with citizens’ rights and thus 
would garner greater media attention. This way the media attention that the specific U.S. 
counterterrorism policy generated would mean that the probability that domestic terrorists 
have heard of the policy and its provisions are higher than if a counterterrorism provision 
was added on to a piece of legislation unrelated to counterterrorism.  
While this was a quantitative study, my choice to use the methods and models of 
researchers associated with START and the GTD as well as those who have also used the 
GTD as a data source may have some bias in terms of approach. While reviewing the 
literature regarding evaluating counterterrorism policy, I found that there were distinct 
groups of researchers who were entrenched in their approach while dismissing 
alternatives. While I did not find any similar acrimonious writings with regards to the 
GTD or the series hazard model, it is possible that a similar dynamic may exist with 
regards to utilizing empirical data to study terrorism. 
Significance of the Study 
This research fills an important gap in the literature by linking empirical data on 
domestic terrorism to U.S. counterterrorism policy. The results may be used in support of 
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or in development of more effective counterterrorism policies by evaluating the 
effectiveness of 21
st
 century counterterrorism policy in the United States with regards to 
domestic terrorism, thereby contributing to positive social change. Furthermore, the 
model I employed in this study offers a non-partisan, non-political, evidence-based 
method of quantifying the terrorist threat.  
Domestic terrorism remains an imminent threat to U.S. citizens’ and residents’ 
daily lives, one that is not restricted to region, age, or socioeconomic status. Hewitt 
(2003) observed that in the immediate response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, 
terrorism was viewed by many Americans as something new and unexperienced, yet the 
United States had experienced at least 3,000 terrorist incidents between 1954 and 2000. 
The majority of these incidents were perpetrated by U.S. citizens and not foreign terrorist 
organizations (Hewitt, 2003; LaFree, 2011; Silva et al., 2019). Building off of LaFree’s 
(2011) examination of myths about terrorism globally by using data from the GTD, Silva, 
Duran, Freililch, and Chermak (2019) examined empirical data to evaluate the veracity of 
six beliefs found in popular discourse in the United States (specifically, beliefs that 
terrorism incidents are increasing, terrorism incidents are becoming more lethal, terrorism 
attacks are perpetrated by international terrorists, these international terrorists are 
jihadist-inspired extremists, these terrorists are of Arab descent, and these terrorists are 
operating in organized groups). Silva et al. found that rather than supporting the popular 
discourse, according to empirical data analyzed from 1995 to 2017, terrorist attacks in the 
United States are decreasing in incidence and are decreasing in lethality. In addition, the 
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terrorists tend to be White, far-right extremists who are not members of an organized 
group, but rather lone wolves (Silva et al., 2019).  
These results, in combination with data from the GTD, show the continuing 
higher incidence of domestic terrorism, yet the focus of counterterrorism policy and 
strategy remains on international threats (START, 2018a). The gap in the literature is that 
changes in domestic terrorism have not been evaluated in relation to the implementation 
of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21
st
 century, specifically in terms of incidence, 
lethality, and costs of domestic terrorism. Therefore, there was a need to examine 
domestic terrorism in the United States in relation to existing counterterrorism policy in 
order to identify policy areas that may be useful in decreasing incidence, lethality, and 
costs of domestic terrorism. 
Identifying effective policies aimed at reducing the threat of domestic terrorism 
would be an important step towards positive social change by enhancing safety within the 
United States. Evaluating the impact of existing counterterrorism policy on domestic 
terrorism may inform future counterterrorism policy aimed at domestic terrorism. A 
unified model that can be employed by policy makers and counterterrorism agencies in 
identifying and measuring the terrorist threat will better guide counterterrorism 
approaches. Domestic terrorism is an imminent threat in the United States, and research 
aimed at providing empirical evidence of the effectiveness of policies that may decrease 
that threat inherently contribute to positive social change. 
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Summary 
Terrorism is a longstanding global problem. In the United States, the primary 
threat comes from domestic terrorists, but U.S. counterterrorism policy has focused on 
the rarer threat of international terrorism. Even though this paradox exists, U.S. 
counterterrorism provisions continue to be developed and renewed without any specific 
empirical data to support their effectiveness. This study fills the gap in the literature in 
terms of using empirical data from the GTD to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism policy in 
the 21
st
 century. I used two theoretical approaches in this study: the MSF from public 
policy and the power elite theory as part of conflict theory from sociology. I filtered and 
analyzed the GTD data by using established measures (Berkebile, 2017; LaFree, Dugan, 
& Korte, 2009). I used descriptive statistics and visual analysis to describe domestic 
terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy. I used 
the series hazard model to analyze the risk of domestic terrorism following the 
implementation of five U.S. counterterrorism policies. Chapter 2 will provide a review of 
the literature I used to (a) understand the MSF and the power elite theory, (b) clarify and 
conceptualize domestic terrorism, (c) develop an overview of US counterterrorism policy 
and approaches to evaluating counterterrorism policy, and (d) justify the methods I used 
for this study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 Terrorism is a ubiquitous problem that has existed since antiquity (Hoffman, 
2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). The focus of much of the U.S. counterterrorism policy 
has been on international terrorism; however, elements of the policies passed following 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks may have affected domestic terrorism. LaFree 
and Freilich (2019) noted that scholarly examinations of the link between extremism 
(including terrorism) and government policy have been increasing recently. However, 
most of these studies have focused on international terror threats or extremism and 
terrorism in countries outside of the United States (LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Shor, 2016). 
The gap in the literature is that changes in domestic terrorism have not been evaluated in 
relation to the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21
st
 century. The 
purpose of this study was to examine and describe domestic terrorism in relation to U.S. 
counterterrorism policy in the 21
st
 century. In this research, I worked to fill an important 
gap in the literature by using empirical data to examine the impact that 21
st
 century U.S. 
counterterrorism policies have had on domestic terrorism. 
Researchers have used many theories to understand the policy process in the 
United States; however, in the case of counterterrorism policy, the MSF is the most 
appropriate. To complement the MSF and the aspects that it fails to account for, I also 
used C.W. Mills’ power elite theory from sociology’s conflict theory. These theoretical 
frameworks complement each other in their applicability to the evolution and 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
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 Chapter 2 covers my analysis and synthesis of empirical research on the MSF and 
power elite theory with regards to how they apply to U.S. policy regarding domestic 
counterterrorism. The first section contains the foundation, evolution, and application of 
the MSF and the power elite theory. The first section concludes with a review of the 
literature examining the MSF and the power elite theory independently in relation to U.S. 
policy process and counterterrorism policy specifically. In the second section, I describe 
the problem of domestic terrorism, the controversy regarding how it is defined, and past 
research approaches to describing this phenomenon. The third section contains 
information about the GTD regarding its development and usage. Included in the third 
section is my rationale for its use in this quantitative study. The fourth section covers the 
evolution of U.S. counterterrorism policy with regards to elements relevant to countering 
domestic terrorism. The fifth section provides a review of the literature examining 
approaches to measuring effectiveness of counterterrorism policy as well as the 
implications of each policy’s mandates. The final section covers the quantitative analysis 
practices I used for this study. 
Strategy for Searching the Literature 
 I reviewed primary sources including books, scholarly, peer-reviewed journal 
articles, federal government websites, federal government publications, legislation, and 
authoritative websites and reports. Federal government publications and legislation were 
accessed from federal government websites, the U.S. Government Publishing Office’s 
govinfo.gov service, and the Digital National Security Archive and HeinOnline research 
databases. Using the Walden University library, I accessed articles from Google Scholar 
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and the following research databases: Academic Search Complete, Business Source 
Complete, Communication and Mass Media Complete, Criminal Justice Database, 
GreenFILE, Homeland Security Digital Library, International Security and Counter 
Terrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, Political Science 
Complete, Project Muse, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Global, PsycARTICLES, 
PsycINFO, Public Administration Abstracts, SAGE Journals, SAGE Stats, SocINDEX 
with Full Text, and Taylor and Francis Online.  
 Database searches involved use of the following key terms and phrases, in 
isolation and in combination: 9/11 commission, antigovernment, antiterrorism, 
antiterrorism laws, antiterrorism policy, conflict, counterterrorism, counterterrorism 
budget, counterterrorism evaluation,  counterterrorism laws, counterterrorism policy, 
counterterrorism spending, department of homeland security budget, department of 
justice budget, domestic extremism, domestic terrorism, extremism, global terrorism 
database, hate, homegrown terrorism, homeland security, national security, policy 
evaluation, political violence, security, terrorism, terrorism data, United States, USA 
PATRIOT, and USA FREEDOM. Variations of terms (e.g., terror, terrorism, terrorist) 
were used to ensure comprehensiveness and exhaustion of search results. I reviewed 
sources cited in relevant articles to ensure comprehensiveness of this literature review. I 
established key word alerts through Walden University library to ensure notification of 
newly published and newly accessed materials that may have been relevant to this study. 
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Theoretical Frameworks 
In this study, I incorporated two theoretical frameworks, the MSF from the field 
of public policy, and the power elite theory from conflict theory from the field of 
sociology. 
Multiple Streams Framework 
The MSF was developed as a framework for better understanding the policy 
process—specifically, agenda setting. Kingdon (2011) introduced the MSF in 1984 and 
since then, researchers have applied it to all areas of the policy process beyond agenda 
setting (Zohlnhofer et al., 2015). Policy formation, from the identification of an issue in 
need of addressing to the research into various options in addressing that issue to the final 
development and implementation of policy, does not follow one path as it may appear to. 
Social problems change in terms of awareness, scope, and priority and are often 
intertwined with other social problems. Because many social problems are addressed 
through the formation and implementation of public policy, it follows that the policy 
process would manifest in a way that reflects the complexity of the social problem it 
addresses and the complexity of contemporary society within which it is seated.  
The MSF offers one approach to creating a model to explain the policy process 
while remaining flexible enough to address a range of policies across a range of 
sociohistorical contexts. Additionally, it is robust enough to be applied to a range of 
systems (Beland & Howlett, 2016; Birkland, 1997, 2004, 2009, 2006; Howlett, 
McConnell, & Perl, 2016; Herweg, Hub, & Zohlnhofer, 2015; Jones et al., 2016; 
Mukherjee & Howlett, 2015; Winkel & Leipold, 2016; Zahariadis, 2007, 2015; 
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Zohlnhofer et al., 2015). At its core, the MSF approach describes the policy process as 
being informed by three, autonomous streams that converge at a critical time period to 
influence the creation of public policy (Kingdon, 2011). According to Kingdon (2011), 
the problem, policy, and political streams follow independent developmental trajectories 
but do converge at critical junctures. It is out of that convergence of streams that grow the 
largest policy changes (Kingdon, 2011). In the following subsections, I discuss the 
various elements of the MSF that I applied to the issue of counterterrorism policy in the 
United States. 
Problem stream. Complex societies face numerous obstacles and social problems 
that hinder a stable, peaceful equilibrium. Whether a particular problem gains enough 
attention to warrant the formation of policy to address it depends upon numerous factors 
including who is affected, how they are affected, and how this social problem impacts 
other social institutions. While many social problems may be addressed due to regular 
monitoring of indicators involving budgetary expenses, deaths, and so on, there are times 
that a single event or string of events push a particular social problem to the forefront 
(Kingdon, 2011). Focusing events are events, crises, disasters, and other incidents that 
create pressure on policy makers to act and, depending upon the severity of the focusing 
event, to act swiftly (Birkland, 1996, 2006; Kingdon, 2011). Focusing events may bring 
attention to an existing social problem (the problem stream), providing an opportunity for 
policy to be developed and implemented. Figure 1 shows how the three autonomous 
streams converge to form policy. 
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Figure 1. Multiple streams framework. 
Policy stream. The policy stream is the idea stream where potential solutions to 
social problems and policy issues are explored. At the heart of the policy stream are 
policy communities. Policy communities are composed of specialists for a particular 
policy issue or social problem. These specialists may be academics, researchers, 
consultants, analysts, political staffers, think tanks, and others whose primary concern or 
focus is on one specific policy issue or social problem (Kingdon, 2011). The diverse 
make-up and motivation of the individual members of the policy community allow for a 
variety of perspectives and an exchange of ideas and analyses regarding the specific 
policy issue or social problem.  
 Policy communities may be close-knit social groups or fragmented social 
aggregates. When greater fragmentation exists within the policy community, different 
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groups of specialists will operate without the knowledge of what other specialists in the 
same policy community are doing. When policy communities are close-knit, there runs 
the risk of groupthink that may hinder alternative perspectives. Depending upon the 
status of the specialist, different specialists’ ideas will gain more attention than others 
(Kingdon, 2011).  
 The product of the policy stream is a policy proposal or a short list of policy 
proposals. There are a range of factors that can impact the policy stream from policy 
community size, cohesiveness, prevailing paradigms and ideologies, power, status, and 
available technologies. Consensus for the policy stream is developed through persuasion 
and diffusion (Kingdon, 2011).    
Political stream. The political stream is composed of “public mood, pressure 
group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and 
changes in administration” (Kingdon, 2011, p.145). With new administrations come new 
agendas and the tabling or abandonment of prior agendas. The political stream is heavily 
influenced by the agendas of political parties. The public mood involves how the public 
demonstrates their agenda priorities, either through social movements, public opinion 
polls, or direct contact with the media and politicians. According to Kingdon (2011), the 
ways that the national mood is measured come from communication between elected 
representatives and their constituents and from the rhetoric from politicians. Public trust 
in the accuracy of politicians’ portrayals and interpretations of the national mood comes 
from the understanding that the politicians’ jobs depend upon how satisfied their 
constituents are. This electoral accountability, however, does not work in areas where 
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there are no term limits, where gerrymandering is used, and where politicians run 
unopposed.  
 Additional aspects of the political stream are the organized political forces of 
pressure group campaigns from interest groups, political mobilization movements, and 
how political elites behave (Kingdon, 2011). For example, heavy pressure campaigns and 
mobilization from the pharmaceutical and health care industries successfully halted 
health care reform during the Clinton administration (Kingdon, 2011).  
 For the political stream, consensus comes from bargaining (Kingdon, 2011). 
Political coalitions are built and negotiate support for various acts of legislation by 
bargaining over concessions and amendments or by bargaining for support for other acts 
of legislation. Broad-based support, depending upon the political make-up of the 
legislative branch is necessary to move agenda items forward to be enacted into law. 
Therefore a policy entrepreneur’s rank and connection to the decision-making portions of 
the political stream may impact which policy entrepreneur’s agenda is pushed forward 
(Zahariadis, 2007; Zohlnhofer et al., 2016). 
Policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs are individuals who dedicate 
resources towards the implementation of a policy when the problem stream, policy 
stream, and political stream converge. The policy entrepreneurs may not necessarily be 
members of the political system, but will have connections within the political system to 
get the policy on the agenda for consideration. Policy entrepreneurs may be members of 
the policy stream community who communicate to the general public and the government 
about the need for action on a particular problem (McGuire, 2013).  
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Policy windows. A policy window is the period in time when the three streams 
come together and create an opportunity for action on a particular policy. During a policy 
window, a particular policy becomes a priority for action; however, when the window 
opens and closes cannot be systematically predicted for all policy types. Policy windows 
tend to be of short duration and only open infrequently (Kingdon, 2011). Some policy 
windows cycle in a predictive pattern but others follow a more random path.  
Focusing events. Birkland (1996, 2006) discussed the role that focusing events 
played on the policy process, providing a more detailed analysis from when Kingdon 
introduced the MSF in 1984. Focusing events are unexpected, unpredicted phenomena 
that can influence public policy (Birkland, 1996, 2006; Kingdon, 2011). A key feature of 
a focusing event is that it is a rare occurrence. Focusing events simultaneously make a 
social problem known to the general public and the policy entrepreneurs. However, not 
all catastrophic events are necessarily focusing events. Catastrophic events, including 
major terrorist attacks, can become focusing events when there is a rapid reaction to those 
events that lead to policy development and/or policy change (Birkland, 1996, 2006). For 
example, the terrorist attack perpetrated by Al Qaeda on the USS Cole, a U.S. Navy 
Destroyer that was anchored in Yemen, was not a focusing event; while the terrorist 
attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 were considered to be focusing 
events (Birkland, 2006; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Focusing events can 
impact all of the streams in the MSF leading to the opening of a policy window, which 
allows for rapid policy development and/or change. Focusing events are an important 
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area of study because they can be easily identified as the catalysts for policy development 
and/or change. 
Assumptions of the MSF. There are three assumptions that must be articulated 
when employing the MSF to policy analysis. The first assumption involves the 
processing of information. From a micro level of analysis, information processing is 
viewed as occurring serially and with individuals only being able to process one piece of 
information at a time or attend to only one issue at a time (Zahariadis, 2007). However, 
the MSF is a macro-level theory and thus it is important to consider how labor is divided 
within a government. Because of this division of labor, rather than taking the view that 
information processing occurs serially, it can be argued that the entire system is able to 
process multiple pieces of information at the same time and attend to multiple issues 
concurrently. Therefore, when examining the time line for the streams, information 
processing should be understood as occurring in parallel (Zahariadis, 2007). 
 The second assumption of the MSF involves the time frame in which policy 
makers have to act. In many cases, policy makers operate within time constraints and 
especially in the context of crises must make decisions quickly. As such, they are not able 
to rationally select which policy areas should receive attention, rather they must act when 
a policy window opens and particularly after a focusing event (Zahariadis, 2007).  
 The final assumption of the MSF is the independence of the streams (Kingdon, 
2011; Zahariadis, 2007). While the streams converge during policy windows, their 
individual evolution and development occur independent of the other streams. The 
political stream is more subject to national mood than the policy stream, which may focus 
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solely on a particular policy, independent of national mood. For example, the policy 
stream for counterterrorism had a policy ready for when the focusing events of the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks occurred and the policy window opened. That is how 
the USA PATRIOT Act, a major piece of legislation, was able to be developed and 
passed within seven weeks (Howell, 2004; Naftali, 2005).  
Application of the MSF to U.S. public policy. Kingdon’s (2011) original 
introduction of the MSF involved the application of the framework to public policy issues 
related to health and transportation. In the most recent edition, Kingdon applied the MSF 
to the federal budget treatment from January to October of 1981, the tax reform act of 
1986, the health care initiative in 1993, and health care reform initiative during the first-
term of the Obama administration. Birkland (1996, 2006) provided a more in-depth 
analysis of focusing events in the MSF, which developed into a theory of focusing events. 
Birkland applied the theory of focusing events to policy development and change 
following disasters and other catastrophic events including natural disasters, nuclear 
power plant leaks, and national security. Ellington (2011) utilized the MSF to examine 
military policy during the George W. Bush administration in deciding to utilize private 
military contractors.  
According to Herweg, Zahariadis, and Zohlnhofer (2018), since 1984, the MSF 
had been applied not only to U.S. public policy processes, but to public policy 
development in other countries operating under different political systems outside of the 
original purview of the framework. In addition, the MSF has been applied to a wide range 
of social problems; however, the result has been an increase in disagreement on the 
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efficacy of the MSF, rather than providing case-study support for the robustness of the 
MSF (Herweg et al., 2018; Jones et al., 2016). Jones et al. (2016) performed a content 
analysis on research articles utilizing the MSF from 2000 to 2013 and found that how the 
MSF was applied across the range of countries, levels of governance, and policy areas 
was inconsistent, demonstrating that there was no established method of utilizing the 
MSF. 
Application of the MSF to terrorism and counterterrorism. The problem 
stream of terrorism has a long history in the United States and continues today. Terrorist 
attacks from Al Qaeda, other foreign terrorist organizations, and from domestic terrorists 
remain an ongoing issue (L. Clarke, 2006; Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 
2018; Nacos, 2016). Hewitt (2003) identified at least 3000 terrorist attacks between 1954 
and 2000 in the United States. Birkland (2004, 2006, 2009) applied the MSF to the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, examining the coordinated attacks as a focusing 
event and examining the policy change that immediately followed. Following the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, all three streams converged to rapidly produce and 
pass the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.  
The policy stream was active prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
(Birkland, 2004). The national security issue of terrorism was not a new problem and had 
been addressed with a variety of policy measures; however, none had been as far-
reaching as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. Until this point, policy aimed at addressing 
terrorism was restricted to foreign terrorist organizations and terrorism funding by State 
sponsors. In addition, terrorism was handled through an intelligence and law enforcement 
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approach (viz., AEDPA, 1996; Antiterrorism Act, 1990; FCAA, 1992; Federal Civil 
Defense Act, 1950; Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act [FISA], 1978; International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, Amendment to the Trading With The Enemy Act, 
1977; National Security Act, 1947; Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act, 
1986; TWEA, 1917). 
 Within the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, drafts of provisions 
that had been part of the early versions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA) were included (Naftali, 2005). In addition, had established policies 
and procedures been properly followed, it was possible that the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks could have been prevented or at least, the damage, fatalities, and 
casualties minimized (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
[NCTAUUS], 2004). Therefore, the problem and policy streams of terrorism were active 
long before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 
The political stream was active before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
but was not as visible until the policy window opened following the attacks. Long before 
these attacks, members of the political stream, namely the National Security Staff, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were 
focused on the threat from Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda (R.A. Clarke, 2004; 
Gunaratna, 2003; Naftali, 2005). Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda had officially declared 
war on the United States on August 23, 1996 and had been connected to the bombing at 
the World Trade Center in New York City on February 26, 1993, the attack on the USS 
Cole on October 12, 2000, and several embassy attacks prior to the September 11, 2001 
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terrorist attacks (R.A. Clarke, 2004; Gunaratna, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; 
Nacos, 2016; Naftali, 2005). The political stream was not only focused on the threat from 
Al Qaeda, but also concerned with the threat from domestic terrorists (R.A. Clarke, 2004; 
Levitas, 2002; Naftali, 2005). For example, R.A. Clarke (2004) specified his role in 1993 
during the development of AEDPA as an update to the Antiterrorism Act of 1990. 
According to R.A. Clarke, four policy issues dominated the development of AEDPA – (a) 
was terrorism an intelligence (CIA) issue or a law enforcement (FBI) issue; (b) what was 
the role of the National Security Council and the White House with regards to domestic 
terrorism; (c) what role the federal government would have in dealing with victims of 
terrorism; and (d) was there a connection between weapons of mass destruction and 
terrorism.  
Immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the policy window 
opened for action, all three streams converged, and the political stream focused on 
passing legislation to prevent further attacks (Birkland, 2004, 2006, 2009). The policy 
entrepreneurs who had connections to the political stream, along with public pressure to 
act in response to the attacks, forced the political stream to act quickly. Seven weeks 
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 was 
enacted into law (Birkland, 2006; Howell, 2004; Naftali, 2005; Scahill, 2006; USA 
PATRIOT Act, 2001). The MSF is a sufficient theoretical framework for describing the 
agenda setting and policy process involved in the development of and passage of the 
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.  
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Limitations of the MSF. The MSF is not without its detractors. While the MSF 
has been used to attempt to explain the policy process by incorporating all of the 
elements involved in the creation and implementation of policy, there are areas that the 
application of the MSF struggles to explain. One of the primary assumptions of the MSF 
is the autonomy of the streams, however in practice; there are policy entrepreneurs that 
may operate across the streams at the same time before the streams officially converge 
during a policy window (Herweg et al., 2018). Additionally, the majority of the 
supporting research for the MSF involved qualitative methods and attempts to apply 
quantitative methods had resulted in greater variation in how elements of the MSF were 
operationally defined (Jones et al., 2016; Winkel & Leipold, 2016). While Birkland 
(2004, 2006, 2009) utilized the MSF to explain the creation of the USA PATRIOT Act in 
the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks as a focusing event, the aptness of 
such an analysis falls apart when one examines the impact and aftermath of the USA 
PATRIOT Act and subsequent U.S. counterterrorism policies.  
 Thus as a single approach, the MSF would be insufficient to explain U.S. 
counterterrorism policy over time. In many cases, the MSF has been combined with other 
theories on public policy development; however, researchers using those combinations 
have struggled to explain why some areas of public policy were implemented when they 
did not fully meet the needs of the country (Beland & Howlett, 2016; Howlett et al., 
2016; Mukherjee & Howlett, 2015; Zohlnhofer et al., 2016). One particular key issue is 
that while members of the policy stream are aware of the increased threat of domestic 
terrorism, the members of the political stream and the policy entrepreneurs have instead 
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enacted policy aimed at preventing international terrorism, which is a much smaller 
threat. The MSF alone was insufficient to explain this paradox. It was with that in mind 
that I chose to incorporate the power elite theory from conflict theory for this current 
study.  
Conflict Theory–The Power Elite Theory 
The origins of conflict theory from sociology can be found in the writings of 
Marx and Weber, yet it gained more notoriety among the sociological community as a 
reaction to structural functionalism in the early to mid-20
th
 century (Ritzer & Stepnisky, 
2018). Within conflict theory, there are variations in approaches from theorists who 
demonstrate closer allegiance to Marxian concepts, to those embracing factors outside of 
Marx’s sole focus on economics in the production of class conflict. C.W. Mills was 
viewed as a radical sociologist within conflict theory at the time of his writings, in 
particular because of his decision to examine power relations (Domhoff, 1970). C.W. 
Mills produced several seminal works in sociology from identifying what the purpose and 
approach to sociology should be in The Sociological Imagination to his more critical 
analysis of power relations in the United States in The Power Elite. It is C.W. Mills’ 
examination of power relations in the United States that was most appropriate to apply to 
this study. 
C.W. Mills examined the distribution and use of power in the United States. 
According to C.W. Mills (1956), there is a three-level power hierarchy that operates 
within the United States. The top level of this hierarchy is called the power elite. Directly 
below the power elite is the middle level of power comprised of professional politicians, 
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pressure groups, and the upper class. The bottom level of power is occupied by the rest of 
society (C.W. Mills, 1956). The power elite is comprised of three circles of influence: the 
political elite, the economic elite, and the military elite. Figure 2 shows a graphical 
representation of the distribution of power in the United States as described by C.W. 
Mills (1956). 
 
Figure 2. The power elite. 
Political elite. The political elite are not a form of aristocracy; rather they are the 
individuals who occupy the influential political positions. These individuals can come 
from local society. While there are a disproportionate number of members of the political 
elite that have come from the upper classes; ultimately, it is the authority of the position, 
not the person that places an individual as a member of the political elite (C.W. Mills, 
1956). Because the political elite are elected as representatives of a region, the members 
of the political elite are not able to operate only in the interests of the upper class 
members of their region, rather they are held accountable to the members of all strata 
through the regular election process.  
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For the members of the political elite who are appointed into their positions, they 
are held accountable in terms of representing the interests of the constituency of those 
who elected the person who appointed them (C.W. Mills, 1956). While C.W. Mills 
(1956) predicted a decline in the professional politician, a person who seeks a range of 
political office holdings in their career; contemporary society is filled with examples of 
the professional politician. It may be that the fact that there are so many professional 
politicians, and that engaging in politics and getting elected requires funding from others, 
that there is more support for the power elite in contemporary society than not. In 
particular, there is more support for the relationship between the political and economic 
elite.  
Economic elite. The economic elite include the corporate rich who own the 
means of production. The economic elite are the wealthiest business owners in the United 
States. In some cases, the economic elite are also members of the political elite. Mizruchi 
(2017) examined the corporate or economic elite in the United States using the power 
elite theory. Mizruchi’s historical analysis demonstrated a shift in the economic elite 
from remaining only marginally invested in politics, to organizing for political action in 
response to growing globalization and competition beginning in the 1970s. However, 
Mizruchi concluded that the economic elite of today differed from the economic elite of 
C.W. Mills’ (1956) writing; namely, that the economic elite of today were more prone to 
short-sighted self-interest rather than working with the other members of the power elite 
to contribute to their interests as well.  
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Military elite. The military elite include the leaders within the military. In some 
cases, there can be overlap between elite memberships of individuals, which also 
contributes to the convergence of elites into one unified power elite. For example, the 
U.S. president is commander-in-chief and is the ultimate person in charge of the military; 
thus he would be a member of the military elite, if he had actual military experience. 
However, the U.S. president is also a politician and thus would be a member of the 
political elite regardless of prior military experience or rank. If a U.S. president was a 
wealthy business owner, he would be a member of the economic elite as well. 
Convergence into the power elite. Both C.W. Mills (1959) and Domhoff (1970, 
1990) stated that entrance into any powerful position in the United States relies on one 
having the elite habitus (Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017). This habitus secures one’s access to 
and inclusion among the power elite, and keeps the power elite as a primarily 
homogenous and endogenous group, with only a few exceptions. This is the first step in 
the convergence of the power elite.  
While Domhoff (1970) has argued that foreign policy and select social policy are 
the primary exemplars of the power elite operating in the United States, his initial 
analysis was dated and completed in a different sociohistorical context. There are other 
areas that may also serve as more recent exemplars; and thus, more accurately represent 
the policy process in the United States today. Perhaps the most obvious example of how 
the three elites have converged to form one power elite comes from the privatized 
military industry.  
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There is a billion-dollar industry in security, arms, weapons, and equipment used 
for military engagements and activities (de Rugy, 2010; Pillar & Preble, 2010; Singer, 
2008). The corporations within these industries operate on a for-profit model and provide 
needed equipment to the U.S. government for use by the military. The owners of these 
corporations are the economic elite. Because their business depends upon government 
purchasing, and the government depends upon the research, development, and supply 
from these industries; the corporation owners can attempt to influence the political elite 
by raising prices or withholding supplies to the military. The military elite are fully aware 
of the need for technologically-advanced equipment; and thus, would apply pressure on 
the political elite to purchase from specific corporations that engage in the most 
innovative and effective research and development. The military elite would also provide 
data and encouragement to the corporations to continue research and development.  
 The interdependent relations among the power elite are not limited solely to 
supplies and equipment. Because the United States has not instituted the draft since the 
major protests and backlash following the Vietnam War, the United States depends upon 
volunteers to serve in the military. As a result of the past protests and backlash from the 
Vietnam War, the political elite are against re-instituting the draft to maintain their 
political positions. As a result, there have been times that the number of military 
personnel is below what is needed to execute its mission. Instead of re-instituting the 
draft, the U.S. government has engaged in the hiring of private security contractors, often 
former military, to assist in U.S. military missions. Therefore, the military and economic 
elites overlap in members and in interests. Because of the close interdependence among 
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these elites, it is to each’s individual benefit to demonstrate that each is looking out for 
the other. This unifies the power elite despite having different primary objectives; the 
political elite to govern, the military elite to protect, and the economic elite to increase 
profit.   
In terms of how the power elite operated with regards to counterterrorism policy, 
Abrams (2006) noted that in the five years following the passage of the USA PATRIOT 
Act of 2001, all three branches of government engaged in deferral and avoidance 
regarding challenges to the law, which resulted in a break-down of the checks and 
balances that the three branches of the government were designed to provide upon the 
others. Hellmuth (2016) observed the changes in the separation of powers, and 
specifically, the use of an ongoing war (i.e., the global war on terrorism), as a way to 
continue the power imbalance in the U.S. government that has been recently described as 
operating under an imperial presidency. It was in counterterrorism and defense policy 
areas that the power elite theory was most clearly applicable. 
Critique of the power elite. There have been many attempts to refute C.W. 
Mills’ analysis of power in the United States, however, none have produced powerful 
empirical evidence to counter his analysis. The strong objection that many sociologists of 
the time had against C.W. Mills may have had more to do with the discipline’s reluctance 
to examine power relations in a similar manner to what C.W. Mills did (Domhoff, 1990). 
Thus rejection of the power elite theory may have been premature, as it had found 
support from research conducted by Marxist sociologists, who added a class dimension to 
the power elite frame (Domhoff, 1990).  
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Whitfield (2014) examined the power elite theory since C.W. Mills’ original 
publication, and did not find empirical support for the theory. Whitfield argued that the 
executive branch is accountable to the population because of the election process for the 
president, regardless of concerns about the Electoral College; and insisted that the 
president operates in the best interests of the country, not for self-interest or the interests 
of the economic or military elite. However, Whitfield failed to delve deeper into the 
decision-making process for decisions, such as going to war, beyond who made the final 
decision (i.e., Congress). Whitfield rejected the power elite theory as a model, yet 
Whitfield’s analysis was cursory, and can be characterized as buying into the illusion of 
society, rather than the reality of society (Kinloch, 2004; Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017).  
More recent evaluations of the power elite have supported the basic framework 
that C.W. Mills described, but have criticized C.W. Mills and Domhoff for not including 
biases based on gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality (see Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017). 
Therefore, it was appropriate to conduct a renewed analysis of the potential usefulness of 
C.W. Mills’ analysis of power within the framework of counterterrorism policy.  
Application of the power elite to U.S. counterterrorism policy. While the 
power elite theory may seem counterintuitive to democracy; instead, the power elite are 
able to manipulate the democratic process for their own benefit. Kinloch (2004) 
examined the role that policy plays for the power elite. Kinloch asserted that the power 
elite manipulate policy in order to serve itself and its own interests. For example, war is 
said to be necessary to ensure national security; however, waging wars has benefitted the 
power elite by (a) helping maintain an atmosphere of fear to ensure continuity in 
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leadership during elections, (b) allowing for profiteering, and (c) maintaining existing 
inequalities by restricting civil rights (Kinloch, 2004). Therefore, applying the power elite 
theory to examine U.S. counterterrorism policy may expose the inconsistencies found 
between the promise of the policy and the reality of its implementation. 
 Ledwidge and Parmar (2017) asserted that issues of race and ethnicity need to be 
considered in the application of the power elite theory to foreign policy. Ledgwidge and 
Parmar argued that much of foreign policy is controlled by the power elite and that the 
power elite are predominantly male and White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP). Thus, 
the power elite used foreign policy to ensure their own dominance. The power elite also 
operated to maintain inequality and to nurture conflict within and among non-White 
groups, so that these groups could not mobilize to gain power. This began with the anti-
miscegenation laws and extended into other areas, even after those laws were repealed. 
During the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), a major approach was 
infiltrating the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and the Black Panther Party, and to sow dissention 
from within so that the groups would fragment (Hewitt, 2003; Levitas, 2002). The 
majority of domestic terrorism has been perpetrated by White men, yet the arrests and 
successful criminal prosecution has been dominated by perpetrators of color (Hewitt, 
2003, 2005; Levitas, 2002; Norris, 2017). The majority of foreign terrorist organizations 
are non-White or of the lower White races (i.e., Irish), and thus the dominance of concern 
in U.S. counterterrorism policy being on international versus domestic terrorism could be 
motivated by racism and ethnocentrism in the United States (Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017). 
By constructing the main terrorist threat as being non-White and non-Christian, the 
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power elite continued the practice of marginalizing distinct racial, ethnic, and religious 
groups, keeping them from mobilizing and uniting, while at the same time, it has 
empowered White, Christian, domestic terrorists to amass weapons (benefiting the 
economic and military elite) and keeping the political elite in power. 
The AETA of 2006 was implemented to prosecute radical environmental and 
radical animal rights activists, labeled eco-terrorists, under the category of terrorism. This 
policy was heavily influenced by the interests of the power elite, namely the economic 
elite. The economic elite who owned logging businesses, animal research facilities, 
furriers, and who also purchased furs and other luxury animal products that are targeted 
by the eco-terrorists, wanted higher penalties for offenses committed by eco-terrorists (Su 
& Yang, 2017). While the eco-terrorists’ actions did not often result in high lethality, 
they did result in high costs to businesses and insurance companies (Bjelopera, 2017; Su 
& Yang, 2017).  
In addition, the non-violent protests also cost the government in resources spent to 
monitor and/or end the protests. For example, when members of Earth First! occupied 
trees near a logging operation, local and state law enforcement as well as emergency 
responders were dispatched to forcibly remove the occupiers, and disengage the elaborate 
cable system that was set up to suspend the occupiers in the trees. The impact extended 
beyond the economic elite to the political elite who were pressured by the economic elite 
to bring an end to the costly protests. While this specific case did not explicitly involve 
the military elite, to continue the support from the political and economic elite, the 
military elite would have supported AETA.  
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Synthesizing the MSF and Power Elite for Counterterrorism Policy 
At the surface, it may seem like selecting theories from different disciplines 
would be difficult to synthesize; however, because of the interdisciplinary nature of the 
academic examination of terrorism, the MSF and power elite complement each other. 
C.W. Mills’ (1956) power elite theory can be applied to explain the inconsistencies in 
strictly applying Kingdon’s (2011) MSF to U.S. counterterrorism policy. As will be 
discussed later in this chapter, while the primary threat of terrorism comes from domestic 
terrorism, U.S. counterterrorism policy has focused on the threat of international 
terrorism. This inconsistency was difficult to explain solely using the MSF; however, 
when considering the distribution of power in the United States using the power elite 
theory, it was clearer that the relationship between the origin and history of the terrorist 
threat in the United States, and the subsequent U.S. counterterrorism policies benefit the 
power elite. Figure 3 graphically shows how MSF, the power elite, and U.S. 
counterterrorism policy relate to one another.  
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Figure 3. The MSF and power elite coverage with U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
The MSF helped compensate for weaknesses in the power elite theory. If the 
power elite solely engaged in activities that promoted themselves, and served themselves, 
then it became difficult to explain why certain policies passed when they did, and why 
certain social problems got policy attention while others did not. The MSF explained this 
shortcoming by demonstrating how the different streams converged during a policy 
window to force policy making, even if such policy did not serve the interests of the 
power elite. The application of these two theories was useful in helping explain the 
connection between domestic terrorism and the specific U.S. counterterrorism policies 
that had been developed and enacted since 2001. 
Domestic Terrorism 
Terrorism is difficult to define because of the breadth of forms of violence that it 
encompasses. States may govern through terror which is called State terrorism or 
democide (Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Rummel, 1994). Examples of State terrorism or 
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democide include the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under Lenin and 
Stalin, and Cambodia under the rule of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge (Martin, 2018; 
Nacos, 2016; Rummel, 1994). States may sponsor terrorism perpetrated by organizations 
not openly associated with the State sponsor, such as the role that Libya played with the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (Coogan, 1994; Martin, 2018; Nacos; 2016). 
Libya provided training, weapons, and financing to the PIRA but did not openly 
acknowledge its support of the PIRA (Coogan, 1994; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Non-
State terrorism, or terror from below, involves any form of terrorism that is perpetrated 
below the levels of established States. In some cases, these groups may perpetrate 
violence against other terrorist organizations, as was the case with the PIRA and the 
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), among others (Coogan, 1994). In other cases, groups 
may target (a) governments and governmental employees, (b) groups within the 
population based upon some social category, and (c) groups or corporations surrounding 
some single issue, such as abortion or non-human animal testing. Furthermore, 
individuals may engage in terrorism as lone wolves with no official or up-to-date 
membership or strong association with a terrorist organization (Enders & Sandler, 2012; 
Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016).  
Terrorism has also been organized and defined along location of operations, 
namely domestic or international. Domestic or homegrown terrorism within this realm 
would consist of terrorism perpetrated by the individuals of a country within which they 
are a resident and/or citizen (Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Enders & Sandler, 
2012; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). International, foreign, 
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or transnational terrorism involves terrorism perpetrated by citizens of one country 
operating and targeting citizens of another country, or the government of another country 
(Enders & Sandler, 2012; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016).  
Terrorism has also been defined and organized according to ideological 
motivations. The ideologies may involve religious, social, economic, and/or political 
objectives. Terrorists who engage in terrorism for religious objectives are often engaging 
in a cosmic war and/or demonstrating intolerance for other religious belief systems 
(Hoffman, 2006; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). The PIRA had 
political and economic objectives, seeking the reunification of Ireland and independence 
from British rule (Coogan, 1994; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). As more 
ideologies fragmented and evolved, more categories were added to define and classify 
terrorism along ideological lines. In addition, some groups encompass several ideological 
orientations making a classification system or definition based on ideology impossible.  
Any definition of terrorism depends upon the type or form of terrorism being 
defined. Therefore, to attempt to develop one definition to encompass all forms of 
terrorism would be an exercise in futility. Regardless, there are essential elements to all 
of the definitions of the different forms of terrorism. These elements include 
premeditation and terror as a means to an end not the end itself. For State terrorism, 
terrorism is the premeditated use of terror and fear as the primary method of social 
control for the State (Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Rummel, 1994). For non-State 
terrorism, Enders and Sandler (2012) define terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat 
to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social 
64 
 
objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate 
victims” (p. 4). While this definition of non-State terrorism appears to encompass many 
of the types of non-State terrorism, it is limited by not including religious and economic 
objectives, which are clear objectives of some terrorists and terrorist organizations.  
For this study, domestic terrorism was defined as premeditated, intentional acts, 
or threats of acts of violence, intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian 
population and/or the government, to achieve some political, religious, economic, 
ideological, and/or social objective(s), and perpetrated by a citizen or resident of the 
country within which the acts or threats are aimed. For this study, only U.S. domestic 
terrorism was analyzed, therefore, only data of terrorist events that occurred in the United 
States and were perpetrated by citizens or residents of the United States were included. 
While this operational definition encompasses the range of types of domestic terrorism 
that has occurred within the United States, there remain some issues regarding any 
definition of U.S. domestic terrorism.   
Definitional Issues 
 Domestic terrorism is socially constructed and thus presents challenges in terms 
of definitions. Depending upon the entity defining the phenomenon, there are differences 
in terms of what is and what is not considered to be domestic terrorism (Bakker, 2015; 
Chermak et al., 2012; Freilich & LaFree, 2016; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 
2016). For example, the definition that the FBI uses is focused on non-State terrorism 
against the United States and has a law enforcement perspective. The U.S. Department of 
State does not limit its definition to non-State terrorism aimed at the United States, but 
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includes State-sponsored terrorism in the development and implementation of sanctions 
and restrictions on access to the United States. As a result, the U.S. Department of State 
maintains a list identifying foreign terrorist organizations on its website (Bjelopera, 
2017).   
Furthermore, domestic terrorism is not a mutually exclusive category from hate 
crime, extremism, and cults (Bjelopera, 2017; Freilich & LaFree, 2016; Hewitt, 2003; 
Martin, 2018). According to Title 18 of the United States Code, domestic terrorism is 
defined as:  
activities that (A)  involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended (i) to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur 
primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (Terrorism, 2011, 
§2331). 
Hate crimes are defined as crimes committed or crimes attempted against any 
person “because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin” or 
“because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, 
gender identity, or disability” (Hate Crime Acts, 2009, §249). If a crime that would 
qualify as a hate crime is perpetrated with the intention of intimidation or coercion of the 
civilian population and/or with the intention to influence the government through 
intimidation or coercion, then that hate crime would also qualify as an act of terrorism. If 
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the perpetrator was a U.S. citizen and the crime occurred within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States, then it would qualify as an act of domestic terrorism.  
However, even in such cases, there has not been much consistency with pursuing 
terrorism charges versus hate crime charges. For example, Dylann Roof perpetrated a 
mass shooting at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, SC on 
June 17, 2015. Roof admitted White supremacist ideology and motivation for the act that 
resulted in the deaths of nine African Americans; however, even though this event fit the 
definition of domestic terrorism, the U.S. government did not label this event as domestic 
terrorism nor sought enhanced penalties for the federal crime of terrorism, instead 
choosing to pursue charges for hate crime acts (Bjelopera, 2017; Norris, 2017; USSG, 
2018, §3A1.4). Therefore solely relying on cases involving perpetrators charged with 
terrorism would not include all events that are domestic terrorism.  
More recently, a new category called violent extremism has been used to 
encompass not only international terrorists but domestic terrorists (Bjelopera, 2017; 
LaFree & Freilich, 2019). This new classification creates controversy in terms of legal 
action against such actors and creates confusion for data analysis. For example, according 
to the FBI (2019), “violent extremism is ‘encouraging, condoning, justifying, or 
supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, 
social, or economic goals’” (para 1). The issue is that this definition of violent extremism 
can encompass individuals and groups that are otherwise protected against prosecution 
under freedom of speech (U.S. Const. amend. I). Because violent extremism is not 
included in the United States Code, it is not an offense that is prosecutable at this time; 
67 
 
however, this terminology may interfere with the prosecution of crimes perpetrated by 
domestic terrorists, who may otherwise be described as violent extremists. Carpenter 
(2018) suggested that the definition of terrorism in the United States Code be expanded to 
encompass hate crimes and homicides to strengthen its usefulness in prosecuting 
domestic terrorism. Carpenter noted that as it is currently written, incidents that cross the 
line between hate crime and domestic terrorism lead to inconsistent treatment under the 
law. 
From the definitional issues for domestic terrorism in the United States comes 
difficulty in creating baseline data or threat evaluation. Bjelopera (2017) highlighted 
three areas of difficulty for domestic counterterrorism policymakers. It is difficult to 
amass a dataset or establish a baseline of the threat of domestic terrorism when different 
agencies that monitor, interact with, investigate, and prosecute domestic terrorism 
employ different definitions and terminology. The second area is that there is no official, 
public, governmental specification for domestic groups or ideologies that are labeled as 
terrorists or extremists. Agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and FBI operate according to different definitions of domestic terrorism, resulting in 
different lists of groups used internally (Bjelopera, 2017). The Southern Poverty Law 
Center (SPLC) maintains a database and map of hate incidents in the United States; 
however, the methodology used to label some groups as extremist or hate groups, while 
others are not labeled as such, is unclear and appears to be driven by the political agenda 
of the SPLC administrators. In addition, it is unclear what information was used in the 
presentation of statistics on their hate map. Thus, such a dataset is neither valid nor 
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reliable, although it can be useful in identifying areas of concern or groups of concern. 
The final area for Bjelopera (2017) is that there is no accounting of domestic terrorist 
plots or attacks that have been investigated. Furthermore, labeling of terrorism changes 
over time and is heavily influenced by power and politics (Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). It 
would be to the best interests of the nation if an empirical, evidence-based method was 
available for determining the terrorist threat, as well as evaluating counterterrorism 
policy. 
Regardless of the form and motivation of terrorism, it is important to remember 
that at its core, terrorism is a tactic or strategy for social change through violent means 
(Bakker, 2015; Bjelopera, 2017; Coogan, 1994; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Enders et al., 
2011; Forest, 2010; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 
2018; Nacos, 2016). When terrorism is conceived of as a tactic or strategy, it allows for a 
clearer analysis of the impact of counterterrorism policy. It is important to note that the 
motivations of a terrorist are very different than those of a traditional criminal and 
therefore, using only a criminal justice approach would not result in the effectiveness that 
an interdisciplinary approach would (Bakker, 2015; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; 
Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). While the criminal justice approach has met limited success 
against domestic terrorists; alone, it is insufficient to break down a well-organized 
terrorist group (Bakker, 2015; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos; 2016). 
This could be part of the impetus for developing policies specific to terrorist offenses. 
Because of the complexity of terrorism and the intersection of terrorist offenses 
with other categories of criminal offenses, the GTD established criteria for inclusion that 
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allows for all global acts of non-State terrorism to be documented. The criteria for 
inclusion in the GTD allows for inclusion of events that are characterized as terrorism 
regardless of criminal proceedings following capture of the perpetrator(s). Thus, the 
criteria used allow for a more complete source of data on acts of terrorism.  
History of Domestic Terrorism 
Domestic terrorism was not added as a classification to the United States Code 
until the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Terrorism, 2011; USA PATRIOT 
Act, 2001); however, it is not because domestic terrorism had not been in existence prior 
to 2001. Between 1954 and 2004, at least 3,120 terrorism incidents occurred in the 
United States, the majority of which were perpetrated by U.S. citizens, and thus qualify 
as domestic terrorism (Hewitt, 2003, 2005).  
Scholars who have studied terrorism have attempted to create categories and 
classifications to ease understanding and empirical analysis of terrorism. While these 
categories are not mutually exclusive nor do they necessarily encompass all forms that 
terrorism may take, they can be useful in attempting to identify trends. Some typologies 
focus on ideological variations, i.e. religious, political, nationalistic, etc., others may 
focus on group dynamics i.e. lone-wolf, organized group, leaderless resistance, cell-
based, hierarchies, etc., and further others may focus on actions, i.e. single-event, 
protracted conflict, etc. (Bakker, 2015; Crenshaw, 1995, [1998] 2012; Greenberg, 2011; 
Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Naftali, 2005; Sandler, 2014).  
Various scholars have attempted to examine commonalities along those 
dimensions or identify paradigmatic trends to understand terrorism and possibly predict 
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terrorist threats. Hewitt (2003) examined U.S. domestic terrorism as occurring in waves, 
comparing active groups with sociohistorical and political contexts. From 1954 to 2000, 
the majority of terrorism incidents and fatalities were perpetrated by White 
racist/Rightest terrorist ideologies (31.2% incidents, 51.6% fatalities) (Hewitt, 2003). 
Revolutionary Leftist terrorist ideologies, which was second to White racist/Rightest, 
accounted for 21.2% of incidents and 2.0% of fatalities (Hewitt, 2003). Foreign terrorist 
attacks in the United States accounted for less than that perpetrated by the White 
racist/Rightist terrorist ideology (20.3% incidents, 11.6% fatalities) from that same time 
frame (Hewitt, 2003). Before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the majority of 
terrorism in the United States was perpetrated by domestic terrorists. 
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START) issued a background report using data from the GTD to show changes in 
ideological motivations for terrorism occurring in the United States from 1970 to 2016 
(Miller, 2017). The breakdown of ideologies differed from those used by Hewitt (2003); 
however, Miller (2017) found that during 2000 to 2009, the majority of domestic terrorist 
attacks were perpetrated by Left-wing extremists including eco-terrorists (i.e. ALF, ELF). 
The number of attacks by Left-wing extremists increased by 80% from the prior decade, 
but most of those attacks resulted in property damage with no fatalities. During 2000 to 
2009 Right-wing extremist terrorism decreased by 40% compared to the previous decade 
(Miller, 2017).  
Compared to the preceding decade, Miller (2017) found that Left-wing extremist 
terrorism decreased from 64% to 12% during 2010 to 2016. During this six-year time 
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period, both Right-wing extremism and religious extremism increased dramatically from 
the previous decade (Right-wing extremists 6% to 35%, religious extremist 9% to 53%). 
It should be noted that there is overlap in motivations for Right-wing extremism and 
religious extremism (Miller, 2017). Overall, terrorism in the United States has decreased 
since 1970 (Miller, 2017).  
After September 11, 2001, a debate arose among terrorism scholars over whether 
there was a new form of terrorism that fundamentally differed from terrorism of the past 
(Crenshaw, [2009] 2012; Laqueur, 2000). Some scholars argued that new terrorism, 
which involves religious motivation and greater lethality made historical interpretations, 
approaches, and understandings of terrorism irrelevant and useless (Crenshaw, [2009] 
2012; Laqueur, 2000). The differences between old terrorism and new terrorism involved 
differences in motivation, goals/aims, methods, organization, and resources. However, it 
remains to be seen whether this characterization of terrorism involves more than simply 
adaptation to countering the security environment and increased technology. 
It is important to remember that just as terrorism is a social construction, so are 
these typologies and organizational classifications. Furthermore, terrorist organizations 
do not exists in stasis rather they evolve over time; some finding greater longevity, some 
transitioning into legitimacy, and others ending abruptly. In some cases terrorist 
organizations split up into different organizations, join forces with other terrorist 
organizations, or work with other terrorist organizations to execute operations or gain 
training and resources (Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Miller, 2017; Nacos, 
2016). There has also been an increasing trend in lone wolf terrorism while official 
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terrorist organizations in the United States have declined (Bjelopera, 2017; Martin, 2018; 
Miller, 2017). This has led to Bjelopera (2017) suggesting that terrorism be 
conceptualized in terms of threat rather than as groups. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
study, the focus was on domestic terrorism and not broken down further by ideological, 
motivational, or form typologies. Terrorists who are part of larger terrorist organizations 
as well as lone wolf actors were analyzed in this study. 
Empirical Approaches to Studying U.S. Domestic Terrorism 
 Domestic terrorism has been an area of study for some time but gained renewed 
interest in recent years. As interest in the field grew from the interdisciplinary “terrorism 
studies” literature, databases were created to keep track of terrorist events (Bakker, 2015; 
Crenshaw, 2014). Within terrorism studies, how terrorism was socially constructed and 
subsequently how it was studied evolved. Predominantly, transnational terrorism and 
terrorism outside of the United States was the focus of much of the terrorism research. 
While qualitative studies examined aspects of terrorism were useful in uncovering 
perceptions of the threat of terrorism, uncovering some of the internal issues within 
terrorist organizations, uncovering some of the motivations of terrorism, and the social 
factors that contribute to someone joining, staying, and/or leaving a terrorist organization; 
there has been a call for more quantitative work, especially in light of the availability of 
data on terrorism (Bassiouni, 1988, 2002; Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017; 
Crenshaw, 2014;  Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; De Cataldo Neuburger & Valentini, 1996; 
Dugan & Distler, 2017; Enders & Sandler, 2014; Freilich & LaFree, 2016; Lum et al, 
2006; Williams, 2018). Policy  makers may use the results from empirical analyses of 
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terrorism to develop, or continue more effective counterterrorism policy, or discontinue 
ineffective counterterrorism policy. 
 Researchers frequently use open source data to build terrorism databases. Open 
source data are those data taken from unclassified and publicly-available sources, often 
media sources, but also legal documentation and other unclassified, public reports 
(Dugan & Distler, 2017; LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). Media 
sources are especially appropriate sources for information about terrorism because of the 
special relationship between terrorism and the media (Altheide, 2006, 2007, 2019; 
Bakker, 2015; Hoffman, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Terrorists 
want to reach a larger audience to get their message heard, and the media is the ideal 
vehicle for broadcasting that message. Terrorists thus aim to attract media attention for 
their attacks, in some cases announcing when an impending attack will approximately 
occur (Dugan & Distler, 2017; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Furthermore, 
the media rely on terrorists because their attacks tend to be sensational and violent, thus 
attracting viewers and keeping the media outlet in business (Altheide, 2006, 2007, 2019; 
Dugan & Distler, 2017; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Usage of the 
internet and social media have extended the reach of reports of terrorist attacks, allowing 
individuals to access local news stories and local personal accounts of terrorist attacks 
that may not have garnered the attention or been accessible to international media outlets 
(Altheide, 2019; Dugan & Distler, 2017).  
Researchers are concerned with data validity when examining terrorism 
quantitatively. Safer-Lichtenstein, LaFree, and Loughran (2017) highlighted the 
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challenges of utilizing empirical data. The primary issue involved the transparency of 
coding and inclusion criteria for different datasets that were openly available. 
Additionally, some data were only available if the researcher(s) had high security 
clearance or classified access. There is a risk of increasing error in analyses when 
datasets from different sources are used, because of inconsistencies along definitions, 
coding strategies, classifications, and information reliability. Even when restricting to one 
dataset, a researcher must deal with missing data. There are events that are believed to 
have been perpetrated by terrorists yet have yielded no declaration of responsibility nor 
prosecution to elucidate which terrorist was responsible. There are events that may be 
terrorism, but also may fall into other crime categories, such as hate crime. It is for these 
reasons that solely relying on crime data from legal agents, such as law enforcement, 
victimization surveys, and perpetrator reports were not reliable in assessing terrorism 
(Dugan & Distler, 2017). 
Safer-Lichtenstein et al. (2017) suggested that the managers of datasets need to be 
as transparent as possible, and that researchers need to clearly state how missing data was 
factored into any analysis. For example, Miller (2017) utilized the GTD to examine 
ideological trends in terrorism in the United States and noted in multiple places that 24% 
of the data were of unknown ideology and were not included in the analysis. One of the 
limitations of the GTD is that the data from 1993 were corrupted and lost, and it is only 
estimated that 15% of the original data on terrorist events that occurred globally during 
1993, have been recovered and included (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 
2018b).  
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Some researchers have studied terrorism using only a criminological approach 
that treats terrorism as another form of crime. Carson, LaFree, and Dugan (2012) utilized 
mixed methods to examine the activities of radical environmental and radical animal 
rights activists operating in the United States. In their analysis, Carson et al. (2012) 
separated activities into two types, terrorist and non-terrorist. As part of this research, 
Carson et al. (2012) constructed a new database, the Eco-Incidents Database (EID) 
pulling from two primary sources, the Foundation for Biomedical Research database on 
criminal cases and the GTD, but also included data from ten additional sources. This 
study was useful in identifying a process by which to study a specific type of terrorism 
empirically, as well as the importance of their findings for future research and for public 
policy.  
Quinn (2016) examined terrorist activity in New York City from 1975 to 2015. 
Using data from START, Quinn (2016) found that terrorist activity in New York City 
decreased steadily since 1975. Quinn examined the geo-spatial patterns of the attacks and 
found that the terrorist attacks became less diffuse throughout New York City, with more 
concentration among the outer boroughs. Quinn identified movement ideologies, number 
and organization of attacks, and methods used over time. Nash (2017) examined the 
effectiveness of the Urban Area Security Initiative Program (UASI) in seven urban areas 
in the United States from 1970 to 2010. Nash used several time-series analyses to 
evaluate the effectiveness of UASI. These studies offered models by which several 
variables of terrorism were assessed over time by using open source data. 
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LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009) examined attack patterns from 1970 to 2004 
of foreign terrorist organizations targeting the United States. The authors identified 53 
groups as having anti-American sentiment and examined the total number of attacks and 
total number of fatal attacks against the United States, and attacks against others. In 
addition, LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw examined the trajectories of terrorist attacks and 
identified sporadic attacks compared to specific decades. The results provided additional 
insight to how terrorist organizations operate. Instead of solely looking at waves as 
Hewitt (2003) did, LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw found that anti-American terrorist 
organizations operated in either waves or in boom and bust patterns. 
Freilich, Adamczyk, Chermak, Boyd, and Parkin (2015) compared homicides 
committed by terrorists to homicides that were not motivated by terrorism. Freilich et al. 
applied deprivation theory, backlash theory, and social disorganization theory to explain 
the differences between homicide motivations at the county level. The limitations of 
Freilich et al.’s study included that they only examined one ideological perspective, i.e. 
far-Right extremists, even though there was a vast array of ideological motivations for 
terrorists in the United States; and they only examined the crime of homicide, even 
though many U.S. domestic terrorists do not engage in homicide as a tactic. As noted 
earlier, Hewitt (2003, 2005) found that most U.S. domestic terrorism does not result in 
fatalities.  
Comparing terrorist activity to criminal activity was not the only method 
employed when researchers investigated terrorism empirically. Time-series analyses have 
been an important component of the terrorism studies literature. Enders and Sandler 
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(1993) examined the impact that six specific counterterrorism interventions had on 
transnational terrorist activity from 1968 to 1988. Enders and Sandler found that terrorist 
organizations adapted their methods in response to specific types of interventions, such as 
increased barriers at embassies, increased use of metal detectors at airports, among 
others. Without the empirical analysis, justification for increasing target hardening 
strategies as part of a counterterrorism approach would rely solely on anecdotal 
information. Hsu, Vasquez, and McDowall (2018) used the GTD to examine whether 
target hardening in the United States resulted in a shift of terrorist activity from the U.S. 
mainland to abroad. Hsu et al. did not find that terrorism was displaced to interests 
outside of the United States upon target-hardening interventions implemented within the 
United States; thus providing empirical data for policy makers in justifying the use of 
these strategies without fear that displacement would occur. 
Some empirical analyses focused on the creation of models of trajectories towards 
terrorist activity. Klausen, Campion, Needle, Nguyen, and Libretti (2016) examined 
specific cases of Al Qaeda-inspired homegrown terrorists in the United States. Klausen et 
al. presented a method for translating qualitative data into quantitative data for statistical 
analysis to produce a descriptive model for radicalization. Subedi (2017) suggested that 
empirical data could be used to establish early warning and early response (EWER) 
systems in countries that deal with radicalization and violent extremism. Models, such as 
the one used by Klausen et al., are critical to establishing EWERs.  
Gonzalez, Freilich, and Chermak (2014) used data from the U.S. Extremist Crime 
Database (ECDB) to examine factors that impact women who engaged in U.S. domestic 
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terrorism. Gonzalez et al. found that regardless of ideology, most women terrorists 
became involved in terrorism due to relationships they had with terrorists or extremists, 
and that their activities tended not to produce high casualties, or even intend on killing 
others. However, Gonzalez et al. found the ECDB to be limited in gaining more 
demographic information on the women perpetrators, which may provide more 
information on trends towards radicalization and activity within U.S. domestic terrorist 
organizations. As such, Gonzalez et al. recommended employing a mixed method 
approach where qualitative interviewing could be used to supplement the data provided 
by the ECDB.  
Makin and Hoard (2014) used the American Terrorism Study (ATS) to examine 
the gender gap in U.S. domestic terrorism. The ATS included data on all FBI 
investigations from 1980 to 2002 (Makin & Hoard, 2014). Through their examination, 
Makin and Hoard suggested that counterterrorism policy needed to take gender into 
consideration, and that there needed to be further research into the role that women play 
in U.S. domestic terrorism.  
Examining successful terrorist events was not the only empirical approach to 
studying terrorism. Comparison of failed plots with successful events provide 
information regarding how a terrorist organization evolves its methods, as well as 
provided a trajectory of behaviors for law enforcement to watch for as warnings of 
potential future terrorist attacks. Utilizing the case of the failed attack by the True 
Knights of the KKK in 1997, Kollars and Brister (2014) demonstrated that important 
information about the evolution of terrorist tactics could be gained by examining a failed 
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mission. While Kollars and Brister only examined a single case study, their methods 
could inform policymakers on how to implement effective counterterrorism policy aimed 
at curbing Right-wing extremists operating within the United States. Charles and Maras 
(2015) examined six case studies to identify how the organizational learning cycles, 
community institutions, and security institutions impacted the success or failure of a 
terrorist attack. While useful information that has the potential for use by policymakers 
was gleaned from these studies, the case study analysis does not lend itself to 
generalization. Therefore, these case study analyses may lay the foundation for future 
quantitative research focusing on the evolution of terrorist organization tactics. Klein, 
Gruenewald, and Smith (2017) used data from ATS to examine the characteristics of 
Right-wing extremist terrorism in the United States. Klein et al. (2017) found mixed 
results in attempting to develop a trajectory from precursor activities to incident success. 
Researchers focusing on the terrorists was not the only area of interest recently. 
Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk (2018) examined the use of sting operations for 
counterterrorism in the United States from 1989 to 2014. Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk 
were interested in how the Oklahoma City bombing terrorist attack and the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks influenced the use of entrapment through sting operations. Through 
examination of domestic terrorist prosecutions in the United States, Norris and Grol-
Prokopczyk uncovered the temporal trends in the use of entrapment against Jihadist 
terrorists, Right-wing extremists, and all types of domestic terrorism in the United States. 
Norris and Prokopczyk found that following the Oklahoma City bombing terrorist attack, 
sting operations targeting Right-wing extremists increased greatly, but entrapment 
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indicators remained low. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, both sting 
operations and entrapment indicators increased (Norris and Prokopczyk, 2018).  
Thus far, the majority of studies discussed focused on single nations; however, 
researchers have used comparative studies. DeLeeuw and Pridemore (2018) compared 
domestic terrorism in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. DeLeeuw and 
Pridemore used the GTD to compare these nations to identify dominant configurations of 
characteristics for incidents, perpetrator types, and outcomes. DeLeeuw and Pridemore 
provided a model for comparing domestic terrorism between nations. 
Reed (2013) compared U.S. militia groups to Northern Ireland Ulster Loyalist 
paramilitary organizations (Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense 
Association (UDA)) to demonstrate the trajectory that extremism took from ideology to 
terrorism. Reed specifically focused on the impact that economic conditions had on 
extremist trajectories. Reed found that economic disruption, especially rapid change, can 
lead to breaking from mainstream society and entrenching into a specific version of 
history that will be defended at all costs.  
What this review shows is that empirical research on terrorism is possible and 
preferred in terms of informing counterterrorism policy. As L. Clarke (2003) noted when 
it comes to learning specific lessons from experience with large-scale terrorist attacks like 
the September 11, 2001 attacks, “the lessons are already there but elites have to pay 
attention if they are to matter” (p. 2). While several of the studies discussed the policy 
implications of their results, none specifically examined U.S. counterterrorism policy and 
its impact on terrorist activity. This study addressed this gap in the literature by using the 
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GTD to examine changes in domestic terrorist incidents, lethality, and costs following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy since the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks.  
The Global Terrorism Database 
The GTD is an open source dataset that has logged non-State terrorism incidents 
from 1970 to 2017 (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). In order for incidents to be 
included within the GTD, they must satisfy all three attributes of the GTD definition of 
terrorism, and at least, two of the three inclusion criteria (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; 
START, 2018b). A terrorist attack, as defined by the GTD is “the threatened or actual use 
of illegal force or violence by a non-State actor to attain a political, economic, religious, 
or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START, 2018b, p.10). Each 
included incident must (a) be intentional, (b) involve some level of use of or threat of use 
of violence, and (c) be perpetrated by sub-national actors. Furthermore, the three 
inclusion criteria from which at least two must be fulfilled are: 
Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not 
satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic 
economic change.  
Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the 
immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if 
every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As 
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long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to 
coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.  
Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare 
activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by 
international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately 
targeting civilians or non-combatants).  (START, 2018b, p.10) 
In the original formulation of the GTD, several existing terrorism databases were 
examined (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). Following the 
verification and compilation of these sources, beginning in 2011, all data entered into the 
GTD were from open sources and compiled by START staff. The data included in the 
GTD came from “publicly available, unclassified source materials” (START, 2018b; 
p.3). While the origins of the GTD came from pre-existing databases, more recent 
additions came from media articles and electronic news archives (START, 2018b). Three 
separate sources for each event were required for an event to be included, and those 
sources were listed along with the event in the GTD (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 
2007; START, 2018a, 2018b).    
There were some methodological issues that came from using databases built on 
open source data. Freilich and LaFree (2016) highlighted the main issues with reliability 
of sources, inter-rater reliability issues, failure to include a control group or non-terrorist 
group in analyses, how missing values are handled, selectivity bias in database 
development and construction, and defining an event in a binary as either terrorism or 
not. Ackerman and Pinson (2016) proposed a blueprint for a method for operationalizing 
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event validity in open source databases. Their “Source Evaluation Schema” method 
addressed the methodological concerns of source reliability, selectivity bias, and event 
validity issues. Ackerman and Pinson highly recommended detailed codebooks that were 
fully transparent. External raters used a scale to measure the degree of confidence for 
various aspects of open source data including individual source credibility, overall event 
validity, inherent event uncertainty, and event detail. Two measures were broken down 
into two indicators. For individual source credibility, the database creator’s objectivity 
and competence were rated. For event detail evaluation, whether the detail on the event 
was corroborated and the level of discrepancy between sources were rated (Ackerman & 
Pinson, 2016). Ackerman and Pinson suggested that their proposed schema operate as a 
starting point for individuals to adapt and expand upon for use with appropriate open 
source databases.   
Behlendorf, Belur, and Kumar (2016) compared terrorism data across three 
publicly-available datasets to check for selection bias. The GTD, the Worldwide Incident 
Terrorism System (WITS), and the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) were compared 
in their inclusion of incidents from the Maoist insurgency in Andhra Pradesh from 2005 
to 2009 (Behlendorf et al., 2016). The data within these terrorism databases were also 
compared to official police records for the region. Behlendorf et al. found that there were 
a substantial number of Maoist insurgency attacks missing from the GTD, WITS, and 
SATP. However, most of the terrorist attacks by the Maoist insurgents were not covered 
by the English-speaking national or international media, which may have contributed to 
their exclusion in these datasets. While Behlendorf et al. demonstrated that there was 
84 
 
selection bias for a case of terrorism, because this study was focusing on U.S. domestic 
terrorism, the media coverage issue and any language-reporting issues would not 
undermine the validity of the GTD.      
The GTD codebook includes detailed descriptions of the history of the GTD, 
coding methods, and a detailed list of changes made with the release of the updated 
database. Not only are the changes listed, but the rationale for the changes along with 
adjustments in methodology are also explicitly presented. For example, when dealing 
with the issue of whether an incident is terrorism, the GTD has a variable called doubt 
terrorism proper, which is checked if there is some question as to whether the event was 
an act of terrorism or not (Freilich & LaFree, 2016; START, 2018b). These details are an 
essential element for transparency and informing researchers who plan to use the GTD in 
their studies, and help researchers address the methodological concerns of using the 
GTD, as with any open source database. A detail that was not included in the codebook 
was the use of a source evaluation scale and the inter-rater reliability results. Those 
measures are used internally by START and not made public, which would be useful for 
external researchers using the GTD and in alignment with the recommendations by 
Ackerman and Pinson (2016). 
Filtering the Dataset for U.S. Domestic Terrorist Incidents 
The GTD contains global terrorism data for non-State terrorism, therefore I had to 
filter the data to conduct my analysis of U.S. domestic terrorism. Berkebile (2017) 
compared several terrorism incident databases in terms of identifying domestic terrorism.  
For an incident to be considered domestic terrorism, the perpetrator and target (victim 
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and attack location) must match. Berkebile offered one method to classify events from 
the GTD as domestic terrorist events. To ensure that only terrorist incidents were 
included in his analysis, Berkebile filtered the GTD to include only subnational actors, 
noncombatant targets, audience beyond the immediate victims, and whether the event had 
a political or social objective. To further filter the GTD for domestic terrorist incidents, 
Berkebile examined the state/nationality of the incident location, the nationality of the 
target, and the nationality of the perpetrators.  
The first step in filtering the GTD was to only include terrorist incidents that 
occurred within the territorial boundaries of the United States. Therefore, attack location 
was filtered for inclusion if the attack location was in the United States or its territories. 
The next step involved perpetrator identity. The GTD does not offer a category 
identifying perpetrator nationality in its public dataset. However, the GTD provides 
variables that identify incidents as logistically and/or ideologically international, in which 
perpetrator nationality is compared with nationality of target. A third variable that 
compares location of attack with nationality of victim without information regarding 
perpetrator nationality is also available. All three of these variables are coded as yes, no, 
or unknown. However, there were some cases in which a domestic terrorist attack was 
coded as international, and therefore, I did not these established variables in the filtering 
process. Instead, I looked up the perpetrator nationality in the open source citations for 
the event in the GTD and/or through open source materials online.  
When I was unable to identify the nationality of the perpetrator, I coded those 
events as unknown. By including the unknown incidents in a combined analysis with 
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known domestic terrorist incidents, an additional source of Type 2 error could have been 
introduced which is why I decided to analyze unknown events separately (see Berkbile, 
2017). Therefore, I analyzed domestic terrorist events, unknown events, and all terrorist 
events (international, domestic, and unknown) separately. 
The GTD is an easily accessible and user-friendly database for terrorism research. 
The GTD has been used in a range of studies examining various elements of terrorism, 
transnational and domestic. This study utilized the data from the GTD to examine the 
impact that U.S. counterterrorism policy had on domestic terrorism. 
U.S. Counterterrorism Policy 
Domestic terrorism has been a problem for a long time in the United States; 
however, counterterrorism policy in the United States has focused mainly on the threat 
from foreign terrorist organizations. There have been policies aimed at regulating and 
managing identified vulnerabilities and hazards that could be exploited by terrorists, and 
thus used in an attack, such as regulations on nuclear material (Mitchell, 2003). However, 
those policies were only from the scope of preventing a catastrophic disaster, and not 
particularly aimed at deterring or preventing terrorism specifically. The overarching 
approach to terrorism for the United States has been one of criminalizing activities 
associated with terrorism, attempting to identify crimes and ideologies that align with 
known terrorist organizations, and preventing terrorist attacks. 
Counterterrorism Policy Before 9/11 
 Provisions regarding State sponsors of terrorism and acts of international or 
transnational terrorism had been included in legislation beginning with the Trading With 
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the Enemy Act (TWEA) of 1917; however, it was the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 that first 
established terrorism as a crime (Antiterrorism Act, 1990; Levitas, 2002; Naftali, 2005; 
Trading with the Enemy Act [TWEA], 1917). While the Omnibus Diplomatic Security 
and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 addressed the threat of terrorism by authorizing the use of 
rewards for intelligence related to terrorism, authorizing United States support in 
antiterrorism activities with allies, prohibition of exporting munitions to countries that 
sponsor terrorism, established boundaries of U.S. jurisdiction over international 
terrorism, and provisions regarding financial support for victims of terrorism, there was 
not specific category of terrorism added to the United States Code, but only a 
recommendation from Congress for the President to negotiate an international convention 
to combat international terrorism.   
The Posse Comitatus Act (PSA) of 1878 established a specific limitation on the 
use of the army or air force as a posse comitatus, or in any other capacity, to execute laws 
without the express approval of Congress (Hewitt, 2003; Levitas, 2002; Posse Comitatus 
Act [PSA], 2011). While it may appear that the PSA prohibits the use of the military 
against domestic terrorism, there are provisions within the United States Code that allow 
for the use of the military against insurrection (Elsea, 2018; Levitas, 2002; PSA, 2011). 
The purpose of the PSA was to prohibit the use of the military to execute civilian law, not 
to interfere with its duties, even when those duties involve cooperation with law 
enforcement in the execution of their duties, which include executing civilian law (Elsea, 
2018). Therefore, the military may be used to combat domestic terrorism without 
violating the PSA.  
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The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) was a 
watered-down version of the proposed Omnibus Counter-Terrorism Act of 1995, which 
never overcame the opposition within the House of Representatives, even after the 1995 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK (Naftali, 
2005). In 1992, the criminal code had the category of international terrorism added 
(FCAA, 1992); however, until AEDPA, terrorism had been handled solely through the 
criminal code (Hewitt, 2003; Naftali, 2005). While the United States had been dealing 
with attacks from domestic terrorists for a long time, it was the threat of international 
terrorist organizations that led to the passage of AEDPA (Hewitt, 2003; Naftali, 2005). 
 It is important to note that even though AEDPA was passed after the Oklahoma 
City terrorist attack, its provisions were not motivated by that terrorist attack (cf., 
Wetherbee, 2007). Rather, the provisions were in the making long before the Oklahoma 
City terrorist attack occurred, and AEDPA specifically addressed foreign terrorist 
organizations, not domestic terrorism (R.A. Clarke, 2004; Naftali, 2005).  
Even though AEDPA was a watered-down version of the Omnibus Counter-
Terrorism act of 1995, it still contained controversial provisions that were challenged as 
violating the U.S. Constitution. Under AEDPA, governmental powers were expanded 
such that any individual suspected of being a terrorist, or supporting terrorism, could be 
denied entry into the United States. In addition, AEDPA allowed for the deportation of 
non-citizens suspected of supporting terrorism (Hewitt, 2003; AEDPA, 1996). The 
AEDPA also allowed for terrorism to be addressed outside of the criminal code, and 
added the ability of the government to prosecute individuals who were identified as 
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funding foreign terrorist organizations (AEDPA, 1996; Agarwal, 2004; Hewitt, 2003). In 
the end, AEDPA made it difficult for terrorist organizations to use the United States as a 
base for financing their activities, while allowing for protections of the civil rights of U.S. 
citizens and residents loyal to the United States, versus those who knowingly engaged in 
contributing to foreign terrorist organizations (Agarwal, 2004).  
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 
 The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 had a primary focus on international terrorism. 
This policy was passed rapidly in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks. Despite its international terrorism focus, the USA PATRIOT Act established 
domestic terrorism as a crime, and thus offered expanded investigative abilities and the 
opportunity to prosecute acts of domestic terrorism as a separate category from non-
terrorist crimes (18 U.S.C. 133B §2331 to 2339D, 2011; Doyle, 2002; Hellmuth, 2016; 
Hewitt, 2003; Howell, 2004; Naftali, 2005; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).  
The USA PATRIOT Act included many of the provisions found in the original 
Omnibus Counter-Terrorism Act of 1995 that had been rejected (R.A. Clarke, 2004; 
Naftali, 2005). The specific provisions within the USA PATRIOT Act taken from the 
Omnibus Counter-Terrorism Act of 1995 included the expansion of surveillance powers 
for law enforcement and a loosening of requirements regarding obtaining warrants for 
suspected terrorists (Doyle, 2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).  
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 included ten titles: enhancing domestic security 
against terrorism, enhanced surveillance procedures, International Money Laundering 
Abatement and Anti-terrorism Financing act of 2001, protecting the border, removing 
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obstacles to investigating terrorism, providing for victims of terrorism, public safety 
officers, and their families, increased information sharing for critical infrastructure 
protection, strengthening the criminal laws against terrorism, improved intelligence, and 
miscellaneous. A sunset clause was included under Title II Enhanced Surveillance 
Procedures which scheduled this title, with some exceptions, to expire on December 31, 
2005 (Doyle, 2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). 
The specific provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act which may have impacted 
domestic terrorism included the increased funding to update and modernize the FBI’s 
technical support center, the enhanced surveillance procedures, increased regulations 
found within the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-terrorism 
Financing Act of 2001, the removing obstacles to investigating terrorism, increased 
information sharing for critical infrastructure protection, strengthening the criminal laws 
against terrorism, improved intelligence, and under the miscellaneous provision 
limitations on hazmat license issuance and increased critical infrastructure protection 
(Doyle, 2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).  
One specific provision involved the use of delayed-notice search warrants (Doyle, 
2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001; Yeh & Doyle, 2006). A delayed-notice search warrant 
allowed for law enforcement to execute a search without prior notification to the property 
owner, as long as law enforcement did not remove any materials (Yeh & Doyle, 2006). 
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 had extended the use of delayed-notice search warrants 
to include any criminal investigation (Doyle, 2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001; Yeh & 
Doyle, 2006). 
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Many of the provisions within the USA PATRIOT Act were challenged as 
unconstitutional and in violation of civil liberties. Within three years of its passage, the 
Supreme Court heard cases involving the rights of detainees to the U.S. legal process 
(Rasul v. Bush), the detention and rights of a U.S. citizen captured as an enemy 
combatant overseas (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld), and the designation of a U.S. citizen as an 
enemy combatant leading to detention under military custody, rather than due process 
through the criminal justice system (Rumsfeld v. Padilla) (Abrams, 2006; Gorham-
Oscilowski & Jaeger, 2008; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004; Pious, 2006; Rasul v. Bush, 2004;  
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 2004; Schwinn, 2016; Wilke, 2005; Wong, 2006). Additional 
challenges to the USA PATRIOT Act involved the expansion of presidential powers, the 
extensiveness of the use of surveillance, the use of detention, and the possible violations 
to the U.S. Constitution, specifically amendments I, IV, V, VI, and XIV (Abrams, 2006; 
Gorham-Oscilowski & Jaeger, 2008; Pious, 2006; Schwinn, 2016; U.S. Const. amend. I, 
IV, V, VI, XIV; Wilke, 2005; Wong, 2006).   
There is always a delicate balance between national security and civil liberties, 
and it was the perceived need for the government to do something in response to the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that allowed for these provisions to not only pass, 
but later be extended. The use of sunset provisions replaced informed debate among 
legislatures and allowed for the USA PATRIOT Act’s rapid passage. Even though there 
were concerns over the constitutionality of the provisions within the USA PATRIOT Act, 
when a draft of its successor named the Domestic Security Enhancement Act (DSEA) of 
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2003 or the PATRIOT Act II was leaked, it showed that governmental powers would be 
expanded at the expense of civil liberties (Hellmuth, 2016; Scahill, 2006).  
The DSEA allowed for prosecution with less burden of proof for terrorism-related 
charges, expanded criminalization of support for terrorism beyond the provisions enacted 
by AEDPA, criminalization of association with suspected terrorists, immigration and 
deportation proceedings would have severe limitations on the use of the writ of habeas 
corpus, and there would not be oversight or checks and balances in place when the 
government engaged in the use of rendition of suspected terrorists to nations that 
practiced torture (Hellmuth, 2016; Scahill, 2006). In addition, DSEA included provisions 
allowing for an expansion of the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) so that 
surveillance of U.S. citizens who may have associations with domestic terrorist groups 
would be legally allowed (Hellmuth, 20165; Scahill, 2006). Another noteworthy aspect of 
the DSEA was the absence of any sunset provision, which would have allowed for the 
entire act to be implemented permanently (Hellmuth, 2016; Scahill, 2006). The absence 
of sunset provisions suggested a new era in which terrorism was considered to be a 
continued threat without any end. The backlash from the release of the draft of the DSEA 
resulted in it not being submitted to Congress, and allowed for it to be redrafted into the 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 
In this first renewal act for the USA PATRIOT Act, 16 of the more controversial 
provisions were addressed. However, instead of allowing further debate on these 
provisions by resetting sunset provisions, 14 of the 16 provisions were made permanent 
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(Abrams, 2006; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 2005; Yeh & 
Doyle, 2006). The only provisions that were given a new sunset date were those 
regarding FISA and roving wiretaps authorization (Abrams, 2006; USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 2005; Yeh & Doyle, 2006).   
The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 more clearly 
elucidated the use and role of National Security Letters (NSL), such that the NSLs were 
in closer compliance with the U.S. Constitution (Abrams, 2006; USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 2005; Yeh & Doyle, 2006). In the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001, NSLs were another method of obtaining information; however, 
they were not subject to judicial review (Doyle, 2002; Schwinn, 2016; USA PATRIOT 
Act, 2001). Another notable change included the lone wolf extension. The lone wolf 
amendment was part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) 
of 2004, which designated non-U.S. persons as eligible for surveillance, regardless of 
whether that individual was officially tied to a foreign terrorist organization (Bazan, 
2005; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act  [IRTPA], 2004; Yeh & Doyle, 
2006). In addition, IRTPA amended FISA (1978) to cover lone wolves and did not 
require probable cause for the issuance of authorization for surveillance (Bazan, 2005; 
IRTPA, 2004).  
Overall, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 
addressed some of the civil liberty concerns by more clearly detailing how intelligence 
could be gathered, loosened restrictions on nondisclosure orders for terrorist 
investigations and surveillance, clarified vague language, and increased oversight by 
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adding additional checks and balances to prevent abuse (Schwinn, 2016; USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 2005; Yeh & Doyle, 2006).  
The provisions of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005 that may have impacted domestic terrorism included the changes in what 
constituted terrorism to include being trained by foreign terrorist organizations and drug 
trafficking to fund terrorism (Yeh & Doyle, 2006). The extension and expansion of use of 
roving wiretaps allowed for the incidental surveillance of U.S. citizens who happened to 
interact with, or be near the surveillance target. Increased penalties for money laundering 
in association with terrorism may also have impacted domestic terrorist operations.  
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006 
 Of the 21
st
 century U.S. counterterrorism policies being examined in this study, 
AETA of 2006 is the only policy that was aimed specifically at a form of domestic 
terrorism. Eco-terrorism involves terrorist activity motivated by radical environmental 
and/or radical animal rights ideologies. Among the most active domestic terrorist 
organizations are those who engaged in eco-terrorism, including organizations such as the 
Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), and Stop Huntingdon 
Animal Cruelty (SHAC) (Bjelopera, 2017; Carson et al., 2012; Miller, 2017; Su & Yang, 
2017). While eco-terrorists are prolific in their attacks, the outcomes of their attacks tend 
to involve property damage, rather than human casualties; although, they will engage in 
targeting individuals at times. Part of eco-terrorists’ motivation involved making it more 
costly and difficult for enterprises that use animals, or are involved in harming the 
environment (i.e. logging industry), as a way to coerce those enterprises to stop their 
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activities (Bjelopera, 2017; Carson et al., 2012; Lemanski & Wilson, 2016; Su & Yang, 
2017).  
In 2008, the FBI estimated that eco-terrorists were responsible for between 1,800 
and 2,000 domestic terrorist incidents, resulting in over $110 million in damages since 
1979 (Bjelopera, 2017; Lemanski & Wilson, 2016). According to the FBI in 2001, as 
cited by Su and Yang (2017), ELF alone caused $100 million in damage. According to 
data from the GTD, eco-terrorist incidents increased steadily since 1980, spiked in 2001, 
and decreased since 2006 (Carson et al., 2012). Miller (2017) compared terrorism data by 
decade and found that eco-terrorism had declined from 64% in the 2000 decade to 12% in 
the first six years of the 2010 decade. Animal-use industry leaders lobbied Congress to 
take more direct action against eco-terrorism, which led to the passage of AETA (Su & 
Yang, 2017).  
The AETA of 2006 is an amended and expanded version of the Animal Enterprise 
Protection Act (AEPA) of 1992, which granted the U.S. government greater legal 
authority in identifying and prosecuting environmental and animal rights extremists, who 
engaged in criminal activity (Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act [AETA], 2006; Bjelopera, 
2017; Su & Yang, 2017). Compared to AEPA, AETA had a broader scope in coverage of 
what was considered to be animal enterprises, such that, now animal enterprises included 
any businesses that were associated with other businesses that engaged in animal 
enterprises (AETA, 2006; Su &Yang, 2017). In addition, AETA identified harsher 
penalties for property damage to businesses identified as animal enterprises.  
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The AETA (2006) amended the United States Code to make interstate and foreign 
travel, or use of mail to perpetrate violence against businesses and other facilities that 
engaged in the use of animals, a specific form of crime with specific sanctions. A 
noteworthy aspect of AETA was that successful and attempted actions were prosecutable, 
as well as threats of harm to individuals (AETA, 2006; Bjelopera, 2017). It was clearly 
stated in AETA (2006) that nothing within the act may be used to infringe upon a U.S. 
citizen’s constitutional rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.   
 However, there remains controversy over labeling radical environmental and 
radical animal rights groups as terrorists, as well as why these specific ideologies and 
organizations were singled out in legislation, while other domestic terrorist ideologies 
and organizations do not have specific legislation addressing their activities (Su & Yang, 
2017). Some of the reasoning behind the focus on eco-terrorism may come from its 
prolific activities and costs incurred by its targets, which included the economic elite. 
Because of their prolific activity, eco-terrorists are also easier to identify than other 
domestic terrorists motivated by non-environmental or non-animal rights ideologies.   
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
The final report from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States (NCTAUUS) was released to the public in 2004, and contained within it, 
specific recommendations to prevent another terrorist attack similar to the ones that 
occurred on September 11, 2001 (NCTAUUS, 2004). Many of those recommendations 
were captured in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007.  
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The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
established funding for improvements for homeland security and emergency management 
and response; established funding to improve and implement inter-agency emergency 
communication systems; included provisions aimed at improving inter-agency 
intelligence sharing and cooperation; increased security for border, aviation, maritime, 
transportation, and critical infrastructure; implemented more secure identification 
documentation; and increased security for materials that could be used as weapons of 
mass destruction (Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, 2007). 
Compared to the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007 had a broader reach in impacting domestic terrorism. The 
overall approach included target hardening, increased security, technological 
modernization, and improved communication and intelligence sharing. While this act was 
not specific to domestic terrorism, its provisions were broad enough to impact all forms 
of terrorism, domestic and international. 
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 
 The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 was passed in response to concerns over law 
enforcement and the government’s role in surveilling U.S. citizens (Berman, 2016; 
Hellmuth, 2016; Lyon, 2015; Rubel, 2017; Schwinn, 2016; Yoo, 2014). As the sunset 
provision to the surveillance provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act approached, it was 
disclosed that the U.S. government had been amassing metadata on U.S. citizens, which 
created public uproar and calls for action. While the 14-year time frame of the USA 
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PATRIOT Act and its subsequent reauthorizations had been filled with a range of 
lawsuits alleging civil rights violations and government overreach, it was not until this 
information had been released that action was taken to tighten the surveillance provisions 
found within the USA PATRIOT Act. It is important to note that the bulk metadata 
collection was legal under the USA PATRIOT Act and its subsequent reauthorizations 
(Rubel, 2017). Rather than attempting to amend the USA PATRIOT Act, it was allowed 
to expire, and was replaced by the USA FREEDOM Act.  
 The intent of the USA FREEDOM Act was to continue established 
counterterrorism strategies outlined in the USA PATRIOT Act; however, with strict 
restrictions regarding intelligence collection and surveillance on U.S. citizens (Berman, 
2015; Lyon, 2014; Romero, 2015; Rubel, 2017; Yoo, 2014). The government was no 
longer permitted to collect information and surveille citizens without warrant (USA 
FREEDOM Act, 2015). Instead, the companies that own that metadata were required to 
retain that data, and may only turn the data over to law enforcement when a warrant was 
served. The restrictions within the USA FREEDOM Act aimed at ceasing the use of the 
government in bulk metadata surveillance and storage.  
 Critics argued that the USA FREEDOM Act missed its mark on attempting to add 
oversight to FISA courts (Berman, 2014; Romero, 2015). Berman (2014) suggested that 
the USA FREEDOM Act did not adequately address the dual role that the FISA courts 
served, and by adding oversight, the efficiency and effectiveness of the FISA courts 
would be compromised. Romero (2015) stated that the USA FREEDOM Act did not go 
far enough because it only protected phone metadata, while leaving other forms of 
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metadata available for collection and surveillance. For domestic terrorists, the USA 
FREEDOM Act may allow for greater communication with other domestic terrorists due 
to the new restrictions and oversight added, but domestic terrorists may be more 
vulnerable to other forms of metadata surveillance.  
 While U.S. counterterrorism policy continues to be developed, challenged, and 
implemented, how effective the existing and past policies were remained inconsistently 
explored. In addition, with these counterterrorism policies came greater expense to the 
U.S. tax payers. The following sections will address how counterterrorism policy has 
been financed and how counterterrorism has been assessed and evaluated. 
Financing Counterterrorism 
For many governments, one approach to addressing terrorism involves throwing 
money at the problem. While it may seem logical that deterrence, prevention, and 
response to terrorist attacks require a lot of money, how that money is spent and whether 
that spending is justified remains unclear. Empirical evidence does support the 
effectiveness in funding counterterrorism operations. In a comparative analysis of 34 
countries, including the United States, Danzell and Zidek (2013) found that increased 
spending on law enforcement and other aspects of the country’s security apparatus led to 
decreased casualties and fatalities due to terrorist attacks, and had a small impact on 
reducing terrorism incidence.  
Wolfendale (2007) challenged the justification for counterterrorism measures by 
arguing that the actual terrorist threat is minimal to an individual civilian, while the threat 
of an individual’s loss of civil liberties by counterterrorism strategies, was much greater. 
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Yet the rhetoric for the threat of terrorism continued, thus justifying increased restrictions 
and narrowed civil liberties for the sake of national security. This rhetoric supported the 
power elite by ensuring continued support for the existing political elite, because the 
political elite could point out the infrequency of international terrorist attacks in the 
United States since the counterterrorism policy was implemented (ignoring the baseline 
infrequency of international terrorism attacks in the United States). The military elite 
benefited by ensuring research and development into weapons systems, surveillance, 
protective equipment, and artificial intelligence for use in the ongoing global war on 
terror. The economic elite benefited from the profits earned for private security and 
contractor corporations as well as profits from the sale of protective equipment to a 
fearful public who have bought into the apocalypse industry and the myths about 
terrorism in the United States (Altheide, 2006, 2007, 2019; Bakker, 2015; LaFree, 2011; 
Silva et al., 2019). Combined, the power elite supported the increased federal spending 
for counterterrorism. The total budget authority for DHS was $37.7 billion at its inception 
in 2003 and has steadily increased to the requested $92 billion for FY2020 (Bush, 2003; 
Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2017, 2019).  
Part of the motivation of allocating a large amount of money to counterterrorism 
was due to the costs incurred from terrorist attacks. The GTD provided the amount of 
property damage, when available for individual terrorist attacks (START, 2018a, 2018b). 
Shellman (2004, 2006) proposed a single model to describe the relationship between 
dissident terrorists and governments. Shellman proposed several contextual frameworks, 
but within each framework was the government decision-making formula that included 
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government costs of action, terrorist dissident costs, and audience/victim costs. While this 
model was not appropriate for this study, Shellman’s identification of the different 
sources of costs of terrorism was relevant. In addition, J. Mueller and Stewart (2014) 
conducted a cost-benefit analysis on counterterrorism spending. From a risk management 
perspective, Kunreuther (2002) questioned how justifiable it was to invest a lot of money 
into preventing a rare event. While I had originally intended on analyzing the budgetary 
appropriations for counterterrorism as well the costs of damage from terrorist attacks, 
inconsistencies and missing data made such an analysis not possible at this time. Because 
the cost to the victims is not readily available, that element was not included in the 
analysis.  
Counterterrorism Policy Evaluation 
While research on terrorism grew and increased its rigor, the same cannot be said 
for research on counterterrorism policy. Many terrorists rely on repressive responses from 
governments to their attacks as a way to mobilize the population against the government; 
and thus, it is imperative to not only acknowledge this relationship, but identify clear 
evaluation of counterterrorism policies (LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 
2016). Solely military responses have been criticized as feeding into the aims of the 
terrorists and resulting in backlash effects, rather than deterrence effects (LaFree, Dugan, 
& Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019). Legal approaches have had mixed success, but 
tended not to produce the same form of backlash effect found from strictly military 
approaches. 
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Despite ongoing work on counterterrorism, actual policy implementation occurred 
on a more reactive basis than on a preventative basis, which is consistent with MSF. As 
such, by rapidly passing legislation, there can be major flaws within the provisions of that 
legislation which may exacerbate, rather than deter or prevent terrorism. Mitchell (2003) 
observed that homeland security strategies tended to have sole focus on defense, rather 
than securing vulnerabilities, and on passing legislation that was similar to previously 
flawed policies. The focus of the new policies ignored the ineffective nature of the past 
policies and held on to its defense-focus at the expense of true security and terrorism 
deterrence and prevention (Mitchell, 2003). Therefore, it is essential that counterterrorism 
policies are evaluated and that these evaluations be evidence-based and communicated 
effectively to policy makers to ensure that mistakes are not repeated with future policy. 
There were different approaches to evaluating counterterrorism policy, 
particularly because counterterrorism policy did not include any instructions for 
evaluation. Individual agencies that are involved in counterterrorism activities may have 
independent methods of evaluating success and effectiveness, but those are limited to the 
specific agency. While a layperson may say that because there has not been another 
terrorist attack exactly like the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, that the policies were 
effective; however, considering that the majority of terrorism in the United States is 
perpetrated by domestic terrorists, evaluating a rare event with whether that event has 
recurred is fraught with error.  
The result of having such variation in approaches to evaluating counterterrorism 
policy is that it leaves policy makers confused as to whether policy works or not. It 
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becomes difficult to compare results when different methodologies yielded different 
results. Freese (2014) argued the need for a framework to evaluate counterterrorism 
policy so that the inconsistency in methods and results are minimized. It has been 
suggested that there needs to be a shift in research towards evidence-based practice in 
policy evaluation research to measure the benefit of policy and its effectiveness (Freese, 
2017; Lum et al., 2006, 2008). 
How one measures effectiveness of a policy is also variable. De Lint and Kassa 
(2015) examined different theoretical approaches to counterterrorism policy evaluation. 
Policy was evaluated in terms of its returns-on-investment, its ability to meet its 
objectives, and its political success (De Lint & Kassa, 2015; McConnell, 2010). At the 
heart of all policy implementation and maintenance is funding for the provisions within 
the policy, or basically how much it costs to keep this policy going. For counterterrorism 
policy, it became difficult to manage the returns of investing in increased security 
(Brzoska, 2016; Danzell & Zidek, 2013; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014). It became difficult 
to measure the reasonableness of costs for prevention. In addition, it is unknown whether 
increased security played a role in thwarting planned attacks, or if there were any planned 
attacks in the works for a particular area that now has increased security. Brzoska (2016) 
identified impact, outcome, and output as the indicators for effective counterterrorism 
financing policy. However, impact is difficult to measure, and while output and outcome 
are more easily quantifiable, they do not necessarily correlate with impact (Brzoska, 
2016). Additionally, there are regional and temporal variations in terms of law 
enforcement’s request for funding for homeland security activities, which may 
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complicate an evaluation of solely funding for counterterrorism (T.C. Johnson & Hunter, 
2017). 
It is important to examine more than just frequency of terrorist attacks to address 
whether counterterrorism policy meets its objectives, namely to prevent future terrorism. 
An organization may operate frequently using small-scale attacks or amass resources to 
execute a single, large-scale attack. Therefore, looking at incident data alone is 
insufficient. Incident data must be paired with other variables such as lethality and 
extensiveness of damage for a more complete analysis (Danzell & Zidek, 2013). The 
growth of availability of open source databases on terrorist attacks makes this approach 
more doable than in the past. However, De Klint and Kassa (2015) and Van Dongen 
(2011) suggested that attempting to identify indicators of counterterrorism policy 
effectiveness was too difficult because of the amount of factors that may influence those 
indicators. 
In terms of political success, that can be measured by the re-electability of the 
politicians who sponsored and supported the policy as well as the general national mood 
regarding the policy (De Lint & Kassa, 2015). Another aspect of political success is the 
extent to which a policy aligns with the norms, values, and ideals of the nation. This also 
can be difficult to measure because how information is socially constructed and presented 
can impact whether a policy is considered to be consistent with the societal norms, 
values, and ideals or not. For example, when it came to interrogation practices, rather 
than calling the practices what they were, torture, the U.S. government called those 
practices enhanced interrogation, which quelled public anxiety over the use of torture, 
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which is inherently against U.S. values and ideals (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 
2003; Dorfman, 2004; Janoff-Bulman, 2007; Martin, 2018; Opotow, 2007; Pious, 2006; 
Raz, 2013; Vrij et al., 2017). However, this form of measurement does not consider the 
impact, positive and negative, that a policy may have had. What follows is a review of 
the more recent literature aimed at evaluating counterterrorism policy. 
Shor (2016) examined short and long-term incidence of terrorism following 
implementation of counterterrorism policy for over 130 countries between 1981 and 
2009. The purpose of counterterrorism policy was framed among three alternatives: an 
effective tool, window dressing, and promoting terrorism. Shor found that in the short-
term, the window dressing purpose, which was basically the passage of policy to appease 
the public and make it appear that the government was acting against terrorism, was the 
only statistically significant result. In the long-term, Shor found that the promoting 
terrorism via terrorist backlash against policy was statistically significant. While Shor 
identified limitations of his study, he suggested future research into the examination 
between the balance of civil liberties and counterterrorism policies as a way to combat 
long-term increases in terrorism.  
Lindahl (2017) proposed a critical terrorism study to evaluating counterterrorism 
policy. Lindahl suggested that counterterrorism be viewed as emancipatory, meaning that 
counterterrorism was an ongoing process that sought to lead towards emancipation, while 
knowing that achieving full emancipation was not possible. Following Weber’s proposals 
of ideal types, Lindahl proposed an emancipatory counterterrorism that included five 
components: key assumptions, priorities or aims, basic principles, strategies and tactics, 
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and evaluation (Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2018). Lindahl’s model was offered as an alternative 
to the more violent constructions of counterterrorism by focusing on nonviolence, 
freedom, and peace.  
Some of the calls for evaluating counterterrorism policy came from concerns that 
such policies provoked further terrorist attacks, rather than deterred or prevented future 
terrorist attacks (Avdan & Uzonyi, 2017; Dietrich, 2014; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; 
Qvortrup, 2016). This led to a policy evaluation approach over time, where specific 
interventions were assessed using empirical data. Such analyses have thus far been 
conducted as specific case studies for particular nations, LaFree, Dugan, and Korte 
(2009) used Northern Ireland, Barros (2003) used Spain, and Sharvit et al. (2013) used 
the Israel/Palestine conflict. The current quantitative study used the case of the United 
States. Following the model used by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009), I examined U.S. 
domestic terrorism data (incidence, lethality, and costs) from the GTD in relation to the 
implementation of each of the counterterrorism policies.  
  Summary of Literature Review 
Terrorism is a global social problem. In the United States, the primary threat 
comes from domestic terrorists but U.S. counterterrorism policy has focused on the rarer 
threat of international terrorism. Even though this paradox exists, U.S. counterterrorism 
provisions continue to be developed and renewed without any specific empirical data to 
support their use. In this study, I fill the gap in the literature by using empirical data from 
the GTD to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21
st
 century.  
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Two theoretical approaches were applied to this study, the MSF from public 
policy and the power elite theory as part of conflict theory from sociology. The MSF 
provided a model for explaining the policy process, particularly the agenda-setting 
portions of the policy process, yet remained flexible enough to be applied to a wide range 
of policies at various levels of governance, and across a range of sociohistorical contexts. 
Kingdon (2011) proposed that there were three independent streams, a problem stream, a 
policy stream, and a political stream which operated autonomously, but converged during 
a policy window when policy implementation occurred. Birkland (1997, 2006) extended 
Kingdon’s analysis by diving deeper into the role that focusing events played in the 
policy process. While the MSF was robust enough to explain many policy areas, it 
struggled to address the paradox of why U.S. counterterrorism policy was not addressing 
the primary threat from domestic terrorists. To complement the MSF, the power elite 
theory from conflict theory in sociology was used as well. According to C.W. Mills 
(1956), power in the United States was divided between the power elite and the rest of 
society. The power elite contained members of the political elite, the economic elite, and 
the military elite who operated in cooperation with each other to serve their own interests. 
It is through examining the power relations in the United States and how the power elite 
function that explained the discrepancy between counterterrorism policy and the terrorist 
threat in the United States. 
Terrorist attacks from domestic terrorists are an ongoing issue in the United 
States. While the purpose of U.S. counterterrorism policies was to prevent, deter, and 
respond to terrorist attacks regardless of their motivation, many of the policies focused on 
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threats from international actors. However, there were provisions that had the potential to 
impact domestic terrorist operations in the United States. The U.S. counterterrorism 
policies that were included in the analysis were those that had provisions that would 
impact domestic terrorism, either specifically or as an extension of provisions aimed at 
curbing international terrorism. These policies listed in chronological order were: the 
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005, AETA of 2006, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission of 
2007, and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.  
Despite the implementation of several counterterrorism policies, a systematic 
approach to evaluating counterterrorism policy was missing. The gap in the literature was 
that U.S. counterterrorism policy had not been evaluated for its impact on domestic 
terrorism in general. Researchers suggested that identifying an evidence-based method of 
evaluating counterterrorism policy in the United States was needed. Because the 
infrequency of international terrorist attacks would undermine the validity and reliability 
of any evaluation solely focusing on international terrorism, this study examined the 
impact of U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21
st
 century on incidence, lethality, and 
costs of domestic terrorism by using the GTD, and following the model used by LaFree, 
Dugan, and Korte (2009).  
The GTD is an open source database and contains a range of variables for analysis 
and sorting. I filtered and analyzed the data using established measures to only include 
U.S. domestic terrorist events (Berkebile, 2017; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). I used 
descriptive statistics and visual analysis to describe domestic terrorism in relation to U.S. 
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counterterrorism policy. I used the series hazard model to analyze the hazard or risk of 
domestic terrorism following the implementation of five U.S. counterterrorism policies. 
In Chapter 3, I will provide a detailed description of the methodology I chose to address 
the research questions for this study. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
The purpose of this longitudinal, quantitative study was to describe U.S. domestic 
terrorist incidence, lethality, and cost in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy. I 
analyzed domestic terrorism data to reveal the hazard for domestic terrorism following 
U.S. counterterrorism policy implementation. Governments around the world and across 
time have attempted to establish policies to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist attacks 
within their jurisdiction, and the United States was no different. While most of the 
terrorist activity in the United States comes from domestic terrorists, U.S. 
counterterrorism policy has focused on the more rare threat of international terrorism. 
However, there are elements to U.S. counterterrorism policy that may have impact on 
domestic terrorist operations.  
The gap in the literature was that changes in domestic terrorism have not been 
evaluated in relation to the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21
st
 
century. In this study, I addressed this gap in the literature by utilizing empirical data 
from the GTD to assess the effectiveness of five U.S. counterterrorism policies (AETA, 
2006; Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, 2007; USA 
FREEDOM Act, 2015; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001; USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act, 2005). Because the entire population of U.S. domestic terrorist 
incidents was available in the GTD, I did not employ a sampling strategy, rather I 
analyzed the entire population. 
In Chapter 3, I detail the research questions and hypotheses, the research method 
and design, the data accessed, the data analysis, and the ethical considerations I made in 
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this study. I also discuss my rationale for selecting a longitudinal trend design using 
secondary data to address the research questions and to confirm or reject the null 
hypotheses.  
Research Design and Rationale 
This was a quantitative, longitudinal study using secondary data. The independent 
variables were the following U.S. counterterrorism policies: the USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001 (enacted October 26, 2001), the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization 
Act of 2005 (enacted March 9, 2006), AETA of 2006 (enacted November 27, 2006), 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (enacted August 3, 
2007), and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (enacted June 2, 2015). The dependent 
variables were the following indicators of domestic terrorism: incidence, lethality, and 
costs.  
I used the following operational definition of domestic terrorism, in which 
domestic terrorism is the premeditated, intentional acts or threats of acts of violence 
intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian population and/or the government 
to achieve some political, religious, economic, ideological, and/or social objective(s) and 
perpetrated by a citizen or resident of the country within which the acts or threats are 
aimed. For U.S. domestic terrorism, the perpetrators must be U.S. citizens or residents 
and the attacks must be planned or executed within the territorial boundaries of the 
United States (Berkebile, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Carpenter, 2018; Crenshaw, 1995, 
[2009] 2012; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Enders et al., 2011; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007; 
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Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; 
Norris, 2017; Ronczkowski, 2018; Sandler, 2014). 
To measure U.S. domestic terrorism, I evaluated three indicators in relation to the 
independent variables. These indicators were (a) incidence of domestic terrorism, (b) 
lethality of domestic terrorism as measured by whether there were casualties, fatalities, 
and hostages taken during domestic terrorist incidents, and (c) the costs of domestic 
terrorism as measured by whether property damage occurred, ransom paid, and monies 
budgeted and spent by the U.S. government for counterterrorism policy (Berkebile, 2012, 
2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Brzoska, 2016; Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; 
Danzell & Zidek, 2013; De Lint & Kassa, 2015; Dietrich, 2014; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et 
al., 2005; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Enders et al., 2011; Freese, 2014; LaFree, Dugan, & 
Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Lindahl, 2017; Lum et al., 2006, 2008; McQuire, 
2013; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Pokalova, 2015; Qvortrup, 2016; Safer-Lichtenstein et 
al., 2017; Sandler, 2014; Schwinn, 2016; Shor, 2016; Van Dongen, 2011; Williams, 
2018).  
The GTD ranks property damage from a terrorist attack across four categories: 
catastrophic (likely equal to or greater than $1 billion), major (likely equal to or greater 
than $1 million but less than $1 billion), minor (likely less than $1 million), and unknown 
(START, 2018b). Additional variables related to property damage in the GTD included 
whether the incident resulted in property damage and the amount of property damage in 
U.S. dollars. If there had been kidnapping and/or hostage-taking incidents that included 
the payment of ransom, those expenditures would have been analyzed. For the time frame 
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of analysis for this study, there were hostage-taking incidents; however, none resulted in 
the payment of ransom (START, 2018a).   
Prior researchers examining lethality have focused on measuring lethality only as 
the number of fatalities; however, casualties (injuries) and hostage-taking should also be 
considered when determining lethality (Asal et al., 2015; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; 
Carson & Suppenbach, 2018; Caspi, Freilich, & Chermak, 2012; Edwards et al., 2016; 
Enders & Sandler, 2000; Nilsson, 2018; Olzak, 2016; Palfy, 2003; Phillips, 2017; 
Sheehan, 2009; Simon & Benjamin, 2000; Wilson & Lemanski, 2013). Hsu et al. (2018) 
specifically noted the importance of utilizing data on injuries and fatalities for future 
research. Therefore, in this study I examined fatalities, casualties, and hostages taken to 
determine lethality. 
In this descriptive study, I used a quantitative, longitudinal trend study of 
secondary data. I decided to use secondary data because of the recent research utilizing 
the GTD; the accessibility, flexibility, and transparency of the GTD; research supporting 
GTD validity and reliability in its use to analyze terrorism; and by my research questions. 
Using the procedure developed by Berkebile (2017), I filtered data from the GTD to 
include only U.S. terrorist events from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017. I 
examined the sources for each event to determine perpetrator nationality, and coded each 
event as domestic terrorism, international terrorism, or unknown. 
I examined incidence, lethality, and cost data from the filtered GTD data through 
descriptive statistics, visual analysis, and by using the series hazard model to describe 
how U.S. domestic terrorism had changed along those variables following the 
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implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21
st
 century. The entire 
population of domestic terrorism events in the United States from the GTD from January 
1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 was used in the analysis.  
The six central RQs were: 
RQ1: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
RQ2: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following the implementation of 
U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
RQ3: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
RQ4: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of US counterterrorism policy? 
RQ5: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of US counterterrorism policy? 
RQ6: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy? 
I chose this research design and methodology because it permitted me to provide 
empirical descriptions of these RQs and the additional SQs, which focused on each 
selected U.S. counterterrorism policy. I answered the first three RQs using descriptive 
statistics and visual analysis. I used the series hazard model to answer the last three RQs. 
My rationale for selecting this research design and methodology was in response to 
trends in the field seeking more empirical analyses regarding terrorist behavior, 
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especially U.S. domestic terrorists, and seeking evidence-based methods of evaluating 
counterterrorism policy. 
While the GTD provides terrorism data from 1970 through 2017, I examined only 
U.S. domestic terrorism data from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017. The terrorism 
data for 1993 was lost, and while parts of the data for that year were reconstructed, it is 
estimated that the data for that year only represents 15% of the total global terrorist 
activity that occurred (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). In 
addition, domestic terrorism activity in the United States for 1970 was at its highest, thus 
skewing any baseline data had I included that year and the immediately following years 
in my analyses (START, 2018a). I used domestic terrorism data for the United States 
from January 1, 1994 through October 26, 2001 to establish a baseline for comparison of 
descriptive statistics and visual analysis on incidence, lethality, and costs (see Howell, 
2004; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).  
My rationale for choosing to examine all forms of U.S. domestic terrorism rather 
than focusing on a specific ideological or methodological approach was because, with the 
exception of AETA, among the U.S. counterterrorism policies examined, the goals of the 
policies were not limited to specific types of terrorism per se, but to deterring, preventing, 
and responding to any terrorist attack. For example, while the USA PATRIOT Act was 
enacted out of the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it was the first 
policy to introduce a definition of domestic terrorism (Naftali, 2005; USA PATRIOT 
Act, 2001). 
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My rationale for selecting five U.S. counterterrorism policies was driven by the 
research focus on U.S. domestic terrorism and time constraints in examining all 
legislation related to preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorism from 1970 to 
2017. I selected the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 as the first policy to examine because 
that is when domestic terrorism was added to the United States Code as a separate 
category (Naftali, 2005; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). I reviewed U.S. counterterrorism 
policy since the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, and I identified four additional 
counterterrorism policies that had the possibility of impacting domestic terrorism activity. 
While other U.S. counterterrorism policies have been enacted since 2000, I chose these 
five because they were the most relevant to this study, and have garnered media attention 
that would allow for its provisions to be more known to the general public.  
To assess the impact of U.S. counterterrorism policy, I filtered data from the GTD 
to include only U.S. domestic terrorist events, and then analyzed those data using the 
series hazard model. Berkebile (2017) offered a model by which GTD data could be 
filtered to analyze domestic terrorism data. I used Berkebile’s model to filter the GTD. 
The GTD included the citations for the three media sources used to compile the 
information on all terrorist events (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 
2018a, 2018b). For unknown perpetrators, I conducted a supplementary analysis to 
identify if more information had been uncovered since the event’s addition to the GTD as 
a way to identify perpetrator nationality. All unknown attacks were analyzed separately. 
Time and resource constraints played a role in my selection of using a 
longitudinal, quantitative design examining secondary data for this study. Policy 
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evaluation research can be a time-consuming and labor-intensive endeavor. By focusing 
on one policy area and its impact, this study was in greater alignment with the temporal 
expectations of a dissertation. In addition, no outside grant monies were sought nor 
attained to fund this research, thus limiting my ability to collect new or additional data. 
To evaluate policy impact, researchers have used correlation or regression; 
however, when utilizing event data over time, neither correlation nor regression was 
appropriate. Correlation assumes independence of observations, but terrorist attacks may 
influence additional terrorist attacks. Therefore, terrorism event data are not independent, 
and thus would not fulfill the necessary assumptions for a correlation analysis. 
Regression analyses assume normality of data. When examining terrorism event data, 
assumption of normality may not be appropriate, and thus a different form of analysis 
was called for. Furthermore, this was a descriptive study, and thus using statistics that 
predicted trajectories did not align with the research questions. 
In examining longitudinal data to describe changes in variables and to evaluate 
policy, researchers have suggested using time-series analyses (O’Sullivan et al, 2017). 
However, there are several threats to internal validity when using a time-series analysis, 
and an interrupted time-series analysis is often used to evaluate the impact of a discrete 
intervention (McDowell, 2011). While there have been many studies that have used the 
interrupted time-series analysis to analyze event data (viz., Hsu et al., 2018), the 
interrupted time-series analysis requires the analyst to select a fixed time frame for 
comparison (Dugan, 2011; McDowell, 2011). Additionally, Shellman (2004, 2006) 
identified the subjectivity involved in planning time-series analyses, thus resulting in 
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variation in interpretation of results. Using a time-series analysis introduces the potential 
for selection bias by the analyst and undermines the validity of the results. 
Because of the nature of terrorism, the presentation of the data from the GTD, and 
more recent studies in specifically examining the relationship between terrorism and 
counterterrorism policy, I employed the series hazard model for data analysis in this 
study (Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). The series 
hazard model was a preferable alternative to time-series analyses because the series 
hazard model has greater flexibility in providing a more detailed analysis that would 
otherwise be lost (Carson, 2014; Dugan, 2011). The series hazard model extends Cox’s 
(1972) proportional hazard model to allow for evaluation of policy implementation 
(Dugan, 2011). The series hazard model allows for use of controls and evaluation of time 
effects since policy implementation, something that time-series analyses cannot do.  
The series hazard model has been used in recent quantitative analyses of terrorism 
data. Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero (2005) examined airline hijackings from 1931 to 2003. 
Carson (2014) examined the impact that legal interventions and sanctions had on radical 
eco-terrorist organizations. Sharvit et al. (2013) examined the types of Israeli intervention 
on Palestinian terrorism from 2000 to 2006.  
The most relevant analysis for this study involved using the series hazard model 
to examine the impact of British counterterrorism policies on terrorist activity in Northern 
Ireland from 1969 to 1992 (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). Because of the complexity 
involved in changing counterterrorism policy in the United Kingdom (UK), LaFree, 
Dugan, and Korte (2009) found the series hazard model to be preferable over other time-
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series analyses, because while there were clear start dates for implementation, end dates 
were not as clear. Counterterrorism policy in the United States was similar in which a key 
policy was implemented on a specific date, but specific provisions within that policy 
ended while others continued as part of different policies. For example, the USA 
PATRIOT Act was allowed to expire on June 1, 2015 and was replaced by the USA 
FREEDOM Act on June 2, 2015; however, many of the provisions from the USA 
PATRIOT Act continued as part of the USA FREEDOM Act. The primary change 
between these two acts involved the provisions regarding governmental surveillance 
powers and access to data on U.S. citizens. This is similar to Great Britain’s 
criminalization policy that officially ended in 1981 with portions of it remaining in place 
via the Ulsterization policy (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). This study was modeled 
after the methodology employed by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009). 
Methodology 
Population 
I analyzed the entire population of data on U.S. domestic terrorism events 
between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017 found within the GTD. The unit of 
analysis was the terrorist event. There were a total of 749 terrorist attacks in the United 
States between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017. Of those, 500 were identified as 
being domestic terrorism, 236 were unknown, and 13 were identified as international 
terrorism (START, 2018a).  
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I did not use any sampling strategy or procedure for selecting which terrorist data 
to include in my analysis; rather, I used the entire population of data on U.S. domestic 
terrorism events between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017 found within the GTD. 
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
I used purposive sampling to identify the U.S. counterterrorism policies that were 
evaluated. The counterterrorism policies examined began with the USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001, because that was when domestic terrorism was added to the United States Code as 
a separate category (Naftali, 2005). I identified four additional U.S. counterterrorism 
policies implemented in the 21
st
 century as having the possibility of impacting domestic 
terrorism activity. While other U.S. counterterrorism policies were enacted since 2000, I 
chose the five which were the most relevant to this study, and which have garnered media 
attention that allowed for its provisions to be known to the general public. The five 
counterterrorism policies I included in this study in chronological order were the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001 (enacted October 26, 2001), the USA PATRIOT Improvement 
and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (enacted March 9, 2006), AETA of 2006 (enacted 
November 27, 2006), Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007 (enacted August 3, 2007), and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (enacted June 2, 
2015). 
Procedure for Secondary Data 
Considering the amount of terrorist attacks that occur in the United States, I used 
data from an existing database of terrorist attacks in this study. The GTD is an open 
source dataset that has logged non-State terrorism incidents from 1970 to 2017, and 
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served as the primary data source for this study (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 
2018b). In order for incidents to be included within the GTD, they must satisfy three 
attributes of the GTD definition of terrorism and at least two of the three inclusion 
criteria (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). A terrorist attack, as defined by the 
GTD is “the threatened or actual use of illegal force or violence by a non-State actor to 
attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation” (START, 2018b, p.10). Each included incident must (a) be intentional, (b) 
involve some level of use of or threat of use of violence, and (c) be perpetrated by sub-
national actors. Furthermore, the three inclusion criteria from which at least two must be 
fulfilled are: 
Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not 
satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic 
economic change.  
Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the 
immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if 
every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As 
long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to 
coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.  
Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare 
activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by 
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international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately 
targeting civilians or non-combatants).  (START, 2018b, p.10) 
These inclusion criteria were consistent with my operational definition of 
terrorism used in this study, which made this database an appropriate source for my 
analyses. 
The GTD is available to download by request from the START website. I 
requested access to the GTD which was approved by the authors of the database on July 
31, 2018 (see Appendices A and B). Prior to IRB approval, I only accessed the GTD 
codebook. I accessed the GTD data following IRB approval on June 5, 2019. 
I identified budget appropriations for counterterrorism by the U.S. government by 
reviewing public data and documentation produced by the U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) and DHS. I also examined authoritative reports regarding 
counterterrorism budgeting by the U.S. government. Initially, I was going to provide 
counterterrorism spending by the U.S. government by fiscal year from 1994 to 2017; 
however, after I reviewed the public budget data, it was clear that identifying how much 
money was allocated towards counterterrorism was not feasible. Aspects of federal 
budget usage were classified as well as spread across a range of agencies and entities. 
Therefore, I focused on counterterrorism budget spending for fiscal years 2002 to 2017. 
Because of issues identified with consistency of reporting and data accuracy, in the end I 
chose to present the data from an open source, authoritative report published by the 
Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Data (2018). 
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Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs 
Secondary Data Selection and Collection 
Once an event fulfilled the inclusion criteria set by the GTD authors, all known 
details of that event were inputted into the database by START researchers (LaFree, 
2010; LaFree and Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). The terrorism data within the GTD 
include month, day, and year of terrorist incident, an approximate date if the actual date is 
unknown or unclear, if the incident lasted beyond 24 hours or within 24 hours, incident 
summary, the GTD inclusion criteria met, whether there is uncertainty regarding if the 
incident qualifies as terrorism, and if so, additional designation is listed, whether the 
incident was independent or part of a series of incidents, and what those related incidents 
were (START, 2018a, 2018b). For location of the incident, the country, region, 
province/administrative region/state, city, vicinity, location details, latitude and 
longitude, and geocoding specificity are noted (START, 2018a, 2018b).  
Incidents are further labeled with primary, secondary, and tertiary types of attack, 
attack success, and if it was a suicide attack. Attack success was coded in terms of 
whether the planned method was executed. It was not coded in relation to the motivation 
or long-term goals of the perpetrator or perpetrator group (LaFree, 2010; START, 
2018b). Weapon information is also provided including the main four weapon types used, 
along with four weapon sub-types used. The target and victim information include 
primary, secondary, and tertiary types and subtypes of target, name of target and specific 
target or victim, and nationality of target. Perpetrator information include primary, 
secondary, and tertiary group and subgroup names, certainty of perpetrator identity, 
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unaffiliated individuals, number of perpetrators, number of perpetrators captured, 
whether there was a claim of responsibility, the mode of such claim, whether there were 
competing claims for up to three groups, and motive of attack (START, 2018a, 2018b). 
While perpetrator nationality is not included in the public database as a discrete variable, 
perpetrator identity, if known is included as well as the citations for the media sources 
used in compiling the information for each event.  
Fatalities and injuries are provided for perpetrator and targets. Total numbers are 
provided along with the number of U.S. citizens killed or injured. Whether there was 
property damage, the magnitude of property damage, and the approximate value of 
property damage in U.S. dollars is provided. If the incident involved kidnapping or 
hostages, additional data regarding those types of incidents and whether and how much 
ransom was paid are included (START, 2018a, 2018b).  
Incidents are coded as international along ideological, logistical, miscellaneous, or 
any of the above within the GTD (START, 2018a, 2018b). While initially this seemed 
like an easy way to filter for domestic terrorist incidents, the method used to code the 
data may result in an underestimation of domestic terrorism. For example, for domestic 
terrorists that are motivated by an ideology outside of the United States or for 
independence, those would be coded as ideologically international, but if the incident 
occurred on U.S. territory, it may or may not be coded as international logistically. For 
example, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci᷇on Nacional Puertorreque᷉na (FALN), a Puerto 
Rican Independencistas revolutionary group was labeled as logistically and ideologically 
international even though the perpetrators were U.S. citizens and the attacks occurred 
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within the territorial boundaries of the United States (Martin, 2018; START, 2018a, 
2018b). Because of how I operationally defined domestic terrorism in this study, FALN 
was coded as a domestic terrorist organization. Therefore, these coding categories from 
the GTD were not used in the data filtering process. Instead, I manually coded the events 
as being domestic terrorism, international terrorism, or unknown. 
The GTD codebook includes detailed descriptions of the history of the GTD, 
coding methods, and a detailed list of changes made with the release of the updated 
database (START, 2018b). Not only are the changes listed, but the rationale for the 
changes along with adjustments in methodology are also explicitly presented (START, 
2018b). It was this level of detail and transparency that led to my choice to use the GTD 
in this study. 
I reviewed public data and documentation produced by the OMB and DHS to 
identify U.S. government budget appropriations for counterterrorism. In addition, I 
reviewed authoritative reports regarding counterterrorism budgeting. Counterterrorism 
spending by the U.S. government as allocated to the DHS was provided by fiscal year 
from 2002 to 2017 (Cordesman, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; Stimson Study Group on 
Counterterrorism Spending, 2018). 
Operationalization 
The independent variables of this study were the following U.S. counterterrorism 
policies: the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (enacted October 26, 2001), the USA 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (enacted March 9, 2006), 
AETA of 2006 (enacted November 27, 2006), Implementing Recommendations of the 
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9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (enacted August 3, 2007), and the USA FREEDOM Act of 
2015 (enacted June 2, 2015). The operational definition of U.S. counterterrorism policy 
was federal legislation enacted to deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks against 
the United States. 
The dependent variables were domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs. 
The operational definition of domestic terrorism was the premeditated, intentional acts or 
threats of acts of violence intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian 
population and/or the government to achieve some political, religious, economic, 
ideological, and/or social objective(s) and perpetrated by a citizen or resident of the 
country within which the acts or threats are aimed. For U.S. domestic terrorism, the 
perpetrators must be U.S. citizens or residents and the attacks must be planned or 
executed within the territorial boundaries of the United States (Berkebile, 2017; 
Bjelopera, 2017; Carpenter, 2018; Crenshaw, 1995, [2009] 2012; Crenshaw & LaFree, 
2017; Enders et al., 2011; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; 
Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Norris, 2017; Ronczkowski, 
2018; Sandler, 2014). 
To measure U.S. domestic terrorism, I evaluated three indicators in relation to the 
independent variables. Incidence of domestic terrorism was the first indicator. Incidence 
of domestic terrorism was measured by frequency of domestic terrorist events by year 
and by time lapse between events in days and in months.  
The second indicator was lethality of domestic terrorism. Prior research 
examining lethality focused on measuring lethality only as the number of fatalities; 
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however, injuries and hostage-taking should also be considered when determining 
lethality (Asal et al., 2015; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Carson & Suppenbach, 2018; 
Caspi, Freilich, & Chermak, 2012; Edwards et al., 2016; Enders & Sandler, 2000; 
Nilsson, 2018; Olzak, 2016; Palfy, 2003; Phillips, 2017; Sheehan, 2009; Simon & 
Benjamin, 2000; Wilson & Lemanski, 2013). Therefore, in this study, I examined 
fatalities, casualties, and hostages taken to determine lethality. Originally, I was going to 
assess the magnitude of lethality; however, low numbers violated the criteria of the series 
hazard model. Therefore, I coded each event in terms of whether the attack was lethal or 
not. 
The final indicator of domestic terrorism was costs. I intended to measure costs of 
domestic terrorism by the amount of property damage incurred, ransom paid, and monies 
budgeted and spent by the U.S. government for counterterrorism. The GTD ranked 
property damage from a terrorist attack across four categories: catastrophic (likely equal 
to or greater than $1 billion), major (likely equal to or greater than $1 million but less 
than $1 billion), minor (likely less than $1 million), and unknown (START, 2018b). If 
there were kidnapping and/or hostage-taking incidents that included the payment of 
ransom, those expenditures would have been analyzed. For ransom data, the GTD 
provided the confirmed amount paid, if known (START, 2018b). Like the lethality 
indicator, I had to adjustment how I examined costs after I accessed of the GTD data. As 
a result, instead of magnitude of property damage, I examined whether an incident 
resulted in property damage or not. I graphically presented counterterrorism spending by 
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the U.S. government spending as reported by the Stimson Study Group on 
Counterterrorism Spending (2018). I presented all costs in U.S. dollars. 
Data Analysis Plan 
I used SPSS to analyze all data to describe domestic terrorism in relation to U.S. 
counterterrorism policy using descriptive statistics, visual analysis, and by employing 
Cox’s proportional hazard test for the series hazard model. Because of some limitations 
with SPSS, I used Excel and manual calculations for the creation of needed variables for 
the series hazard model. I encrypted, password-protected, and secured the database using 
Intercrypto Advanced Encryption Package 2017. All analyses and reports were also 
encrypted, password-protected, and secured using Intercrypto Advanced Encryption 
Package 2017. 
Filtering GTD data. Because the GTD contains all incidents globally from 1970 
to 2017, I filtered the dataset to include only events that occurred between 1994 and 
2017. Following the procedure proposed by Berkebile (2017), I filtered the data along the 
following criteria: perpetrators were subnational actors, target included noncombatants, 
intention of attack was to influence larger audience, motivated by political, social, 
economic, or religious ideology, the location of the incident was within the jurisdiction of 
the United States, perpetrator nationality, and target nationality.  
The GTD does not provide a code for perpetrator nationality in its public dataset, 
therefore, I conducted supplemental examination of the sources cited in the GTD for each 
event and I examined additional open source data to determine perpetrator nationality 
when that information was not found in cited sources for the event in the GTD. The GTD 
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does contain references of the three primary sources of information for data inclusion for 
each event (START, 2018b). I sought out those references first. For cases in which 
perpetrator nationality was unknown, I coded them as unknown and analyzed them 
separately. Once the data were filtered to only include events within U.S. jurisdiction, the 
database was ready for descriptive statistical and visual analyses. Consistent with prior 
studies utilizing the series hazard model and terrorism event data, I created additional 
variables, calculated in SPSS, or in Excel or manually if those calculations were not 
possible in the version of SPSS that I used. I included all U.S. domestic terrorist data in 
my analyses.  
Compilation of US counterterrorism spending. Originally, I planned on 
compiling the counterterrorism budget data by fiscal year, and present that data 
graphically along with being analyzed using descriptive statistics. However, several 
inconsistencies and unexpected challenges arose as I reviewed the data before I started 
compiling it. Instead of conducting the compilation myself, I decided to present the data 
from the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018). The Stimson Study 
Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018) noted the same obstacles that I faced in 
attempting to compile and present budget data on U.S. government counterterrorism 
spending, which led me to concur with their recommendations regarding accountability, 
accuracy, and uniform operationalization and conceptualization of concepts. 
Research questions and hypotheses. In this study, there were six central 
research questions (RQs). For each research question, there were five sub questions 
(SQs), one for each specific U.S. counterterrorism policy that was evaluated. The null 
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and alternative hypotheses for each RQ and SQ are included below. I answered the first 
three RQs using descriptive statistics and visual analysis. I answered the last three RQs 
using the series hazard model. 
RQ1: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
H01: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H11: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. 
SQ1A: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H01A: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H11A: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ1B: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005? 
H01B: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
H11B: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
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SQ1C: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
H01C: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the AETA of 2006. 
H11C: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
AETA of 2006. 
SQ1D: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007? 
H01D: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
H11D: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
SQ1E: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H01E: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H11E: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
RQ2: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following the implementation of 
U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
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H02: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. 
H12: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. 
SQ2A: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H02A: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of 
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H12A: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ2B: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005? 
H02B: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
H12B: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
SQ2C: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the AETA of 2006? 
H02C: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the 
AETA of 2006. 
H12C: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the AETA 
of 2006. 
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SQ2D: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007? 
H02D: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of 
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
H12D: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
SQ2E: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H02E: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the 
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H12E: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA 
FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
RQ3: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
H03: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H13: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
SQ3A: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H03A: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
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H13A: domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ3B: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005? 
H03B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
H13B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005. 
SQ3C: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
H03C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
H13C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
SQ3D: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007? 
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H03D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007. 
H13D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007. 
SQ3E: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H03E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H13E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
RQ4: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
H04: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H14: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
SQ4A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H04A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
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H14A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ4B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005? 
H04B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005. 
H14B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
SQ4C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
H04C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
H14C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the AETA of 2006. 
SQ4D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007? 
H04D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007. 
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H14D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
SQ4E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H04E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H14E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
RQ5: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of US counterterrorism policy? 
H05: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event increases following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H15: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event decreases following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
SQ5A: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H05A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H15A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ5B: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005? 
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H05B: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005. 
H15B: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005. 
SQ5C: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
H05C: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
H15C: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
SQ5D: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007? 
H05D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007. 
H15D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007. 
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SQ5E: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H05E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H15E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
RQ6: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy? 
H06: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H16: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
SQ6A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H06A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H16A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ6B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005? 
140 
 
H06B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
H16B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
SQ6C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
H06C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
H16C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
SQ6D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007? 
H06D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
H16D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007. 
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SQ6E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H06E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H16E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
Statistical analysis plan. I examined the frequency of incidence of domestic 
terrorist attacks, lethal attacks, and attacks resulting in property damage using descriptive 
statistics and visual analysis for each policy time frame. I used the series hazard model to 
examine what the risk or hazard of future U.S. domestic terrorist attacks was following 
the implementation of each U.S. counterterrorism policy (Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 
2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). For this part of the analysis, instead of frequency 
of domestic terrorist attacks, frequency of lethal attacks, and frequency of costly attacks, 
the dependent variable was time between terrorist attacks in days for each indicator 
(Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; Sharvit et al., 
2013). 
The series hazard model extends Cox’s proportional hazard model by replacing 
the individual with an event (Cox, 1972; Dugan, 2011). Cox’s proportional hazard model 
provides the probability that each unit will experience an event only once; however, this 
model does not take into account the exact timing of the event, instead examining the 
order of the events (Cox, 1972; Dugan, 2011; M. Mills, 2012). In addition, the 
proportional hazards assumption avoids the necessity of imposing any distributional 
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assumptions that could force structure on data as would be needed for statistical analyses 
that include the assumption of normality (Cox, 1972; Dugan, 2011). The proportional 
hazards assumption is that for any two individuals, or events for series hazard, the ratio of 
hazards is constant (Cox, 1972; Dugan, 2011). The series hazard model builds on Cox’s 
proportional hazard model by adding the element of exact timing in order to measure 
probability from a specific intervention (Dugan, 2011). Because time-series analyses 
require equidistant measures of time between events and the implementation of policy as 
well as the domestic terrorism activities do not occur on such a schedule, time-series 
analyses was not appropriate for this study. 
The present study fulfilled the criteria needed for using the series hazard model. 
The data that I analyzed were discrete events (terrorist attacks) that were recorded such 
that duration between events was calculable (see Dugan, 2011). Domestic terrorist attacks 
do occur with relative frequency within the United States, which meets the second 
criterion for using the series hazard model. 
The following formula was used to analyze the data, where the coefficients 
associated with the hazard of a new domestic terrorist attack (number of days, Y) was 
estimated as a function of an unspecified baseline hazard function and other risk or 
protective factors measured at the time of the current attack represented by vectors U.S. 
COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY and CONTROLS (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). 
     h (Y) = λ0(Y) exp (β1U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY + β2CONTROLS)    (1) 
To measure the impact of U.S. counterterrorism policy, I created a series of 
dummy variables associated with the specific policy implementation date to the next 
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policy implementation date where values of “1” were coded as attacks during that time 
frame (Dugan, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). However, with short durations 
between some policies and thus small numbers of attacks for that time frame, the 
counterterrorism policies were coded as a series of dummy variables associated with the 
specific policy implementation date to its end date, if applicable, or to the end of the time 
frame of analysis if the policy remained in effect. Therefore, as time passed, there was 
overlap across multiple U.S. counterterrorism policies, which were in effect concurrently.  
I applied the same diagnostics used for Cox’s proportional hazard model, because 
the series hazard model is an extension of Cox’s proportional hazard model (see Dugan, 
2011). I examined Schoenfeld’s residuals as the diagnostic to determine if the 
proportional hazards assumption was met (Caroni, 2004; M. Mills, 2012; Xue & 
Schifano, 2017). I used a likelihood ratio test to identify which model, one including 
policy interaction variables with time and one without, was the best fit for the data.  
I included the following control variables: time elapsed from start of analysis in 
months, success density across three incidents, attack density across three incidents, and 
number of days since previous attack. For the domestic terrorism models, I included the 
following additional control variables: days since previous domestic attack, success 
density across three incidents of only domestic attacks, attack density across three 
incidents for only domestic attacks, and months elapsed from start of analysis for 
domestic attacks were added. I ran two models for each RQ and SQ, one with policy 
interaction variables with time and one without. 
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Threats to Validity 
Research validity refers to the extent to which what a researcher is trying to 
measure is actually being measured. Internal validity refers to the extent to which the 
independent variable caused a change in the dependent variable, and that the dependent 
variable was an appropriate indicator of the concept it was intended to indicate 
(O’Sullivan, Rassel, Berner, & Taliaferro, 2017). External validity refers to the 
generalizability of the findings (O’Sullivan et al., 2017).  
LaFree (2010) identified challenges with using open source event databases like 
the GTD with regards to accuracy of source data. Because terrorism is aimed at gaining 
media attention; however, the GTD may have a higher probability of accuracy than other 
data involving perpetrators who do not aim for media attention, such as traditional 
criminological data (LaFree, 2010). Therefore, data accuracy was not as large of a threat 
to internal validity as it would have been for non-terrorism data.  
To ensure the most complete database, the variable called doubt terrorism proper 
was included in the GTD. This variable identified whether there was any question as to 
that event being an act of terrorism or not. While this variable does add validity to the 
database, inconsistencies in coding the variable over time undermined its reliability. 
Therefore, I did not filter the data such that only those events that were not coded as 
doubt terrorism proper were included. I included all events in my analyses, independent 
of how the doubt terrorism proper variable was coded. 
The primary threats to internal validity for this study are history and maturation 
effects. However, the series hazard model allows for considerations involving history and 
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maturation effects. Because the data are disaggregated, levels of aggregation are not a 
threat as they would be in a time-series analysis (Dugan, 2011). The series hazard model 
provides information on the estimated hazard of future attacks based on time since last 
attack; therefore, the impact that prior attacks have on future attacks is accounted for 
(Dugan, 2011). In addition, because the series hazard model uses time between events as 
the dependent variable rather than frequency of events, it is possible to estimate the 
impact that policies had on the baseline hazard for future terrorist attacks (Dugan, 2011). 
Finally, because the event being measured is a domestic terrorist attack, it does not have 
to be assumed that all domestic terrorist attacks are the same; rather, the series hazard 
model allows for consideration of specific characteristics of each attack (Dugan, 2011). 
With regards to external validity, because this study used the entire population of 
data for U.S. domestic terrorism, I did not have the common concerns regarding 
generalizability to a larger population. Furthermore, I utilized a model already used in a 
range of contexts to explore the impact that some intervention had on a specific type of 
terrorism (see Carson, 2014; Carson et al., 2012; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; 
LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Sharvit et al., 2013). This study 
was a descriptive study that utilized the series hazard model for U.S. domestic terrorism 
in general, and offered insight as to its applicability for future research. 
Ethical Issues in the Use of Secondary Data Analysis Research 
I received permission to use the GTD and have no relationship with START, nor 
any workers who have been part of the process of inputting data into the GTD (See 
Appendices A and B). All information contained within the GTD came from public 
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source materials and did not contain any confidential information. Regardless, I chose to 
encrypt, password-protect, and secure the database using Intercrypto Advanced 
Encryption Package 2017. In addition, I encrypted, password-protected, and secured all 
subsequent analyses using the same encryption software. Data and analyses will be 
retained for at least five years. I sought and received IRB approval from the IRB at 
Walden University before I accessed the GTD and began my analyses. 
Summary 
The purpose of this study was to describe domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, 
and costs in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21
st
 century. In Chapter 3, I 
discussed how the gap in the literature was filled. This study filled an important gap in 
the literature because I utilizing utilized empirical data and employed the series hazard 
model to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism policy. This descriptive, 
quantitative, longitudinal trend study involved secondary data analysis as I described in 
Chapter 3. I conducted this research only after IRB approval, and in alignment with 
ethical standards. I secured all data and analyses. There was no conflict of interest 
between the GTD proprietors and myself. Chapter 4 will include the results of the 
analyses performed, as well as adjustments and the rationale for adjustments in the 
analyses in response to the unanticipated issues I encountered once I accessed the GTD.   
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Chapter 4: Results  
The purpose of this quantitative, longitudinal trend study was to describe the U.S. 
domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs in relation to U.S. counterterrorism 
policy in the 21
st
 century using descriptive statistics and the series hazard model. There 
were six primary research questions; I answered the first three using descriptive statistics 
and visual analysis, and addressed domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs 
separately. I answered the final three research questions using the series hazard model to 
determine whether there were changes in the hazard of incidence, lethality, and costs in 
domestic terrorist attacks in the United States. For each research question there were five 
sub-questions, one for each counterterrorism policy examined: USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001, USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, AETA of 2006, 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, and USA 
FREEDOM Act of 2015. The null and alternative hypotheses for each RQ and SQ are 
included below.  
RQ1: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
H01: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H11: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. 
SQ1A: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
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H01A: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H11A: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ1B: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005? 
H01B: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
H11B: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
SQ1C: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
H01C: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the AETA of 2006. 
H11C: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
AETA of 2006. 
SQ1D: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007? 
H01D: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
149 
 
H11D: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
SQ1E: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H01E: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation 
of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H11E: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
RQ2: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following the implementation of 
U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
H02: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. 
H12: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. 
SQ2A: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H02A: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of 
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H12A: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ2B: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005? 
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H02B: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
H12B: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
SQ2C: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the AETA of 2006? 
H02C: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the 
AETA of 2006. 
H12C: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the AETA 
of 2006. 
SQ2D: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007? 
H02D: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of 
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
H12D: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
SQ2E: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of 
the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H02E: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the 
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H12E: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA 
FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
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RQ3: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
H03: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H13: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
SQ3A: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H03A: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H13A: domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ3B: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005? 
H03B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
H13B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005. 
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SQ3C: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
H03C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
H13C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
SQ3D: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007? 
H03D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007. 
H13D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007. 
SQ3E: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change 
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H03E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change 
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H13E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
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RQ4: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
H04: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H14: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
SQ4A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H04A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H14A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ4B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005? 
H04B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005. 
H14B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
SQ4C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
154 
 
H04C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
H14C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the AETA of 2006. 
SQ4D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007? 
H04D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007. 
H14D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
SQ4E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H04E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H14E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation 
of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
RQ5: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event occurring change 
following implementation of US counterterrorism policy? 
H05: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event increases following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
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H15: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event decreases following 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
SQ5A: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H05A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H15A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ5B: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005? 
H05B: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005. 
H15B: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005. 
SQ5C: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
H05C: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
H15C: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
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SQ5D: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007? 
H05D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007. 
H15D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007. 
SQ5E: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H05E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H15E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
RQ6: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy? 
H06: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
H16: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
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SQ6A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001? 
H06A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
H16A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
SQ6B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005? 
H06B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
H16B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
SQ6C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the AETA of 2006? 
H06C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
H16C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the AETA of 2006. 
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SQ6D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007? 
H06D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
H16D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007. 
SQ6E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage 
change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015? 
H06E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not 
change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
H16E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes 
following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. 
In Chapter 4, I present the data collection procedures and results of my analyses. 
Results are broken up by incidence, lethality, and costs, with the presentation of the 
descriptive statistics and answers to the associated first three RQs, followed by the 
presentation of the series hazard model results and answers to the associated final three 
RQs. 
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Data Collection 
Upon receipt of IRB approval (06-05-19-0720342), I accessed the GTD dataset 
and began the analyses outlined in Chapter 3’s data analysis plan. Because perpetrator 
nationality was not included in the public GTD dataset, once I filtered the dataset to only 
include terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States and its territories between 
January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017, I manually coded each event as being domestic, 
international, or unknown. When sources were available for each attack in the GTD, I 
reviewed those sources first. When the GTD was initially created, it involved the 
combining of information from other existing databases (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 
2007; START, 2018b). For the events that were imported from another database, only 
that database was listed as the source (START, 2018a). I did not have access to those 
databases to check their sources; therefore, I entered each event into a Google search to 
identify newspaper items covering the event and its consequences. In addition, I reviewed 
the information provided in Hewitt (2005), which was also listed as a source within the 
GTD for particular events. I determined perpetrator nationality based on the review of all 
of these sources. For organizations that were known to be domestic or international and if 
they claimed responsibility for the attack, the event was coded accordingly based on 
responsible group. For example, the KKK is a domestic terrorist organization and thus all 
events claimed by the KKK were coded as domestic. Table 1 shows the list of identified 
organizations and how they were coded.  
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Table 1 
 
Terrorist Organizations and Number of Associated Incidents Listed in the GTD 
Type of 
terrorism 
Number 
of 
incidents 
Organization 
 
Domestic 2 
64 
1 
48 
1 
1 
32 
2 
3 
1 
1 
20 
6 
1 
11 
1 
6 
6 
1 
16 
3 
1 
1 
8 
1 
2 
65 
2 
2 
3 
1 
30 
6 
2 
2 
1 
Anarchists  
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) 
Animal rights extremists 
Anti-abortion extremists 
Anti-Arab extremists 
Anti-environmentalists 
Anti-government extremists 
Anti-government group 
Anti-gun control extremists 
Anti-Kim Jong-il extremists 
Anti-liberal extremists 
Anti-Muslim extremists 
Anti-police extremists 
Anti-Republican extremists 
Anti-Semitic extremists 
Anti-technology extremists 
Anti-White extremists 
Army of God 
Aryan Nation 
Aryan Republican Army 
Black Hebrew Israelites 
Black Nationalists 
Citizens for Constitutional Freedom 
Coalition to Save the Preserves (CSP) 
Court Reform Extremists 
Earth First! 
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) 
Environmentalists 
Farm Animal Revenge Militia (FARM) 
Incel extremists 
Jewish extremists 
Jihadi-inspired extremists 
Ku Klux Klan (KKK) 
Maccabee Squad and the Shield of David 
Macheteros 
Minutemen American Defense 
(table continues) 
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Type of 
terrorism 
Number 
of 
incidents 
Organization 
 
 13 
6 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
4 
14 
1 
61 
2 
24 
2 
 
6 
Muslim extremists 
Neo-Nazi extremists 
Organization 544 
Phineas Priesthood 
Pro-LGBT rights extremists 
Republic of Texas 
Revenge of the Trees 
Revolutionary Cells-Animal Liberation Brigade 
Right-Wing extremists 
Sovereign Citizen 
The Justice Department 
United Aryan Empire 
Unknown 
Veterans United for Non-Religious Memorials 
White extremists 
White Rabbit Three Percent Illinois Patriot Freedom Fighters 
     Militia 
World Church of the Creator 
International 4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
Al Qaeda 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
Anti-government extremists 
Anti-Israeli extremists 
Anti-Trump extremists  
Cuban exiles  
Iraqi extremists 
Palestinians 
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 
Unknown 1 
29 
1 
1 
2 
4 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
Anarchists  
Anti-abortion extremists 
Anti-Castro group  
Anti-environmentalists 
Anti-government group 
Anti-LGBT extremists 
Anti-Muslim extremists 
Anti-police extremists 
Anti-Sikh extremists 
Anti-technology extremists 
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) 
Environmentalists 
(table continues) 
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Type of 
terrorism 
Number 
of 
incidents 
Organization 
 
 1 
1 
1 
1 
182 
Islamist extremists 
Pro-LGBT rights extremists 
Sons of the Gestapo 
Students for Insurrection 
Unknown 
  
It should be noted that for many of the unknown events, the targets and method of 
operation were consistent with known domestic terrorist activities. For example, several 
attacks on abortion clinics were listed as unknown, yet the majority of known attacks on 
abortion clinics in the United States have been perpetrated by U.S. citizens or residents. 
As shown in Table 1, 48 domestic incidents involved anti-abortion groups, while none 
were perpetrated by international terrorists (START, 2018a). The same can be said for 
attacks on various places of worship. While not as clearly shown in Table 1 as abortion-
clinic attacks, there were many attacks on religious figures, religious devotees, and places 
of worship perpetrated by groups such as the KKK. Therefore, I displayed the breakdown 
of terrorist attacks by target type, as coded in the GTD, in Table 2.  
As shown in Table 2, organizations that restricted attacks for single-issues, such 
as Army of God targeting abortion clinics, were included in target type analysis. As 
shown in Table 2, there were 55 abortion-related incidents perpetrated by domestic 
terrorists while none were perpetrated by international terrorists. Similar results were 
found for the religious figures and institutions target type, in which 49 incidents were 
perpetrated by domestic terrorists and none by international terrorists.  
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Table 2 
 
Breakdown of Type of Terror Attack by GTD Target Type 
Target type International Domestic Unknown Total 
Abortion related 0 55 61 116 
Airports and aircraft 2 4 3 9 
Business 1 141 28 170 
Educational institution 1 36 5 42 
Food or water supply 0 1 0 1 
Government (diplomatic) 0 2 2 4 
Government (general) 2 44 29 75 
Journalists and media 0 5 13 18 
Maritime 0 1 0 1 
Military 0 13 2 15 
NGO 0 3 2 5 
Other 0 0 1 1 
Police 1 22 5 28 
Private citizens and property 5 111 24 140 
Religious figures/institutions 0 49 49 98 
Telecommunication 0 2 0 2 
Terrorists/non-State militia 0 0 1 1 
Tourists 1 1 1 3 
Transportation 0 4 3 7 
Unknown 0 3 0 3 
Utilities 0 3 6 9 
Violent political party 0 0 1 1 
TOTAL 13 500 236 749 
 
Coding Inconsistencies with the GTD 
The GTD includes a variable entitled “doubt terrorism proper.” This variable was 
introduced into the GTD after the initial compilation and has only been systematically 
coded for events since 1997 (LaFree, 2010; START, 2018b). When I reviewed the coding 
for this variable in the dataset, I found some inconsistencies. For the known domestic 
terrorist attacks, 378 were labeled as terrorism, 111 were labeled as doubt terrorism 
proper, and 11 were labeled unknown (START, 2018a). When further examining the 
events that were labeled as doubt terrorism proper, I found many of those that have been 
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labeled by the media and subsequently prosecuted as hate crimes, were labeled as doubt 
terrorism proper even if the event met the inclusion criteria of terrorism and met the 
definition of terrorism from the United States Code. In addition, there seemed to be an 
imbalance of coding where similar incidents perpetrated by persons of color and/or 
Muslims were coded as terrorism while incidents involving White perpetrators were 
coded as doubt terrorism proper. Interestingly enough, the attack by Dylann Roof on the 
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, SC on June 17, 2015 was 
coded as terrorism. Originally, I had planned on only analyzing events that did not meet 
the doubt terrorism proper criterion; however, upon noting the coding patterns, I decided 
to not remove any of the events labeled as doubt terrorism proper from my subsequent 
analyses. When the updated GTD is released with the terrorism data for 2018, it will be 
interesting to see how the Tree of Life Synagogue attack in Pittsburgh on October 27, 
2018 will be coded.  
I encountered some unexpected issues with the GTD data that I had not 
previously anticipated, and that led to some adjustments in my research questions and 
procedure. However, none of these adjustments were substantial enough to warrant 
another review by the IRB. Specifically, in the GTD, there were eight incidents that were 
labeled with only a month and year, but no specific day. While I had anticipated 
approximate dates, I had not anticipated the approximation being as open-ended as it was. 
A total of eight attacks did not have a specifically known date (seven in the pre-USA 
PATRIOT Act period, and one after the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted but before the 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act was enacted). If I removed these 
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attacks from my analyses, I would have introduced additional error into the analyses, and 
artificially increased gap times in the series hazard analyses. Therefore, based on 
procedures used by past researchers using the series hazard model when encountering this 
issue, I assigned the 15
th
 day of the month to those eight attacks (see Carson, 2014; 
Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 2012). 
In terms of lethality, I originally intended to examine the magnitude of lethality in 
relation to the selected counterterrorism policies. However, due to the low number of 
highly lethal attacks, I chose to instead create a dummy variable identifying whether an 
attack was lethal (had at least one fatality, injury, or hostage), and based the analyses on 
that criterion. Because of this change I adjusted RQ2 and RQ5, such that the questions 
asked how lethal domestic terrorism changed rather than how the magnitude of lethality 
changed. 
Another issue I encountered involved the consistency of coding the data for 
property damage. The GTD provides several variables regarding property damage. One 
variable identifies whether the event caused property damage, one variable identifies the 
level of property damage on the following scale: catastrophic (likely equal to or greater 
than $1 billion), major (likely equal to or greater than $1 million but less than $1 billion), 
minor (likely less than $1 million), and unknown, and a third variable provides the 
amount of property damage if known, in U.S. dollars (START, 2018a, 2018b). The 
second and third variables were supposed to be coded only for events that had known 
property damage. However, I immediately noted some inconsistencies. For the first 
variable of whether the event caused property damage, 522 incidents had known property 
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damage, 211 had no property damage known, and 16 were unknown as to whether they 
resulted in property damage (START, 2018a). As I more closely analyzed these specific 
events, I found that in some cases, the comments or source material specified that 
property damage occurred; however, those events were coded as unknown regarding 
property damage. Due to the terms of the EULA, changes in the GTD coding scheme is 
forbidden, and therefore I was not permitted to change the existing data in the GTD (see 
Appendix B).  
Because the scaled variable of property damage should have been coded for only 
those events that had known property damage from the first variable, and because that 
scale included a category for unknown amounts, I expected to find 522 events coded 
within that variable. Instead only 443 events were coded according to the specified scale 
(START, 2018a). I do not know why 79 events with known property damage were 
moved to system missing for this variable, instead of being coded in the unknown 
category. In addition, when I examined the third variable specifying the amount of 
property damage in U.S. dollars, I found that only 313 events had an amount listed, and 
of those, 142 had an unknown amount of property damage (START, 2018a). 
Furthermore, in some cases, events were coded as having an unknown amount of 
property damage, but were simultaneously coded as having minor or major property 
damage in the second variable. Because specific dollar amounts are used to separate 
minor from major damage, how those determinations were made is unclear.  
As a result of these issues, I created a new dummy variable for property damage 
where “1” indicated cases of known property damage, “0” had no known property 
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damage, and the 16 unknown cases were coded as system missing. Originally, I had 
intended on examining magnitude of property damage as coded in the second variable 
described above, but due to the issues listed, I only ran property damage analyses using 
the newly-created dummy variable and adjusted RQ3 and RQ6 to reflect that change.  
Prior researchers using the series hazard model to examine policy effects on 
terrorism data restricted their analyses to one year after policy implementation as a way 
to account for whether policies had specific end dates or if policies occurred in rapid 
succession, thus eliminating the issues of overlapping policy effects (see Carson, 2014; 
LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). When I examined the incidence of U.S. domestic 
terrorist attacks within one year of each policy enactment, the number of events were too 
small to analyze with any confidence. Therefore, even though there may be overlapping 
effects of policies on terrorism, I analyzed incidence, lethality, and property damage for 
the entire known period within which each policy was in effect. The USA PATRIOT Act 
was the only policy examined with a known end date within the scope of this analysis, 
that being June 1, 2015, the day before the USA FREEDOM Act was enacted.  
SPSS Version 25.0.0.2 Limitations 
I determined early in my analyses that there were several limitations in using 
SPSS with the series hazard model. As a result, I had to complete some calculations 
either by hand or in Excel, and then I had to import or manually entered those 
calculations and data into SPSS for analyses. Specifically, I was required to complete 
manual and Excel computations for success densities. I had to manually correct all gap 
times for events that occurred on the same day. Because the GTD does not list event 
168 
 
order by time of day, the ordering of events listed on the same day needed to be adjusted 
so that each same-day event had the same gap time for next event and previous event 
beyond that date (see Dugan, 2011; Dugan and Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 
2009). In addition, while the statistical software used by Dugan (2011), Dugan and Yang, 
(2012), and LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) allowed for use of the exact marginal 
strategy to resolve tied data or attacks occurring on the same day to account for all 
possible orderings, that option was not available in the version of SPSS that I used.  
To examine Schoenfeld’s residuals diagnostic for the series hazard model, I had 
to create individual graphs of residuals by time for each covariate separately for all 
iterations of the series hazard models that I ran, and I had to visually analyze those graphs 
to determine whether the proportional hazard assumption had been met. The proportional 
hazard assumption was met if the slope of Schoenfeld’s residuals was zero. Additionally, 
to determine which model was the best fit for the data, I had to manually calculate the 
likelihood ratio tests, and then check with the χ2 distribution table through SPSS. All of 
these issues with SPSS introduced additional error into the analyses that could have been 
avoided if I had used a different statistical software package. 
Results 
Incidence 
Between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017, there were 749 terrorist attacks 
perpetrated in the United States (START, 2018a). Figure 4 shows the breakdown of 
domestic, international, and unknown terrorist attacks. As shown in Figure 4, the majority 
of terrorist attacks in the United States were perpetrated by domestic terrorists. When 
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examining the features of the unknown attacks, many shared the modus operandi of 
domestic terrorism rather than international terrorism. Considering the dearth of attacks 
perpetrated by international terrorists and the overarching challenges of conducting 
terrorist operations in foreign countries; it is reasonable to presume that most, if not all of 
the unknown attacks were perpetrated by domestic terrorists. However, without 
verification I did not complete an analysis of attacks using the combined domestic and 
unknown terrorist attacks, and instead I analyzed the unknown terrorist attacks separately 
from domestic terrorist attacks and all terrorist attacks regardless of perpetrator 
nationality.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Terrorist attacks in the United States from January 1, 1994 until December 31, 
2017 by perpetrator type. 
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Figure 5 shows the incidence of terrorist attacks for the time frame of analysis and 
in relation to the counterterrorism policies examined. As shown in Figure 5, there was a 
general decrease in terrorist attacks in the United States from 1994 until 2006. There has 
been an increasing trend in terrorist attacks in the United States from 2007 to 2017. 
Figure 5. Terrorist attacks in the United States from January 1, 1994 until December 31, 
2017 in relation to counterterrorism policy. 
 
To address RQ1, Figure 6 shows the incidence of terrorist attacks in the United 
States by type: international terrorism, domestic terrorism, and unknown. As shown in 
Figure 6, international terrorist attacks in the United States occurred rarely with many 
years of no known international terrorist attacks. Domestic terrorist attacks occurred 
frequently and at least yearly. For unknown attacks, there have been a few years without 
any unknown attacks, but like domestic terrorist attacks, they occurred with some 
regularity. 
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Figure 6. Terrorist attacks in the United States by type from January 1, 1994 until 
December 31, 2017 in relation to 21
st
 century counterterrorism policies.  
 
 As shown in Figure 6, domestic terrorist attacks spiked in 1999, 2002, and 2017. 
Following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the FBI increased investigation into 
militia groups and anti-government groups. Prior to the Oklahoma City bombing, two 
sieges with federal law enforcement served as inspiration for retaliatory attacks against 
the U.S. government. The Ruby Ridge siege in Naples, Idaho began on August 21, 1992 
and ended on August 31, 1992 (Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018). The 
siege in Waco, TX between law enforcement and the Branch Davidian cult members 
occurred February 28 to April 19, 1993 (Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 
2018). Anti-government groups responded by increasing their activities in retaliation for 
Ruby Ridge and Waco. It may be the backlash from the increased FBI investigations 
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following these events that may have led to the spike in domestic terrorist attacks that 
occurred in 1999.  
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks there was a distinct rise in 
anti-Muslim and anti-Arab terrorism, including attacks against Sikhs and others who 
were mistakenly identified as Arab or Muslim (Martin, 2018; START, 2018a). After 
hitting a low in 2011, domestic terrorist attacks have been steadily increasing (see Figure 
6). This rise in domestic terrorism may be attributed to two factors, the re-election of 
President Barack Obama and the rise of the birther conspiracy theory in 2012, and the 
racist and anti-immigrant presidential campaign announcement by Donald J. Trump on 
June 16, 2015. The birther conspiracy theory questioned the place of birth and thus 
eligibility and legitimacy of Barack Obama as president (Pham, 2015; Warner & Neville-
Shepard, 2014). Trump was one of the major figures who headlined and publicly 
supported the birther conspiracy theory, which laid the foundation for his later 
presidential campaign and administration. The rhetoric used by the Trump campaign and 
subsequent administration has been one in support of White nationalism, nativism, and 
fear-inducing anti-Muslim sentiment (Montgomery, 2019; Newman, Shah, & 
Collingwood, 2018). Many White supremacists, White nationalists, and neo-Nazis were 
given greater legitimacy from the Trump campaign and election, and further fueled by 
Trump’s comments following the violent clash of protesters at the Unite the Right rally in 
Charlottesville, VA on August 11-12, 2017, which resulted in one death after one of the 
Unite the Right protestors drove his car into a crowd of counter-protestors (J. Johnson, 
2018; Perry, 2018).  
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Tables 3 and 4 show the number of terrorist attacks by type for each policy 
period. Table 3 shows the incidence of terrorism as represented in how I analyzed the 
data.  
Table 3 
 
Incidence of Terrorist Attacks Included in Counterterrorism Policy Analysis  
 
 
Domestic 
terrorism 
International 
terrorism 
Unknown Total 
Pre-USA PATRIOT act (January 1, 
1994 to October 25, 2001) 
218 7 117 342  
USA PATRIOT act (October 26,  
     2001 to June 1, 2015) 
186 4 58 248  
USA PATRIOT Improvement and  
     Reauthorization act (March 9,  
     2006 to December 31, 2017) 
206 5 93 304 
 
AETA (November 27, 2006 to  
     December 31, 2017) 
202 5 93 300 
Implementing Recommendations of  
     the 9/11 Commission act  
     (August 3, 2007 to December  
     31, 2017) 
197 5 92 294 
 
USA FREEDOM act (June 2, 2015  
     to December 31, 2017) 
96 2 61 159 
 
Note. There are overlaps across policies.  
 
Table 4 shows only the number of attacks between policy implementation periods. 
Only the USA PATRIOT Act had a specified end date. All other policies were in effect 
through the end of 2017 at least.  
As shown in both Tables 3 and 4, 45.7% of terrorist attacks in the United States 
occurred in the seven years prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. Compared to 
that baseline, there was a decrease in the frequency of terrorist attacks in the United 
States since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act (54.3% of attacks occurred over a 16-
year time frame). These results supported the acceptance of H11 that incidence of 
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domestic terrorism changed following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy for 
RQ1. 
Table 4 
 
Incidence of Terrorist Attacks Between Counterterrorism Policies 
 
 
Domestic 
terrorism 
International 
terrorism 
Unknown Total 
Pre-USA PATRIOT act (January 1,  
     1994 to October 25, 2001) 
218 7 117 342 
 
USA PATRIOT act (October 26,  
     2001 to March 8, 2006) 
76 1 26 103 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and  
     Reauthorization act (March 9,  
     2006 to November 26, 2006) 
4 0 0 4 
AETA (November 27, 2006 to  
     August 2, 2007) 
5 0 1 6 
Implementing Recommendations of  
     the 9/11 Commission act  
     (August 3, 2007 to June 1, 2015) 
101 3 31 135 
USA FREEDOM act (June 2, 2015  
     to December 31, 2017) 
96 2 61 159 
Note. There are no overlaps across policies.  
 
While Tables 3 and 4 show a change in incidence of domestic terrorism following 
the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, those 
results may have been affected by later policy initiatives. Therefore, I was not able to 
reject the null hypothesis for SQ1B.  
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the intervention variables. I created 
dummy variables for each counterterrorism policy, such that “1” indicated that a specific 
policy was in effect.  
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Table 5 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Intervention Variables for Incidence  
 
 
N M SD Min 
value 
Max 
value 
USA PATRIOT act      
     Any attack 749 .33 .471 0 1 
     Domestic only 500 .37 .484 0 1 
     International only 13 .31 .480 0 1 
     Unknown only 236 .25 .431 0 1 
USA PATRIOT Improvement 
and Reauthorization act 
     
     Any attack 749 .41 .491 0 1 
     Domestic only 500 .41 .493 0 1 
     International only 13 .38 .506 0 1 
     Unknown only 236 .39 .490 0 1 
AETA      
     Any attack 749 .40 .490 0 1 
     Domestic only 500 .40 .491 0 1 
     International only 13 .38 .506 0 1 
     Unknown only 236 .39 .490 0 1 
Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission act 
     
     Any attack 749 .39 .489 0 1 
     Domestic only 500 .39 .489 0 1 
     International only 13 .38 .506 0 1 
     Unknown only 236 .39 .489 0 1 
USA FREEDOM act      
     Any attack 749 .21 .409 0 1 
     Domestic only 500 .19 .394 0 1 
     International only 13 .15 .376 0 1 
     Unknown only 236 .26 .439 0 1 
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Keeping in mind that the policy periods overlap, 33% of any type of terrorist 
attack occurred during the USA PATRIOT Act, 41% during the USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 40% during AETA, 39% during the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and 21% during the USA 
FREEDOM Act. For domestic terrorism, 37% of attacks occurred during the USA 
PATRIOT Act, 41% during the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 
40% during AETA, 39% during the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act, and 19% during the USA FREEDOM Act. Considering that AETA was 
the only policy specifically aimed at domestic terrorism, it is noteworthy that there was 
not a greater reduction in domestic terrorism after AETA was enacted. 
Within RQ1, there were five SQs, one for each policy. The USA PATRIOT Act 
of 2001 was the focus for SQ1A. As discussed, incidence of domestic terrorism did 
change following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and therefore these 
results supported the acceptance of H11A. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005 was assessed in SQ1B. Based on Figure 6 and Table 5, there 
was no immediate change in domestic terrorism following the implementation of the 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.  
 For SQ1C, AETA of 2006 was evaluated. AETA was enacted eight months after 
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act which created some 
challenges for interpreting whether the policy had an impact independent of the USA 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act. There were only four domestic 
terrorist attacks that occurred between the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement 
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and Reauthorization Act and AETA and there were only five domestic terrorist attacks 
that occurred between the passage of AETA and the Implementing Recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. Because of the sparse data and possible influence of 
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and later policy initiatives, I 
was not able to reject the null hypothesis for SQ1C. 
 The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 was 
addressed by SQ1D. As shown in Figure 6, incidence of domestic terrorism did change 
following the implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act. Therefore the null hypothesis was rejected and H11D accepted. The 
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 was addressed by SQ1E. As shown in Figure 6, the 
increasing trend in domestic terrorism continued after the passage of the USA 
FREEDOM Act, exceeding the incidence of domestic terrorism in 1999. While the trend 
in domestic terrorist attacks immediately preceding the passage of the USA FREEDOM 
Act was increasing, the pattern shows that there would be an increase one year, followed 
by a slight decrease the next year. The slope of the increasing trend in incidence of 
domestic terrorism is steeper after the USA FREEDOM Act was passed. That, in 
combination with the data in Tables 3, 4, and 5 led me to reject the null hypothesis for 
SQ1E. 
I present the results of the series hazard model analysis for RQ4 and its SQs. The 
series hazard model addressed whether the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack changed 
following the implementation of counterterrorism policy. I present the results in the same 
178 
 
manner and format as prior researchers using the series hazard model (see Dugan et al., 
2005; Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009).  
The series hazard model required the creation of several variables. The dependent 
variable was the number of days from the current terrorist event to the next terrorist 
event. For analysis of domestic terrorist events, the dependent variable was the number of 
days from the current domestic terrorist event to the next domestic terrorist event. For 
analysis of unknown terrorist events, the dependent variable was the number of days from 
the current unknown terrorist event to the next unknown terrorist event.  A censor or 
status variable was needed for the model to identify which cases should be included in 
the analyses. Utilizing the methods outlined by Dugan (2011) and Dugan and Yang 
(2012), I created censor variables such that only the last terrorist event was censored out 
of the analysis (because it is unknown when the next event occurs). I created separate 
censor variables for analyses of all attacks regardless of perpetrator type, domestic 
terrorist attacks, and unknown attacks, because the last event for each differed, and thus 
needed to be coded appropriately.  
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable of days until 
next attack for all attacks regardless of type, domestic attacks, international attacks, and 
unknown attacks.  
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Table 6 
 
Descriptive Statistics on Terrorist Attacks in the United States, 1994 to 2017 
 
 
N M SD Min 
value 
Max 
value 
Days until any next attack 748 11.70 19.686 0 188 
Days until next domestic attack 498 17.57 27.799 0 252 
Days until next international  
     attack 
12 712.08 841.806 0 2731 
Days until next unknown attack 235 36.81 80.903 0 895 
 
As shown in Table 6, the mean number of days between terrorist attacks in the 
United States (with standard deviations in parentheses) was 11.70 (19.686) with no more 
than 188 days passing between attacks. For international terrorist attacks, the mean 
number of days between attacks was 712.08 (841.806) days or 23.4 (27.7) months with 
no more than 89.8 months or 7.5 years between attacks. For domestic terrorist attacks, the 
mean number of days between attacks was 17.57 (27.799) with no more than 252 days or 
8.3 months between attacks. Even the unknown attacks have a greater frequency than 
international attacks, yet U.S. counterterrorism policies continue to focus on the threat 
from international terrorism. 
I created several control variables for the series hazard model analysis (see Table 
7). As with the dependent variable and censor variables, I created control variables for 
each type of attack: any or all, domestic, and unknown. I included the number of days 
from the previous terrorist event to the current event to control for momentum and 
backlash, and to account for dependency between events. I created separate control 
variables for gap time from previous event for domestic attacks and unknown attacks, as 
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well as any attack. I included the number of months from the start of the analysis to 
control for the passage of time.  
Success density was a variable appeared in all prior terrorism studies utilizing the 
series hazard model (see Carson, 2014; Dugan et al., 2005; Dugan, 2011; Dugan and 
Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, and Korte, 2009). I included success density in my analysis 
because success of immediately preceding attacks may impact future attacks. The 
formula I used to calculate success density is shown in Equation 2. 
P(success for current and two previous attempts)    (2) 
    (event datecurrent – event date2nd previous)/365 
The GTD coded attack success in terms of whether the planned method was 
executed. It was not coded in relation to the motivation or long-term goals of the 
perpetrator or perpetrator group (LaFree, 2010; START, 2018b). Of the 749 terrorist 
attacks, 606 were coded as successful and 143 were coded as unsuccessful (START, 
2018a). The values of success density ranged from 0 to 365. A value of 365 indicated 3 
consecutive successful attacks executed on the same day. A value of 0 indicated 3 
consecutive unsuccessful attacks. 
I included a control variable of attack density. I measured attack density as the 
amount of time between three incidents, the current event and the second preceding 
event, regardless of attack success (see Dugan, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). I 
used this variable to determine if there was momentum from successive attacks 
independent of success. Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics for the control variables I 
used in the series hazard models examining incidence. International terrorism statistics 
were not included because its rare occurrence violated one of the criteria of using the 
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series hazard model. As shown in Table 7, all terrorist attacks occurred with greater 
frequency, greater success, and less attack density than domestic and unknown attacks. 
Table 7 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables  
 
 
N M SD Min 
value 
Max 
value 
Days since any previous attack 748 11.70 19.686 0 188 
Days since previous domestic  
     attack 
498 17.54 27.782 0 252 
Days since previous unknown  
     attack 
235 36.81 80.903 0 895 
Success density for any attack 747 59.38 96.99 0 365 
Success density for domestic- 
     only attacks 
498 51.22 95.96 0 365 
Success density for unknown- 
     only attacks 
234 31.01 67.64 0 365 
Attack density for any attack 747 23.43 30.30 0 233 
Attack density for domestic-only  
     attacks 
498 35.14 43.84 0 314 
Attack density for unknown-only  
     attacks 
234 73.77 122.06 0 936 
Months for any attack 749 135.43 98.24 1 288 
Months for domestic-only attacks 500 137.75 95.56 1 288 
Months for unknown-only attacks 236 130.72 104.21 3 287 
 
  I determined the coefficients for the series hazard model by running Cox’s 
proportional hazard model in SPSS using days until next terrorist attack as the dependent 
variable. Table 8 shows the results for incidence of terrorism by type for the series hazard 
model. I ran separate series hazard models for any terrorist attacks, only domestic 
terrorist attacks, and unknown terrorist attacks with the appropriate dependent and control 
variables.  
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Table 8 
 
Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model for Incidence of 
Terrorism in the United States, 1994 to 2017 
 All 
(N=749) 
Domestic 
only 
(N=500) 
Unknown only 
(N=236) 
Counterterrorism policies    
     USA PATRIOT act -0.293 
0.169 
-0.478* 
0.205 
-0.503 
0.341 
     USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
          Reauthorization act 
-1.151 
0.598 
-0.920 
0.545 
-0.732 
1.170 
     AETA 0.718 
0.715 
0.525 
0.690 
---- 
     Implementing Recommendations of  
          the 9/11 Commission act 
0.381 
0.428 
0.153 
0.472 
1.320 
1.221 
     USA FREEDOM act 0.650* 
0.275 
0.102 
0.330 
0.875 
0.553 
Control variables    
     Days since previous attack 0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.005 
0.008 
0.006 
     Success density 0.001** 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.002 
0.001 
     Attack density -0.003 
0.002 
0.004 
0.003 
-0.006 
0.004 
     Months -0.001 
0.002 
0.001 
0.002 
-0.005 
0.003 
     Days since previous domestic attack  -0.010** 
0.004 
 
     Success density domestic only  0.001 
0.001 
 
     Attack density domestic only  -0.001 
0.002 
 
     Days since previous unknown attack   0.001 
0.002 
     Success density unknown   0.001 
0.001 
     Attack density unknown   0.001 
0.001 
Note. *p ≤ 0.05. **p ≤ 0.01. ***p < 0.001. 
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For any terrorist attacks, only the coefficients for the USA FREEDOM Act and 
success density were statistically significant. Therefore following the implementation of 
the USA FREEDOM Act, the hazard of another terrorist attack increased (p=0.018); 
however, the start date of the USA FREEDOM Act was confounded with the presidential 
campaign announcement by Trump, and so it is unclear whether the shift in terrorist 
attacks are due to the USA FREEDOM Act alone. The statistically significant success 
density suggests a contagion component whereby prior successful terrorist attacks 
increased the hazard of another terrorist attack (p=0.002).  
For only domestic terrorist attacks, the hazard of another terrorist attack decreased 
following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act (p=0.020). As the days since 
the previous domestic terrorist attack increased, the hazard of another domestic terrorist 
attack decreased (p=0.010). While the overall series hazard model for unknown terrorist 
attacks was statistically significant from a null model (p<0.001), none of the individual 
coefficients were statistically significant. 
I ran another set of series hazard models that included policy interaction variables 
with time. These interaction variables between policy and number of months can be used 
to estimate how the baseline hazard changes as a result of time elapsing after policy 
implementation. The coefficients for these interaction variables can be used to determine 
whether the policy effect is gradual, immediate, temporary, or permanent (see Dugan, 
2011). Table 9 shows the results for the series hazard model for each type of terrorism 
including these interaction variables.  
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Table 9 
 
Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model with Interaction 
Variables for Incidence of Terrorism in the United States, 1994 to 2017 
 
 
All 
(N=749) 
Domestic 
only 
(N=500) 
Unknown only 
(N=236) 
Counterterrorism policies    
     USA PATRIOT act 1.888* 
0.768 
3.394*** 
0.943 
-2.944* 
1.498 
     USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
          Reauthorization act 
-4.437*** 
1.118 
-6.131*** 
1.267 
0.306 
2.093 
     AETA 0.704 
0.717 
0.512 
0.691 
---- 
     Implementing Recommendations of  
          the 9/11 Commission act 
0.057 
0.457 
-0.259 
0.511 
1.333 
1.247 
     USA FREEDOM act 2.807 
2.796 
3.119 
3.687 
-1.521 
4.797 
Control variables    
     Days since previous attack 0.002 
0.003 
0.001 
0.001 
0.010 
0.006 
     Success density 0.001** 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
     Attack density -0.002 
0.002 
0.005 
0.004 
-0.007 
0.004 
     Months -0.002 
0.002 
0.001 
0.003 
-0.010* 
0.004 
     USA PATRIOT act x months  
          interaction 
-0.018** 
0.007 
-0.034*** 
0.009 
0.023 
0.013 
     USA PATRIOT Improvement x 
          months interaction 
0.025*** 
0.007 
0.042*** 
0.009 
-0.012 
0.014 
     AETA x months interaction ---- ---- ---- 
     Implementing Recommendations of  
          the 9/11 Commission x months 
          interaction 
---- ---- ---- 
     USA FREEDOM act x months  
          interaction 
-0.019 
0.012 
-0.032* 
0.016 
0.022 
0.021 
     Days since previous domestic attack  -0.008* 
0.004 
 
     Success density domestic only  0.001 
0.001 
 
(table continues) 
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All 
(N=749) 
Domestic 
only 
(N=500) 
Unknown only 
(N=236) 
     Attack density domestic only  0.001 
0.002 
 
     Days since previous unknown attack   0.001 
0.002 
     Success density unknown   0.001 
0.001 
     Attack density unknown   0.001 
0.001 
Note. *p ≤ 0.05. **p ≤ 0.01. ***p < 0.001. 
For all three types of terrorism, coefficients for AETA x months interaction and 
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act x months were linearly 
dependent or constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value 
reported by SPSS. In the unknown terrorism model, the AETA intervention was also 
found to be linearly dependent or constant. 
By including these interaction variables, the impact of the specific policies 
changed from the models without these variables. For any terrorist attack, the hazard for 
another attack increased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act (p=0.014). 
However, the hazard of any terrorist attack decreased following the passage of the USA 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act (p<0.001). These two results are 
mirrored for only domestic terrorist attacks but at a greater magnitude. The hazard of 
another domestic terrorist attack increased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT 
Act (p<0.001). The hazard of another domestic terrorist attack decreased following the 
passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act (p<0.001). For 
unknown terrorist attacks, the hazard of another unknown terrorist attack decreases 
statistically significantly following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act (p=0.049).  
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Similar results for any terrorist attack and domestic terrorist attacks were found 
for the interaction variables of the USA PATRIOT Act x month and the USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act x month variables. The hazard of a terrorist attack 
decreased as time since the USA PATRIOT Act had been implemented elapsed 
(p=0.008). The hazard of a terrorist attack increased as the time since the USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act had been implemented elapsed (p=0.001). While 
the direction of change was similar from any attack to domestic attacks, the magnitude 
for domestic attacks was amplified. The hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased as 
time since the USA PATRIOT Act had been implemented elapsed (p<0.001). The hazard 
of a domestic terrorist attack increased as the time since the USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act had been implemented elapsed (p<0.001). 
Success density was found to increase the hazard of any terrorist attack (p=0.001). 
For domestic terrorist attacks, the interaction between the USA FREEDOM Act x months 
was statistically significant which showed that as time passed since the USA FREEDOM 
Act had been implemented, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased (p=0.041). 
In addition, as days from previous domestic terrorist attacks increased, the hazard of a 
domestic terrorist attack decreased (p=0.043). For the unknown attacks, the time 
component was found to be statistically significant indicating that as months pass, the 
hazard of another unknown terrorist attack decreased (p=0.021).  
I conducted a likelihood ratio test between the models with and without the 
interaction variables to determine which model was a better fit to explain the data. For all 
terrorist attacks and for domestic terrorist attacks, the model with the interaction variables 
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was the best fit (p<0.01). For the unknown attacks model, the model with the interaction 
variables was not statistically significant, thus the addition of the interaction variables did 
not significantly improve the fit of the model; and therefore, the simpler model was the 
best fit. I analyzed Schoenfeld’s residuals to ensure that the covariates fulfilled the 
proportional hazard assumption and found that the proportional hazard assumption was 
fulfilled. 
As shown in Table 9, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack did change as a 
function of counterterrorism policies, thus the null hypothesis for RQ4 was rejected. 
Because the coefficients for the USA PATRIOT Act and the USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act were statistically significant, the null hypotheses 
for SQ4A and SQ4B were rejected. With no statistical significance for AETA, 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and the USA FREEDOM 
Act, the null hypotheses were retained for SQ4C, SQ4D, and SQ4E. 
Lethality 
 To determine if an event was a lethal event, the event needed to have at least one 
fatality, injury, or hostage. I created a dummy variable to identify events that fulfilled the 
lethal criteria or not. If an event had missing information for one of the items (fatalities, 
injuries, or hostages) but had at least one fatality, injury, or hostage in the remaining 
items, then I coded that event as lethal. Only events that had missing information and 
zeroes for the remaining items were excluded from the analysis.  
From January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 there were 18 incidents involving 
hostages, 13 perpetrated by domestic terrorists, 4 by international terrorists, and 1 by an 
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unknown perpetrator (START, 2018a). Ten of the hostage incidents occurred prior to the 
passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, six perpetrated by domestic terrorists and four 
perpetrated by international terrorists. Three hostage incidents occurred between the 
passage of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act and the 
USA FREEDOM Act, two perpetrated by domestic terrorists and one by an unknown 
perpetrator. Five hostage incidents occurred since the USA FREEDOM Act was 
implemented and were all perpetrated by domestic terrorists. 
Figure 7 shows lethal terrorist attacks in the United States by type and in relation 
to counterterrorism policies. As shown in Figure 7, there were no lethal attacks in 2003, 
2004, 2005, and 2007. After an initial spike in 2002, lethal domestic terrorist attacks 
decreased to 0 until the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization 
Act. While there was a decrease in lethal domestic terrorist attacks between AETA and 
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, the numbers were so 
small as to question whether there was a significant impact from the passage of AETA. 
Additionally, most eco-terrorism involved property damage over lethality, and thus any 
impact on lethal domestic terrorism by AETA would be small. Lethal domestic terrorist 
attacks have been increasing since 2011. From 2014 to 2015, lethal domestic terrorist 
attacks decreased before resuming an increasing trend.  
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Figure 7. Lethal terrorist attacks in the United States from January 1, 1994 until 
December 31, 2017 in relation to 21
st
 century counterterrorism policies and by type of 
attack.  
 
Table 10 shows the counts and descriptive statistics for lethal terrorist attacks by 
type. In general, most terrorist attacks in the United States were non-lethal attacks. The 
trends in lethal attacks are mirrored for any attack type and for domestic attacks. The 
differences occurred from the baseline period to after the USA PATRIOT Act was 
enacted. For any attack, there was a decrease in lethal attacks but for domestic attacks, 
lethal attacks increased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. The number of 
days to next lethal attack was lowest for any lethal attack and highest for unknown 
attacks. 
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Table 10 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Lethal Terrorist Attacks in the United States, 1994 to 2017 
 
 
All 
(Total 
N=183) 
 
Domestic 
only  
(Total 
N=137) 
Unknown only 
(Total N=36) 
Lethal attacks 184 138 37 
Non-lethal attacks 563 362 196 
System-missing 2  3 
    
Counterterrorism policies    
     USA PATRIOT act 61 (12) 51 (9) 7 (2) 
     USA PATRIOT Improvement and  
          Reauthorization act 
105 (1) 91 (1) 11 (0) 
     AETA 104 (0) 90 (0) 11 (0) 
     Implementing Recommendations of  
          the 9/11 Commission act 
104 (48) 90 (41) 11 (5) 
     USA FREEDOM act 56 (56) 49 (49) 6 (6) 
    
Pre-USA PATRIOT act 67 38 24 
    
Mean days to next lethal attack  
(Standard deviation in parentheses) 
47.52 
(125.058) 
63.48 
(158.197) 
237.47 
(458.676) 
 
Table 11 shows the descriptive statistics for the intervention variables for lethal 
attacks. As shown in Table 11, for any lethal attack, domestic lethal attacks, and 
unknown lethal attacks, the means were the same for the USA PATRIOT Improvement 
and Reauthorization Act, AETA, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act and higher than the means for types of lethal attacks for the USA 
PATRIOT Act and the USA FREEDOM Act.  
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Table 11 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Intervention Variables for Lethal Terrorist Attacks in the United 
States, 1994 to 2017 
 
 
N M SD Min 
value 
Max 
value 
USA PATRIOT act      
     Any attack 184 0.33 0.472 0 1 
     Domestic only 138 0.37 0.484 0 1 
     Unknown only 37 0.19 0.397 0 1 
USA PATRIOT Improvement 
and Reauthorization act 
     
     Any attack 184 0.57 0.496 0 1 
     Domestic only 138 0.66 0.476 0 1 
     Unknown only 37 0.30 0.463 0 1 
AETA      
     Any attack 184 0.57 0.497 0 1 
     Domestic only 138 0.65 0.478 0 1 
     Unknown only 37 0.30 0.463 0 1 
Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission act 
     
     Any attack 184 0.57 0.497 0 1 
     Domestic only 138 0.65 0.478 0 1 
     Unknown only 37 0.30 0.463 0 1 
USA FREEDOM act      
     Any attack 184 0.30 0.461 0 1 
     Domestic only 138 0.36 0.480 0 1 
     Unknown only 37 0.16 0.374 0 1 
 
 As shown in Figure 7, Table 10, and Table 11, lethal domestic terrorism changed 
following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy in general. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis was rejected for RQ2. Lethal domestic terrorist attacks increased 
following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and the USA FREEDOM Act (49 
attacks in 2 ½ years compared to 51 attacks in approximately 14 years). Therefore, the 
null hypotheses for SQ2A, SQ2D, and SQ2E were rejected. Lethal domestic terrorist 
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attacks did not substantively change following the passage of the USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act and AETA; therefore, I retained the null 
hypotheses for SQ2B and SQ2C. 
Table 12 shows the descriptive statistics for the additional control variables for 
the series hazard model beyond the values listed in Table 7. The dependent variable for 
the series hazard models was days until next lethal attack. Table 7 shows the values for 
the control variables regardless of lethality for days since previous attack, success 
density, and attack density. Table 12 includes the control variables by type for only lethal 
attacks. Control variables regardless of lethality were included in case there was a 
contagion effect based on attacks in general, not just lethal attacks. As shown in Table 12, 
there were longer gaps between previous lethal attacks to current lethal attacks than 
incidence of attacks (see Table 7). As with attack incidence regardless of lethality, any 
lethal attack occurred with less time between attacks than domestic or unknown. Success 
densities for any lethal attack and lethal domestic attacks were similar, and success 
densities for unknown lethal attacks were low. Attack density reflected the same pattern 
shown with days since previous attack. 
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Table 12 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Additional Control Variables for Lethal Terrorist Attacks in the 
United States, 1994 to 2017 
 
 
N Mean SD Min 
value 
Max 
value 
Days since previous lethal attack 748 47.52 125.058 0 1338 
Days since previous lethal  
     domestic attack 
137 63.48 158.197 0 1400 
Days since previous lethal  
     unknown attack 
36 237.47 458.676 0 2445 
Success density 182 44.528 98.080 0.25 365 
Success density for lethal  
     domestic 
136 45.000 103.280 0 365 
Success density for lethal  
     unknown 
35 10.612 21.329 0.11 91.25 
Attack density 182 95.47 184.026 0 1485 
Attack density for lethal domestic 136 127.16 232.928 0 1547 
Attack density for lethal  
     unknown 
35 485.86 717.112 4 3340 
Lethal months 184 164.14 103.048 2 287 
Lethal months for domestic  138 181.07 100.536 2 287 
Lethal months for unknown 37 108.68 98.253 2 286 
 
The series hazard models for lethal attacks were used to answer RQ5. The rare 
occurrence of unknown lethal attacks violated the criteria for the series hazard model. 
While statistical significance was found for the full model at p < 0.01 and for specific 
variables, the results were not reliable due to the small number of events. Therefore, the 
focus of the interpretation that follows will be on any lethal attack and lethal domestic 
attacks. Table 13 shows the results of the Cox’s proportional hazard model for lethal 
attacks. 
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Table 13 
 
Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model for Lethal 
Terrorism in the United States, 1994 to 2017 
 
 
All 
(N=138) 
Domestic 
only 
(N=135) 
Unknown only 
(N=34) 
Counterterrorism policies    
     USA PATRIOT act -1.560*** 
0.474 
-3.966*** 
0.873 
-3.390* 
1.550 
     USA PATRIOT Improvement and  
          Reauthorization act 
-1.314 
1.764 
1.007 
1.948 
-0.388 
2.786 
     AETA 0.910 
1.748 
0.979 
1.711 
---- 
     Implementing Recommendations of  
          the 9/11 Commission act 
---- ---- ---- 
     USA FREEDOM act -1.230* 
0.599 
-3.599*** 
0.982 
-3.085 
2.393 
Control variables    
     Days since previous lethal attack 0.001 
0.001 
  
     Success density for lethal attacks 0.001 
0.001 
  
     Attack density for lethal attacks 0.001 
0.001 
  
     Months of lethal attacks 0.010* 
0.004 
0.011* 
0.005 
0.015 
0.014 
     Days since any previous attack 0.001 
0.008 
0.009 
0.012 
-0.166* 
0.066 
     Success density for any previous attack 0.001 
0.001 
0.002 
0.002 
-0.002 
0.011 
     Attack density for any previous attack 0.003 
0.004 
0.001 
0.008 
0.077 
0.040 
     Days since previous lethal domestic  
          attack 
 0.001 
0.001 
 
     Success density lethal domestic only  0.001 
0.002 
 
     Attack density lethal domestic only  0.001 
0.001 
 
     Days since previous domestic attack  -0.008 
0.009 
 
(table continues) 
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All 
(N=138) 
Domestic 
only 
(N=135) 
Unknown only 
(N=34) 
     Success density domestic only  -0.002 
0.002 
 
     Attack density domestic only  0.008 
0.006 
 
     Days since previous lethal unknown  
          attack 
  0.001 
0.001 
     Success density lethal unknown   -0.018 
0.034 
     Attack density lethal unknown   -0.001 
0.001 
     Days since previous unknown attack   -0.008 
0.007 
     Success density unknown   0.030 
0.025 
     Attack density unknown   0.12 
0.007 
Note. *p ≤ 0.05. **p ≤ 0.01. ***p < 0.001. 
For all three types of terrorism, coefficients for Implementing Recommendations 
of the 9/11 Commission Act were linearly dependent or constant resulting in a reduction 
of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value reported by SPSS. For all lethal terrorist attacks 
and domestic lethal attacks, only the coefficients for the USA PATRIOT Act, the USA 
FREEDOM Act, and the months of lethal attacks were statistically significant. For any 
lethal terrorist attack, the hazard of another lethal terrorist attack decreased following the 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act (p=0.001) and following the implementation 
of the USA FREEDOM Act (p=0.040). For lethal domestic terrorist attacks, the hazard of 
another lethal domestic terrorist attack decreased following the implementation of the 
USA PATRIOT Act (p<0.001) and following the implementation of the USA 
FREEDOM Act (p<0.001). However, as time passed, the hazard of any lethal terrorist 
attack (p=0.012) and the hazard of lethal domestic terrorist attacks (p=0.028) increased. 
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Considering the differences in magnitude of the coefficients for the USA PATRIOT Act 
and the USA FREEDOM Act between any lethal attack and domestic lethal attacks, it 
appeared that domestic lethal attacks were more affected by these policies than any lethal 
attack in general. 
I ran the series hazard model with the inclusion of intervention variables for 
lethality. Because of the small N, the series hazard model results for unknown lethal 
attacks, while statistically significant (p<0.01) are unreliable, and thus were not further 
interpreted. Table 14 shows the results of the Cox’s proportional hazard model for lethal 
terrorist attacks including the policy intervention variables. 
For all models, coefficients for Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act, the AETA x months interaction and the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act x months were linearly dependent or 
constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value reported by 
SPSS. The only statistically significant coefficient was found for lethal domestic terrorist 
attacks after the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted. As shown in Table 14, there were no 
statistically significant coefficients in the model for any lethal terrorist attack. For lethal 
domestic terrorist attacks, the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act decreased the hazard of 
another lethal domestic terrorist attack (p=0.024). 
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Table 14 
 
Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model with Interaction 
Variables for Lethal Terrorism in the United States, 1994 to 2017 
 
 
All 
(N=749) 
Domestic 
only 
(N=135) 
Unknown only 
(N=34) 
Counterterrorism policies    
     USA PATRIOT act 2.426 
3.845 
-10.607* 
4.708 
4.725 
8.186 
     USA PATRIOT Improvement and  
          Reauthorization act 
-4.480 
4.948 
6.169 
5.363 
-15.622 
11.032 
     AETA 1.483 
1.849 
1.136 
1.744 
---- 
     Implementing Recommendations of  
          the 9/11 Commission act 
---- ---- ---- 
     USA FREEDOM act -1.798 
6.080 
-13.055 
6.826 
-17.836 
15.309 
Control variables    
     Days since previous lethal attack 0.001 
0.001 
  
     Success density for lethal attacks 0.001 
0.001 
  
     Attack density for lethal attacks 0.001 
0.001 
  
     Months of lethal attacks 0.006 
0.005 
0.002 
0.008 
0.002 
0.017 
     Days since any previous attack 0.001 
0.008 
0.006 
0.012 
-0.194** 
0.070 
     Success density for any previous attack 0.001 
0.001 
0.002 
0.002 
-0.005 
0.011 
     Attack density for any previous attack 0.002 
0.004 
0.001 
0.008 
0.081 
0.042 
     USA PATRIOT act x lethal months  
          interaction 
-0.038 
0.037 
0.066 
0.041 
-0.082 
0.086 
     USA PATRIOT Improvement x lethal  
          months interaction 
0.043 
0.039 
-0.52 
0.43 
0.120 
0.081 
     AETA x lethal months interaction ---- ---- ---- 
     Implementing Recommendations of  
          the 9/11 Commission x lethal  
          months interaction 
---- ---- ---- 
(table continues) 
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All 
(N=749) 
Domestic 
only 
(N=135) 
Unknown only 
(N=34) 
     USA FREEDOM act x lethal months  
          interaction 
-0.021 
0.041 
0.075 
0.045 
---- 
     Days since previous lethal domestic  
          attack 
 -0.001 
0.001 
 
     Success density lethal domestic only  0.001 
0.002 
 
     Attack density lethal domestic only  0.001 
0.001 
 
     Days since previous domestic attack  -0.006 
0.009 
 
     Success density domestic only  -0.002 
0.002 
 
     Attack density domestic only  0.008 
0.006 
 
     Days since previous lethal unknown  
          attack 
  0.002 
0.001 
     Success density lethal unknown   0.001 
0.037 
     Attack density lethal unknown   -0.001 
0.001 
     Days since previous unknown attack   -0.008 
0.007 
     Success density unknown   0.026 
0.025 
     Attack density unknown   0.014 
0.007 
Note. *p ≤ 0.05. **p ≤ 0.01. ***p < 0.001. 
I conducted a likelihood ratio test between the models with and without the 
interaction variables to determine which model was a better fit to explain the data for 
lethality. None of the models with the interaction variables were statistically significant, 
thus the interaction variables did not significantly improve the fit of the models in 
explaining lethality. Therefore, the series hazard model in Table 13 was used to answer 
RQ5 and its SQs. I analyzed Schoenfeld’s residuals to ensure that the covariates fulfilled 
the proportional hazard assumption and found that the proportional hazard assumption 
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was fulfilled. As shown in Table 13, lethal domestic terrorism changed following the 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy, thus I rejected the null hypothesis for 
RQ5. The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and the USA FREEDOM Act decreased 
the hazard of another lethal domestic terrorist attack; therefore, I rejected the null 
hypotheses for SQ5A and SQ5E. However, as time passed in months for lethal terrorist 
attacks, the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist attack increased. The lack of statistical 
significance for the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, AETA, and 
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act led to retaining the null 
hypotheses for SQ5B, SQ5C, and SQ5D. 
Costs from Property Damage 
 Costs of terrorism in the United States include the costs of property damage, 
ransom paid, and counterterrorism spending. Counterterrorism spending will be 
elaborated on in the next section. From January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 there were 
18 incidents involving hostages (START, 2018a). No incidents resulted in payment of 
ransom. Therefore, I analyzed costs for whether property damage was sustained in 
attacks.   
 Figure 8 shows the terrorist attacks resulting in property damage by type in 
relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy. As shown in Figure 8, domestic terrorist attacks 
that resulted in property damage decreased in 2004 and then began a slow increasing 
trend following the passage of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act. The increasing trend in domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property 
damage became less noisy after the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act. 
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Figure 8. Terrorist attacks in the United States that resulted in property damage from 
January 1, 1994 until December 31, 2017 in relation to 21
st
 century counterterrorism 
policies and by type of attack.  
 
Unlike the results on lethality, the trends for attacks resulting in property damage 
differed by type of terrorism. For all terrorist attacks resulting in property damage, 
attacks increased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act and then decreased. For domestic terrorist attacks resulting in 
property damage, attacks decreased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
For unknown terrorist attacks resulting in property damage, after the initial decrease 
following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, attacks increased following the USA 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and then decreased. 
Table 15 shows the descriptive statistics for terrorist attacks that resulted in 
property damage. As shown in Table 15, the majority of terrorist attacks for each type 
had higher incidence of attacks resulting in property damage than attacks that did not 
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result in property damage. Additionally, attacks resulting in property damage, regardless 
of type decreased following the passage or the USA PATRIOT Act. 
Table 15 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Terrorist Attacks Resulting in Property Damage 
 All 
(Total 
N=521) 
 
Domestic 
only  
(Total 
N=329) 
Unknown only 
(Total N=182) 
Attacks with property damage 522 330 183 
Attacks without property damage 211 155 52 
System-missing 16 15 1 
    
Counterterrorism policies    
     USA PATRIOT act 153 (69) 112 (54) 39 (15) 
     USA PATRIOT Improvement and  
          Reauthorization act 
190 (1) 111 (1) 77 (0) 
     AETA 189 (3) 110 (2) 77 (1) 
     Implementing Recommendations of  
          the 9/11 Commission act 
186 (80) 108 (55) 76 (23) 
     USA FREEDOM act 106 (106) 53 (53) 53 (53) 
    
Pre-USA PATRIOT act 263 165 91 
    
Mean days to next attack with property 
damage  
(Standard deviation in parentheses) 
16.78 
(28.769) 
26.57 
(43.354) 
47.41 
(101.854) 
 
As with lethal attacks, attacks resulting in property damage for all types had a 
greater number of days to next attack with property damage compared to incidence of 
another attack regardless of outcome. As with incidence and lethality results, time to next 
attack with property damage was shortest for any attack with property damage and 
longest for unknown attacks with property damage. Table 16 shows the descriptive 
statistics for the intervention variables by type.   
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Table 16 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Intervention Variables on Terrorist Attacks that Resulted in 
Property Damage in the United States, 1994 to 2017 
 
 
N M SD Min 
value 
Max 
value 
USA PATRIOT act      
     Any attack 522 0.29 0.456 0 1 
     Domestic only 330 0.34 0.474 0 1 
     Unknown only 183 0.21 0.411 0 1 
USA PATRIOT Improvement 
and Reauthorization act 
     
     Any attack 522 0.36 0.482 0 1 
     Domestic only 330 0.34 0.473 0 1 
     Unknown only 183 0.42 0.495 0 1 
AETA      
     Any attack 522 0.36 0.481 0 1 
     Domestic only 330 0.33 0.472 0 1 
     Unknown only 183 0.42 0.495 0 1 
Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission act 
     
     Any attack 522 0.36 0.479 0 1 
     Domestic only 330 0.33 0.470 0 1 
     Unknown only 183 0.42 0.494 0 1 
USA FREEDOM act      
     Any attack 522 0.20 0.403 0 1 
     Domestic only 330 0.16 0.368 0 1 
     Unknown only 183 0.29 0.455 0 1 
 
As shown in Table 16, regardless of attack type, the percentage of attacks for the 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, AETA, and the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act was constant or nearly constant. For 
domestic terrorist attacks with property damage, the percentage of attacks decreased from 
33-34% in prior policy periods to 16% after the USA FREEDOM Act. For any terrorist 
attack resulting in property damage and unknown attacks resulting in property damage, 
the percentage of attacks were lower for the USA PATRIOT Act and USA FREEDOM 
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Act periods. I rejected the null hypotheses for RQ3, SQ3A, SQ3D, and SQ3E based on 
the results shown in Figure 8, Table 15, and Table 16. Because the change in domestic 
terrorist attacks that resulted in property damage did not change substantially after the 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and 
AETA, I retained the null hypotheses for SQ3B and SQ3C. 
I created additional control variables for the analysis for property damage to 
account for the influence of previous attacks, success density, and attack density 
regardless of property damage, the descriptive statistics for which are shown in Table 17.  
Table 17 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Additional Control Variables for Terrorist Attacks that Resulted 
in Property Damage in the United States, 1994 to 2017 
 
 
N Mean SD Min 
value 
Max 
value 
Days since previous attack with  
     property damage 
521 16.78 28.769 0 237 
Days since previous domestic  
     attack with property damage 
329 26.57 43.354 0 329 
Days since previous unknown  
     attack with property damage 
182 47.41 101.854 0 1036 
Success density 520 53.348 93.061 0 365 
Success density for domestic with  
     property damage 
328 45.948 93.531 0.65 365 
Success density for unknown  
     with property damage 
181 28.098 65.363 0 365 
Attack density 520 33.60 45.423 0 427 
Attack density for domestic with  
     property damage 
328 53.27 66.338 0 427 
Attack density for unknown with  
     property damage 
181 94.65 154.243 0 1096 
Months with property damage 522 125.19 98.878 0 287 
Months for domestic with  
     property damage 
330 122.21 93.395 2 287 
Months for unknown with  
     property damage 
183 132.06 108.966 2 286 
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I ran the series hazard model for each type of terrorism using the days until the 
next attack with property damage as the dependent variable. Table 18 shows the results of 
the Cox’s proportional hazard model for attacks with property damage. For the unknown 
attacks with property damage, the coefficient for AETA was linearly dependent or 
constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value reported by 
SPSS. For any terrorist attack resulting in property damage the only statistically 
significant coefficient was for the USA PATRIOT Act (p=0.012), which indicated that 
the hazard for another terrorist attack resulting in property damage decreased following 
the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act. For domestic attacks resulting in property 
damage, statistical significance was found for the USA PATRIOT Act and the attack 
density from any previous attack regardless of property damage. These results indicate 
that the hazard of a domestic attack resulting in property damage decreased after the USA 
PATRIOT Act was enacted (p<0.001), but increased when the attack density from any 
previous attacks increased (p=0.040). For unknown attacks that resulted in property 
damage, statistical significance was found for the USA FREEDOM Act and months of 
attacks with property damage. For unknown attacks resulting in property damage, the 
hazard of another unknown attack resulting in property damage increased following the 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act (p=0.002), but decreased as time passed 
(p=0.001).   
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Table 18 
 
Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model for Terrorism 
Resulting in Property Damage in the United States, 1994 to 2017 
 
 
All 
(N=518) 
Domestic 
only 
(N=326) 
Unknown only 
(N=180) 
Counterterrorism policies    
     USA PATRIOT act -0.519* 
0.208 
-0.887*** 
0.253 
0.063 
0.468 
     USA PATRIOT Improvement and  
          Reauthorization act 
-1.326 
1.201 
-1.090 
1.120 
1.463 
1.374 
     AETA 0.891 
1.286 
1.091 
1.308 
---- 
     Implementing Recommendations of  
          the 9/11 Commission act 
0.696 
0.608 
0.033 
0.821 
-0.216 
1.437 
     USA FREEDOM act 0.646 
0.347 
-0.170 
0.425 
2.298** 
0.734 
Control variables    
     Days since previous attack with  
           property damage 
0.001 
0.004 
  
     Success density for attacks with  
          property damage 
0.002 
0.001 
  
     Attack density for attacks with  
          property damage 
-0.002 
0.003 
  
     Months of attacks with property  
          damage 
-0.003 
0.002 
0.001 
0.002 
-0.013*** 
0.004 
     Days since any previous attack -0.002 
0.005 
-0.006 
0.007 
0.010 
0.007 
     Success density for any previous attack -0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.002 
0.002 
0.001 
     Attack density for any previous attack 0.001 
0.004 
0.009* 
0.005 
0.001 
0.005 
     Days since previous domestic attack  
          with property damage 
 0.004 
0.003 
 
     Success density domestic only with  
          property damage 
 0.002 
0.002 
 
     Attack density domestic only with  
          property damage 
 -0.003 
0.002 
 
     Days since previous domestic attack  -0.010 
0.006 
 
(table continues) 
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All 
(N=518) 
Domestic 
only 
(N=326) 
Unknown only 
(N=180) 
     Success density domestic only  -0.001 
0.003 
 
     Attack density domestic only  0.001 
0.004 
 
     Days since previous unknown attack  
          with property damage 
  0.001 
0.001 
     Success density unknown with  
          property damage 
  0.002 
0.003 
     Attack density unknown with property  
           damage 
  -0.001 
0.001 
     Days since previous unknown attack   -0.004 
0.003 
     Success density unknown   -0.003 
0.003 
     Attack density unknown   0.002 
0.001 
Note. *p ≤ 0.05. **p ≤ 0.01. ***p < 0.001. 
Table 19 shows the coefficients of the series hazard model for attacks with 
property damage by type including interaction variables. For all three types of attacks 
resulting in property damage, coefficients for the AETA x months interaction and the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act x months were linearly 
dependent or constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value 
reported by SPSS. For unknown attacks resulting in property damage, the coefficient for 
AETA was linearly dependent or constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom 
to 0 and no value reported by SPSS.  
As shown in Table 19, the inclusion of the interaction variables decreased the 
number of interventions that were statistically significant. For any terrorist attack 
resulting in property damage, the only coefficient that was statistically significant was the 
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time component of months of attacks with property damage indicating that the hazard of 
any attack with property damage decreased over time (p=0.012). For domestic attacks 
with property damage, the only statistically significant coefficient was for attack density 
for any previous attack regardless of property damage (p=0.021). As the attack density 
for any previous attack decreases, the hazard of a domestic attack with property damage 
increases.  
The model for unknown attacks with property damage was the only model that 
had multiple coefficients that were statistically significant after the inclusion of the 
interaction variables. As shown in Table 19, the hazard of an unknown attack resulting in 
property damage decreased following the USA PATRIOT Act (p=0.009) and decreased 
over time (p<0.001), but increased for the interactions of the USA PATRIOT Act with 
months of attacks with property damage (p<0.001) and the USA FREEDOM Act 
interaction with months of attacks with property damage (p=0.018). This indicates that 
the increase in hazard of an unknown attack resulting in property damage was short-term 
for the USA PATRIOT Act and USA FREEDOM Act.  
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Table 19 
 
Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model with Interaction 
Variables for Terrorism Resulting in Property Damage in the United States, 1994 to 2017 
 All 
(N=518) 
Domestic 
only 
(N=326) 
Unknown only 
(N=180) 
Counterterrorism policies    
     USA PATRIOT act -0.331 
1.004 
-0.289 
1.212 
-6.209** 
2.391 
     USA PATRIOT Improvement and  
          Reauthorization act 
-3.012 
1.692 
-2.990 
1.826 
2.733 
2.876 
     AETA 0.942 
1.286 
1.153 
1.303 
---- 
     Implementing Recommendations of  
          the 9/11 Commission act 
0.303 
0.642 
-0.219 
0.858 
-0.399 
1.531 
     USA FREEDOM act -0.835 
3.403 
-6.189 
5.201 
-5.916 
5.480 
Control variables    
     Days since previous attack with  
          property damage 
0.001 
0.004 
  
     Success density for attacks with  
          property damage 
0.002 
0.001 
  
     Attack density for attacks with  
          property damage 
-0.001 
0.003 
  
     Months of attacks with property  
          damage 
-0.006* 
0.002 
-0.002 
0.003 
-0.031*** 
0.006 
     Days since any previous attack -0.002 
0.005 
-0.008 
0.007 
0.015* 
0.006 
     Success density for any previous attack -0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.002 
0.001 
0.001 
     Attack density for any previous attack 0.001 
0.004 
0.010* 
0.005 
-0.003 
0.005 
     USA PATRIOT act x property damage  
          months interaction 
0.001 
0.009 
-0.004 
0.011 
0.060** 
0.019 
     USA PATRIOT Improvement x  
          property damage months interaction 
0.011 
0.009 
0.013 
0.011 
-0.21 
0.019 
     AETA x property damage months  
          interaction 
---- ---- ---- 
     Implementing Recommendations of  
          the 9/11 Commission x property  
          damage months interaction 
---- ---- ---- 
(table continues) 
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 All 
(N=518) 
Domestic 
only 
(N=326) 
Unknown only 
(N=180) 
     USA FREEDOM act x property  
          damage months interaction 
0.005 
0.015 
0.019 
0.021 
0.063* 
0.027 
     Days since previous domestic attack  
           with property damage 
 0.005 
0.003 
 
     Success density domestic only with  
           property damage 
 0.001 
0.002 
 
     Attack density domestic only with  
          property damage 
 -0.003 
0.002 
 
     Days since previous domestic attack  -0.010 
0.006 
 
     Success density domestic only  -0.001 
0.003 
 
     Attack density domestic only  0.001 
0.004 
 
     Days since previous unknown attack  
          with property damage 
  0.001 
0.001 
     Success density unknown with  
          property damage 
  0.001 
0.003 
     Attack density unknown with property  
          damage 
  0.001 
0.001 
     Days since previous unknown attack   -0.005 
0.003 
     Success density unknown   -0.001 
0.003 
     Attack density unknown   0.004* 
0.002 
Note. *p ≤ 0.05. **p ≤ 0.01. ***p < 0.001. 
I conducted a likelihood ratio test between the models with and without the 
interaction variables to determine which model was a better fit to explain the data for 
property damage. For the unknown attacks model, the model with the interaction 
variables was the best fit for property damage (p<0.01). For all terrorist attacks and for 
domestic terrorist attacks, the model with the interaction variables was not statistically 
significant, thus the interaction variables did not significantly improve the fit of the 
model for property damage. Therefore, the series hazard model in Table 18 was used to 
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answer RQ6 and its SQs. I analyzed Schoenfeld’s residuals to ensure that the covariates 
fulfilled the proportional hazard assumption and found that the proportional hazard 
assumption was fulfilled.  
I rejected the null hypothesis for RQ6 because the hazard of a domestic terrorist 
attack with property damage changed in relation to the implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. As shown in Table 18, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack 
with property damage decreased following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT 
Act; therefore, I rejected the null hypothesis for SQ6A. The only other statistically 
significant variable for the series hazard model for domestic terrorist attacks resulting in 
property damage was the attack density for any previous attack. As the attack density for 
any previous attack increased, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack resulting in 
property damage increased. The lack of statistical significance for the USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act, AETA, the Implementing Recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission Act, and the USA FREEDOM Act led to retaining the null 
hypotheses for SQ6B, SQ6C, SQ6D, and SQ6E. 
Counterterrorism Spending 
Determining U.S. government counterterrorism spending was more complicated 
than I initially anticipated due to inconsistencies across budget reports by the OMB and 
DHS. Additionally, before the creation of the DHS, counterterrorism responsibilities 
were found mainly within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of 
Justice (DOJ). As such, identifying how much funding was allocated and appropriated by 
the DOD and DOJ was not possible. Therefore, I focused on U.S. government 
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counterterrorism spending since the creation of the DHS. While the DOD and DOJ 
continued to contribute to counterterrorism efforts, the majority of the funding earmarked 
for counterterrorism was allocate and appropriated to the DHS. Thus the spending 
displayed was conservative and offered a glimpse into the minimum amount of spending 
by the U.S. government for counterterrorism efforts. 
Because of these difficulties and the fact that several government reports and 
academic articles refer to the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, the 
following data on counterterrorism comes from the Stimson Study. It should be noted that 
the obstacles I faced were the same obstacles that the Stimson Study Group on 
Counterterrorism Spending encountered in compiling their report (Stimson Study Group 
on Counterterrorism Spending, 2018). The four key findings from the Stimson Study 
Group on Counterterrorism Spending were that (a) total counterterrorism spending came 
to $2.8 trillion from 2002 to 2017, (b) no clear definition exists for U.S. counterterrorism 
spending, (c) the trend is that counterterrorism spending is increasing over time, and (d) 
that “an accurate evaluation of total and programmatic counterterrorism spending 
requires a reinstitution of governmentwide tracking by OMB, clarity of terms and 
definitions used, and more rigorous control of what should and should not be included in 
the CT budget” (p.8). 
 The Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018) identified four 
major counterterrorism budget categories: government-wide homeland security budget 
authority, defense emergency and overseas contingency operations (OCO), war-related 
state/USAID, and other foreign aid. Government-wide homeland security budget 
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authority referred to budgetary appropriations to DHS along with other agencies. Defense 
emergency and OCO were funded primarily by the DOD. War-related state/USAID was 
funded by the Department of State. Other foreign aid was funded by accounts for specific 
foreign counterterrorism initiatives (Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, 
2018). Figure 9 shows the breakdown of counterterrorism spending by fiscal year for 
each of these major categories.  
 
Figure 9. Total U.S. counterterrorism spending (in billions) by categories from FY2002 
to FY2017. From “Protecting America While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability” 
by the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, 2018. Open source 
document retrieved from https://www.stimson.org/content/counterterrorism-spending-
protecting-america-while-promoting-efficiencies-and-accountability. 
 Figure 10 shows U.S. counterterrorism spending by fiscal year from 2001 to 
2017. The large increase in spending for defense emergency and OCO coincided with the 
2007 surge of U.S. forces into Iraq. The decrease in spending for defense emergency and 
Governmentwide 
Homeland Security 
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Total U.S. Counterterrorism Spending (in billions) FY 2002-2007 
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OCO coincided with troop reductions with the Obama administration. As shown in 
Figure 8, for DHS and other agencies tasked with counterterrorism duties, there was an 
increasing trend from FY2002 to FY2017 in budget spending, although there were some 
years where the budget remained relatively unchanged.  
 
Figure 10. Counterterrorism spending by categories from FY2001 to FY2017. From 
“Protecting America While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability” by the Stimson 
Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, 2018. Open source document retrieved from 
https://www.stimson.org/content/counterterrorism-spending-protecting-america-while-
promoting-efficiencies-and-accountability. 
 
These data show that counterterrorism spending, in combination with the property 
damage data support the expensive nature of counterterrorism operations. However, as 
the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018) noted, there lacks a 
systematic evaluation of whether the increased spending was justified.  
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Summary 
From January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017, 66.76% of terrorist attacks in the 
United States were perpetrated by domestic terrorists. International terrorism accounted 
for 1.74% of attacks for the same time frame. Many of the unknown attacks shared the 
same method of operation as domestic terrorism; however, those attacks were analyzed 
separately and accounted for 31.51% of attacks. The results of the descriptive analyses 
were not surprising as prior research had also noted the higher incidence of domestic 
terrorism compared to international terrorism. Considering the contextual factors, the 
trends seen in domestic terrorism were not wholly unexpected. What was surprising was 
that AETA had not shown greater impact on reducing domestic terrorism considering that 
the sole goal of AETA was to target and prosecute domestic eco-terrorists.  
The results of the series hazard models were surprising, especially in comparison 
to the data in Figure 6. While trends appeared to show greater amounts of terrorism, the 
series hazard model demonstrated that the actual hazard of a domestic terrorist attack did 
not systematically align with the visual analysis of the frequency of incidence, lethality, 
and costs over time in relation to the specific U.S. counterterrorism policies. Therefore, 
including the series hazard analysis to examine the impact that policy has on terrorism 
should always be included because it adds greater depth in understanding how terrorism 
is impacted by policy interventions. 
I rejected the null hypotheses for all six central RQs. The USA PATRIOT Act 
was the only policy that resulted in rejection of the null hypothesis for all six SQAs. The 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act changed the hazard of the 
215 
 
incidence of domestic terrorism (SQ4B), but did not result in changes in domestic 
terrorism for SQBs for RQs 1-3 and RQs 5-6. I retained the null hypotheses for the 
impact that AETA had on domestic terrorism for all six RQs. The Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act changed domestic terrorism incidence, 
lethality, and costs resulting in my rejection of the null hypotheses for the SQDs for RQs 
1-3, but did not change the hazard of domestic terrorist attacks in terms of incidence, 
lethality, and costs resulting in my retention of the null hypothesis for the SQDs for RQs 
4-6. The USA FREEDOM Act changed domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs 
resulting in my rejection of the null hypotheses for the SQEs for RQs 1-3. The USA 
FREEDOM Act changed the hazard of lethal domestic terrorist attacks resulting in my 
rejection of the null hypothesis for SQ5E, but did not change the hazard of domestic 
terrorist attacks in terms of incidence and costs resulting in retaining the null hypothesis 
for SQ4E and SQ6E. 
In Chapter 5, I will further elaborate on the results of this study. In addition, I will 
relate the results of this study back to the literature review and theoretical frameworks 
employed for this study, MSF and the Power Elite. I will discussion the limitations of this 
study as well as future directions for continued research. Finally, I will explain the 
positive social change implications of this study. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Terrorism is a ubiquitous problem that has existed since antiquity (Hoffman, 
2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Domestic terrorism involves terrorism perpetrated by 
citizens of the nation of which and within which they are targeting. A majority of terrorist 
attacks against the United States have been perpetrated by domestic terrorists. However, 
when examining U.S. counterterrorism policy, the policy focus has been on threats from 
international terrorists. While most of these policies have focused on international 
terrorism, elements of these policies may have impact on the operations of domestic 
terrorists in the United States.  
Additionally, while researchers have attempted evaluation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy, they have not universally employed evidence-based evaluation 
using empirical data. Because of the diversity of approaches to evaluating 
counterterrorism policy, the results of such evaluations have been mixed. The gap in the 
literature was that U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21
st
 century had not been 
empirically evaluated in terms of its impact on domestic terrorism in general. In this 
study, I filled an important gap in the literature and utilized empirical data to examine the 
impact that 21
st
 century U.S. counterterrorism policies had on domestic terrorism.  
To address this gap in the literature, I conducted a quantitative, longitudinal trend 
study involving the analysis of secondary data. The purpose of this quantitative, 
longitudinal trend study was to describe the U.S. domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, 
and costs in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21
st
 century using the 
empirical data from the GTD, and using descriptive statistics, visual analysis, and the 
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series hazard model for data analysis. This study contributed to positive social change by 
providing an empirical model for evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy’s impact on 
domestic terrorism, and by providing an evidence-based, non-partisan, non-political 
method for quantifying the terrorist threat.  
I analyzed domestic terrorism data for incidence, lethality, and costs for the 
United States from the GTD from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 in relation to 
five U.S. counterterrorism policies: USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, AETA of 2006, Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, and USA FREEDOM Act of 
2015. The first three RQs addressed how U.S. domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and 
costs changed in relation to the selected U.S. counterterrorism policies, and were 
answered using descriptive statistics and visual analysis. The final three RQs addressed 
how the implementation of the U.S. counterterrorism policies listed affected the hazard of 
a domestic terrorist attack occurring, a lethal domestic terrorist attack occurring, and a 
domestic terrorist attack with property damage occurring. These final three RQs were 
answered using the series hazard model. Each research question had five SQs, one for 
each U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
Domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs changed as a result of the 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. Specifically, U.S. domestic terrorism 
incidence, lethality, and costs changed following the implementation of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and 
the USA FREEDOM Act. The hazard of domestic terrorist attacks, lethal domestic 
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terrorist attacks, and domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage changed as a 
result of U.S. counterterrorism policy. Specifically, the hazard of a domestic terrorist 
attack and the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist attack, and the hazard of a domestic 
terrorist attack resulting in property damage changed following the implementation of the 
USA PATRIOT Act. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
changed the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack. The USA FREEDOM Act changed the 
hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist attack. 
In some cases, the results from the series hazard model did not appear to align 
with the visual analysis of frequency of domestic terrorist attacks, lethal domestic 
terrorist attacks, and domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage. This 
demonstrated that the aggregation of terrorism data may obscure the threat of terrorism. 
Additionally, when running the series hazard model analyses, I identified and included 
additional control variables that may impact domestic terrorism, such as the passage of 
time, the passage of time in relation to specific policies, attack density, and days since 
prior attacks. Furthermore, because the series hazard model produced an estimate of the 
hazard of a terrorist attack, the series hazard model results are akin to an empirical model 
to measure the terrorist threat. From the results of this study, I demonstrated the need to 
include a series hazard model analysis in combination with descriptive statistics to 
uncover the depth of impact that policy interventions have, as well as to offer an 
empirical method to measure the terrorist threat.  
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In Chapter 5 I provide my interpretation of the findings presented in Chapter 4. I 
will elaborate on the limitations of this study, as well as provide recommendations for 
future research. Finally, I discuss the positive social change implications of this study. 
Interpretation of Findings 
Between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017 there were 749 terrorist attacks 
perpetrated in the United States (START, 2018a). Of these, 500 attacks (66.76%) were 
perpetrated by domestic terrorists, 13 (1.74%) by international terrorists, and 236 
(31.51%) had unknown perpetrators (START, 2018a). When examining the features of 
the unknown attacks, many shared the same modus operandi of domestic terrorism rather 
than international terrorism. Considering the dearth of attacks perpetrated by international 
terrorists, and the overarching challenges of conducting terrorist operations in foreign 
countries, it was reasonable to presume that most of the unknown attacks were 
perpetrated by domestic terrorists. However, I did not combine the unknown with the 
domestic terrorist attacks in my analyses, rather I analyzed the attacks separately. These 
data supported earlier studies’ identification of the higher incidence of domestic terrorism 
in the United States compared to international terrorism. 
Relative to the incidence of terrorism prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT 
Act, the incidence of terrorism is decreasing. In the 7 years prior to the passage of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, the United States had 45.7% of all terrorist attacks from 1994 to 
2017; of which 63.7% were perpetrated by domestic terrorists, 2% were perpetrated by 
international terrorists, and 34.2% had unknown perpetrators. Compared to the 54.3% of 
terrorist attacks that occurred over the 16-year time frame following the passage of the 
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USA PATRIOT Act, it was clear that in general, terrorism was decreasing in the United 
States. Since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, 69.2% of terrorist attacks have been 
perpetrated by domestic terrorists, 1% by international terrorists, and 29.2% by unknown 
perpetrators. These data further show that the threat from international terrorism is very 
low compared to the threat from domestic terrorism and highlight why the MSF on its 
own was insufficient to explain U.S. counterterrorism policy.  
When considering incidence, lethality, and costs, I found that the majority of U.S. 
domestic terrorist attacks are non-lethal (N = 362) and do result in property damage (N = 
330). These results support prior findings (Bjelopera, 2017; Su & Yang, 2017). When I 
examined data on domestic terrorism in the United States in relation to U.S. 
counterterrorism policy, I found that domestic terrorism in general, and lethal domestic 
terrorist attacks increased in 2002, were at their lowest levels in 2011, steadily increased 
until 2014, and rapidly increase beginning in 2015 after a brief decrease (see Figures 6 
and 7). Domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage showed only slight 
increase in 2002, but sharply increase in 2003 followed by a sharp decrease and a slow 
increase beginning in 2011 turning into a sharp increase in 2015 (see Figure 8).  
The spikes in domestic terrorism in 2002 and 2003 may be explained in terms of 
backlash against the September 11, 2001 attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda and the truther 
conspiracy theory. Following those attacks, there were increased domestic terrorist 
attacks targeting Muslims, Arabs, and those mistaken for Muslim and/or Arab. In 
addition, the emergence of the truther conspiracy theory fed into anti-government 
ideology, and may have led to increases in domestic terrorist attacks perpetrated by anti-
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government individuals or groups. The truther conspiracy theory in its most basic form 
involved the belief that the Bush administration, namely Chaney, Rumsfeld, and 
Wolfowitz, staged the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and subsequently used those 
attacks as rationale for invading Iraq, seizing control of oil, and engaging in profiteering 
from the global war on terror (Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014).  
The increase in domestic terrorism in 2011 may be explained by Obama’s re-
election campaign and the growth of the birther conspiracy theory. The birther conspiracy 
theory, which was spearheaded by Donald Trump, involved the belief that Obama had 
been born in Kenya, that his birth certificate showing his place of birth in Hawaii was 
forged, and thus Obama was not eligible to be president (Pham, 2015; Warner & Neville-
Shepard, 2014).  
There were several factors that may explain the sharp increase in domestic 
terrorism beginning in 2015. The increase in domestic terrorism beginning in 2014 may 
be due to the additional restrictions found in the USA FREEDOM Act regarding 
surveilling U.S. citizens, although that impact was confounded by the presidential 
campaign announcement of Trump 2 weeks following the passage of the USA 
FREEDOM Act. The rhetoric used by the Trump campaign and subsequent 
administration has been one in support of White nationalism, nativism, and fear-inducing 
anti-Muslim sentiment (Montgomery, 2019; Newman et al., 2018). Many White 
supremacists, White nationalists, and neo-Nazis were given greater legitimacy from the 
Trump campaign and election, and were further fueled by Trump’s comments following 
the violent clash of protesters at the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, VA on 
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August 11-12, 2017 that resulted in one death after one of the Unite the Right protestors 
drove his car into a crowd of counter-protestors (Johnson, 2018; Perry, 2018). 
While the descriptive statistics and visual analysis of the aggregated terrorism 
data tell one story, the results from the series hazard model tell a different story. By 
examining the temporal occurrence of events and using the series hazard model, I was 
able to better uncover the role that time played, as well as additional control variables in 
describing how policy intervention impacted domestic terrorism. With the dependent 
variable being number of days until the next attack, the series hazard model provides the 
hazard or risk of another attack occurring based on the data regarding the gap time 
between attacks. This outcome is akin to measuring the threat of terrorism, as the series 
hazard model provides the risk of another terrorist attack. 
For the central RQs related to the hazard of domestic terrorist attacks, I found that 
U.S. counterterrorism policy changed the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack, a lethal 
domestic terrorist attack, and a domestic terrorist attack resulting in property damage. 
Specifically, the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act increased the hazard of a domestic 
terrorist attack (p < 0.001). The hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased following 
the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act (p < 0.001). 
However, for both of these acts, the change in hazard was temporary. As time passed 
from when the USA PATRIOT Act had been implemented, the hazard of a domestic 
terrorist attack decreased (p < 0.001). As time passed from when the USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act had been implemented, the hazard of a domestic 
terrorist attack increased (p < 0.001). While there was no statistically significant impact 
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by the USA FREEDOM Act on the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack, as time passed 
since the USA FREEDOM Act had been implemented, the hazard of a domestic terrorist 
attack decreased (p = 0.041). In addition, as days from previous domestic terrorist attacks 
increased, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased (p = 0.043).  
These results indicate that the immediate effects of the USA PATRIOT Act, the 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, and the USA FREEDOM Act on 
the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack reverse as time passes. This suggests that 
domestic terrorism is sensitive to U.S. counterterrorism policy implementation but also to 
time effects. These results were consistent with the visual analysis of domestic terrorist 
attacks discussed above (see Figure 6).  
For lethal domestic terrorist attacks, the hazard of another lethal domestic terrorist 
attack decreased following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act (p < 0.001) 
and following the implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act (p < 0.001). However, as 
time passed, the hazard of lethal domestic terrorist attacks (p = 0.028) increased. While 
similar results were found for all terrorist attacks, considering the differences in 
magnitude of the coefficients for the USA PATRIOT Act and the USA FREEDOM Act 
between any lethal attack and lethal domestic attacks, it appears that lethal domestic 
attacks were more affected by these policies than any lethal attack in general. These 
results are not consistent with the visual analysis of lethal domestic terrorist attacks (see 
Figure 7). While the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist attack decreased following the 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act, Figure 7 shows an increase in incidence of 
lethal domestic terrorist attacks. One of the complications in comparing the selected 
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policies involved the short time frame for evaluating the USA FREEDOM Act. While the 
USA PATRIOT Act had 14 years of data to use to evaluate its impact on domestic 
terrorism, the USA FREEDOM Act only had two years of data. Therefore, by using the 
series hazard model, I provided additional detail when considering the impact of policy 
initiatives.  
For domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage, the hazard of a 
domestic terrorist attack resulting in property damage decreased after the USA PATRIOT 
Act was enacted (p<0.001), but increased when the attack density from any previous 
attacks increased (p=0.040). Because of the lack of statistical significance for the policy 
interaction variables with time and the time variables, these results indicated that 
domestic terrorists engaging in attacks that result in property damage were more affected 
by the USA PATRIOT Act than the other U.S. counterterrorism policies. I was 
particularly surprised by this result because eco-terrorists tended to engage in attacks that 
predominantly resulted in property damage, yet their activities were not significantly 
affected by the passage of later U.S. counterterrorism policies, specifically the one aimed 
at domestic eco-terrorists, AETA. In addition, the series hazard model was able to handle 
the spike in domestic terrorist attacks in 2003, such that the hazard of domestic terrorist 
attacks was not overly influenced by this spike in attacks (see Figure 8). Like with the 
lethality results, the results of the series hazard model for domestic terrorist attacks 
resulting in property damage were not consistent with the visual presentation of 
frequency of domestic terrorist attacks involving property damage shown in Figure 8. 
225 
 
Like with lethality, this could be due to the short time frame in assessing the impact of 
the USA FREEDOM Act compared to the other U.S. counterterrorism policies. 
The results of this study support the importance of investigating event data 
utilizing the series hazard model beyond aggregating data without consideration of the 
time component. This is glaringly obvious when a visual analysis of aggregated terrorism 
data by year appear to show one trend, while the series hazard model reports a more 
sophisticated expectation in terms of the risk of future terrorist attacks. The series hazard 
model thus provides an empirical, evidence-based method of measuring the threat of 
terrorism. 
Considering that 522 of the 749 terrorist attacks in the United States between 
1994 and 2017 resulted in property damage, terrorist attacks are expensive (Bjelopera, 
2017; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Su & Yang, 2017; START, 2018a). In combination 
with the results from the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018), it 
becomes clear that U.S. counterterrorism efforts are costly.  The series hazard model in 
addition to descriptive and visual evaluation of frequency of terrorist attacks was used to 
provide evidence-based information that may be used to evaluate how justified 
counterterrorism spending is, and whether the increased spending translated to a safer 
nation. The results from using the series hazard model can better inform and rationalize 
the money spent for counterterrorism in relation to the actual threat of terrorism and 
where that threat originates. 
The results of this study support the disconnect between the advertised threat of 
international terrorism and the subsequent focus of U.S. counterterrorism policy, and the 
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actual threat of domestic terrorist attacks in the United States. It was excruciatingly clear 
that international terrorists rarely attack the United States within its territorial boundaries, 
instead focusing on targets abroad such as embassies and military targets. There were 13 
international terrorist attacks from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017, four of which 
were the September 11, 2001 attacks. While the NCTAUUS found glaring issues that 
allowed for the planning and execution of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, issues 
regarding barriers to safe and efficient response, rescue, and recovery efforts, and offered 
recommendations, some of were which implemented through the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, these initiatives were aimed at a rare 
event. As such, attempting to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism policy based on its focus of 
reducing an already rare event is not possible. Furthermore, this leads to questions as to 
how much money should be spent to counter a rare event (Kunreuther, 2002). 
Meanwhile, domestic terrorism continued to flourish and even increase in recent 
years. While the statistically significant results for the hazard of lethal domestic terrorist 
attacks decreased following the USA FREEDOM Act, I would caution the full 
acceptance of these results, namely due to the short time frame and relatively lower 
numbers of domestic terrorist attacks involved in its evaluation. Recommendations such 
as those identified in the REAL ID Act of 2005 would be completely irrelevant for 
domestic anti-government groups and individuals like Sovereign Citizens who already 
dismiss the need for official credentials, and refuse to acknowledge and follow the laws 
established and enforced in the United States at all levels of governance (Martin, 2018; 
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Nacos, 2016). I recommend that the same careful investigation and analysis needs to be 
conducted on domestic terrorist attacks. 
I was able to explain the policy process using the MSF, while also being able to 
explain the disconnect between the real terrorist threat and the counterterrorism policies 
by adding the power elite theory. Consider who benefits from a policy like AETA? It is 
mainly business owners as AETA expanded the definition for what types of businesses 
qualified as animal enterprises, including third-party entities, and thus could reap victims 
of terrorism benefits for any attacks, as well as more severely prosecute those who attack 
them or threaten them.  
In addition, one of the rallying calls of the Trump campaign and administration 
was to battle against “radical Islamic terrorism,” yet such forms of terrorism rarely occur 
in the United States (Montgomery, 2019). Of the 500 known cases of domestic terrorism 
in the United States, only 43 or 8.6% were perpetrated by “radical Islamic terrorists” (see 
Table 1). Contrast that with 82 or 16.4% White nationalists, White extremists, Neo-Nazi 
attacks and 56 or 11.2% anti-government attacks. Similar to Miller (2017), these results 
support the dramatic increase in domestic terrorism by White supremacist groups.  
Of the motivation types, eco-terrorism occurred the most (147 or 29.4%) which 
aligned with the passage of AETA, although I was unable to show a significant decrease 
in domestic terrorism following the implementation of AETA. It is here where the 
contribution of the power elite was most appropriate. Bjelopera (2017) noted that public 
data on eco-terrorism was more readily available in recent years than other forms of 
domestic terrorism, leading to the possibility of underreporting of the other forms of 
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domestic terrorism. While Bjelopera noted the lack of conformity in prosecuting 
domestic terrorism; anecdotally, I noticed that the media were quick to assign the label of 
terrorist to non-White perpetrators and use other criminal labels for White perpetrators. 
Thus, the disconnect between the political and media narrative on the terrorist 
threat and what the empirical data show may lead to a potential connection with the 
systemic racism found in U.S. society. Following a cursory examination of recent 
domestic terrorist attacks, I found that White perpetrators were charged with hate crimes 
while perpetrators of color, if they survived, were charged with terrorism. That cursory 
examination may be supported by the coding practices for the doubt terrorism proper 
variable in the GTD. When further examining the events that were labeled as doubt 
terrorism proper, I found that many of those were labeled by the media and subsequently 
prosecuted as hate crimes, even if the event met the inclusion criteria of terrorism and 
met the definition of terrorism from the United States Code. In addition, there seemed to 
be an imbalance of coding where similar incidents perpetrated by persons of color and/or 
Muslims were coded as terrorism, while incidents involving White perpetrators were 
coded as doubt terrorism proper. Interestingly enough the attack by Dylann Roof on the 
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, SC on June 17, 2015 was 
coded as terrorism. When the updated GTD is released including the terrorism data for 
2018, it will be interesting to see how the Tree of Life Synagogue attack in Pittsburgh on 
October 27, 2018 will be coded. 
These possible racial discrepancies were supported by Hewitt’s (2003) 
examination of domestic terrorism. For U.S. domestic terrorism from 1955 to 2000, 
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Hewitt noted the discrepancy in treatment of domestic terrorism by ideological category, 
finding that the ratio of arrests to incidents for the KKK was 0.39 and for Black militants 
was 0.61. Sentencing also differed for deadly offenses with Black militants getting an 
average of 37.0 years compared to the average 17.0 years for White racists and KKK 
(Hewitt, 2003). Conviction rates were also higher for Black militants compared to the 
KKK, with Black militants being convicted in 51.1% of any offense and 75.4% for 
deadly offenses, while the KKK were convicted in 47.8% of any offense and 29.7% for 
deadly offenses (Hewitt, 2003). While Hewitt’s analysis cited ideological category 
differences, when examining the ideology for the KKK, White racists, and Black 
militants, there was also a clear racial gap. 
Alone, MSF was inadequate to explain how policy can be implemented that is in 
direct contradiction with both the problem and policy streams. The question of influence 
of the political stream may be what is really connected to the power elite. Kinloch (2004) 
asserted that the power elite manipulate policy in order to serve itself and its own 
interests. For example, war is said to be necessary to ensure national security, however 
waging wars have benefited the power elite by helping maintain an atmosphere of fear to 
ensure continuity in leadership during elections, allowing for profiteering, and 
maintaining existing inequalities by restricting civil rights; a perfect trifecta of benefit for 
the political, economic, and military elites (Kinloch, 2004). Abrams (2006) noted that in 
the five years following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, all three 
branches of government engaged in deferral and avoidance regarding challenges to the 
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law which resulted in a break-down of the checks and balances that the three branches of 
the government were designed to provide upon the others.  
Recent events highlight presidential overreach by Trump declaring a national 
emergency to provide funding for a border wall along the U.S. border with Mexico once 
Congress refused to allow for such funding. Hellmuth (2016) observed the changes in the 
separation of powers and specifically, the use of an ongoing war (the global war on 
terror) as a way to continue the power imbalance in the U.S. government that has been 
described as now operating under an imperial presidency. This is especially concerning 
considering the rhetoric and practices of the current Trump administration.  
While troop withdrawals and a shift in approach to the global war on terror were 
hallmarks of the Obama administration, aggressive rhetoric, troop increases, and framing 
of the global war on terror to include illegal immigrants, the Trump administration may 
have had a greater impact on domestic terrorism in the United States beyond what the 
results of this study provided (Montgomery, 2019; Newman et al., 2018; Pham, 2015; 
Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014). In addition, while the Mueller Report concluded that 
there was no collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia, had the actions of 
Trump been those of anyone who was not a currently-serving President of the United 
States, that person would have faced charges of obstruction of justice (R.S. Mueller, 
2019). Regardless of one’s political ideology, that behavior is concerning and lends 
credence to the need for an analysis of how the Trump presidency compares with other 
presidencies in relation to terrorism, specifically domestic terrorism. 
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Ledgwidge and Parmar (2017) argued that much of foreign policy is controlled by 
the power elite and that the power elite are predominantly male WASPs, and thus the 
power elite uses policy to ensure their own dominance. The majority of foreign terrorist 
organizations are non-White or of the lower White races (i.e. Irish) and thus the 
dominance of concern in U.S. counterterrorism policy being on international versus 
domestic terrorism could be motivated by racism and ethnocentrism in the United States 
(Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017). By constructing the main terrorist threat as being non-White 
and non-Christian, the power elite continued the practice of marginalizing distinct racial, 
ethnic, and religious groups keeping them from mobilizing and uniting, while at the same 
time, it has empowered White, Christian domestic terrorists to amass weapons (benefiting 
the economic and military elite) and keeping the political elite in power. In addition, by 
constructing the terrorist threat as being non-White and non-Christian, White 
supremacists and White nationalists find rationalization for their hatred and intolerance 
towards non-White and non-Christian people (J. Johnson, 2018). 
Therefore, the combination of the MSF and the power elite theory served to 
explain the discrepancy between the empirical data and the focus of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. The MSF explained how different streams converged to create 
policy and the power elite theory addressed the unequal influence of some in directing the 
substance of the developed policy, even when not supported by evidence. In addition, by 
adding the consideration of race and ethnicity, the trends I identified in the results are 
elucidated further. While these results were compelling, there were limitations to this 
study which I will elaborate on in the following section. 
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Limitations of the Study 
Following IRB approval, once I accessed the GTD and began working on the data 
filtering and analysis, I uncovered additional limitations to this study that I had not 
anticipated. There were four primary limitations that will be elaborated in this section: (a) 
issues with the GTD data, (b) issues with public reporting of counterterrorism spending, 
(c) issues with the proximity of counterterrorism policy and paucity of data to evaluate 
the policy in accordance with past studies, and (d) issues with SPSS version 25.0.0.2. 
While I addressed some of my assumptions about the GTD in Chapter 1, issues I had not 
anticipated became apparent as I began working with the data. 
One of the primary limitations of the present study involved the selected data 
source. While the GTD has been shown to be reliable and valid, I found myself 
questioning that reliability as I uncovered inconsistencies in the coding. Some of these 
inconsistencies may be explained by changes in practice and in the retro-coding of new 
variables added; however, others may be related to implicit bias among coders. While the 
GTD codebook is very detailed, perhaps additional detail addressing these 
inconsistencies would be useful for future researchers seeking to use the GTD to analyze 
domestic terrorism. For incidence and for many of the variables that I did not explore in 
this study, I believe the GTD is an excellent database and it offers compatibility with 
statistical analysis software packages that increase the efficiency of conducting 
quantitative analyses with the data. Just because the variables I intended to analyze did 
not conform with my expectations when planning this study does not mean that the entire 
dataset is unreliable or invalid.  
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A second major limitation to this study involved the accuracy and reporting of the 
U.S. government counterterrorism spending. While there are many public documents 
available including annual budget by agency and department from the OMB, those data 
were inconsistent with the budget reports available from DHS. The Stimson Study Group 
on Counterterrorism Spending (2018) noted the same inconsistencies and had more 
deeply explored how counterterrorism was defined among and within agencies, through 
which they uncovered inconsistencies that may contribute to the data inconsistencies 
found in the public documents. As a result of these inconsistencies, my planned analysis 
of counterterrorism spending was not feasible for the current study. 
A third limitation involved the selected U.S. counterterrorism policies. Similar to 
LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009), four of the interventions did not have an end date. 
While I attempted to utilize the same procedure to avoid confounding the analyses by 
having overlapping policy effects by using a one-year time frame following policy 
implementation, when I filtered the data to that level, the amount of data was too small to 
analyze with confidence (see Dugan, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). In addition, 
the rapid passage of counterterrorism policy led to difficulties in identifying whether 
those policies had any impact (i.e., USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization 
Act, AETA, and Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act). For the 
series hazard analyses, there were several cases in which SPSS would not report a value 
for those policies or their interaction variables with time due to being constant or linearly 
dependent. However, removing them from the analyses did not seem like it would solve 
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the problem of their possible influence. I was particularly reluctant to remove AETA as 
that was the only policy that focused on domestic terrorism. 
A fourth limitation involved the introduction of additional error to the analyses. 
While I had anticipated some additional error due to manually coding events as domestic, 
international, or unknown, I had not anticipated the challenges in running the series 
hazard model using SPSS version 25.0.0.2. As such, there were several times the filtered 
dataset became corrupted as I attempted to add or merge data calculated in Excel with the 
SPSS data, thus resulting in several occasions in which I had to re-filter the data, and at 
least one occasion of recoding the entire dataset. As a result, I had to calculate certain 
variables in Excel, which then I had to manually enter into SPSS. This manual data entry 
led to additional error because even though I triple-checked the data entry, there is still a 
possible chance that an error was made. Because of limitations in computing variables in 
SPSS, I had to conduct some calculations by hand, and while I triple-checked those 
calculations, there is still a possible chance that I made a mistake. Hopefully future 
versions of SPSS will offer a more comprehensive and complete method of conducting 
the variable creation and analysis for the series hazard model that would not require 
outside calculations either by hand or by using other software packages. The other 
researchers who have used the series hazard model have used different statistical software 
packages and did not appear to encounter the same types of additional work and 
calculation that this version of SPSS required. 
While there were these limitations that may add caution to accepting the results, I 
do not believe that these limitations substantially undermined the purpose of this study 
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nor its applicability for positive social change. I believe that the strength of the effects 
found compensated for the additional error due to manual calculation and manual data 
entry. If anything, these limitations will guide future research and offer a wide range of 
recommendations for future research. 
Recommendations 
I have many recommendations for future research from looking at specific aspects 
of the GTD data coding process to testing additional theories to further modifications in 
the series hazard model. While working on the data analysis and interpretation, I was able 
to find several areas that should be explored, the results of which may contribute to 
positive social change. I will begin with discussing identifying or supplementing data 
sources for analysis of U.S. domestic terrorism. 
One of the first recommendations for future research involves combining multiple 
data sources for analyses. For example, Carson (2014) utilized both the GTD, the EID, 
and supplemented the information from those databases with additional, open source 
chronologies. Another option would be to choose a different dataset such as the 
Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the United States (TEVUS) database that pulls from 
information from the GTD along with other databases and studies. Included in TEVUS 
are biographical and demographic information on perpetrators which would be useful in 
extending the current analysis to evaluate factors involving race, ethnicity, and religion 
(START, 2018c).  
Another direction for future research involves examining domestic terrorism and 
counterterrorism policy focusing on race and ethnicity, as well as potentially theories 
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from the sociology of race and ethnic relations. Those theories may better explain the 
racial disparity than the power elite theory alone. A global analysis could be done to 
evaluate racial and ethnic stratification for different countries in relation to domestic 
terrorism for those countries. 
A specific area of study could involve a systematic examination of the coding of 
the doubt terrorism proper variable in the GTD in relation to racial, ethnic, religious, and 
other social minorities. It would be interesting to identify if the pattern from my cursory 
and unsystematic examination of the events coded as doubt terrorism proper are 
systematically present. This potential research could examine if there is an imbalance of 
incidents labeled as doubt terrorism proper when perpetrators are among the dominant 
strata, whereas similar incidents are labeled as terrorism when perpetrators are among the 
minorities or lower strata. The results could be used to assist START project managers in 
improving interrater reliability for coding events, as well as perhaps suggest sensitivity to 
implicit bias among coders. 
While Hewitt (2003) examined waves of domestic terrorism in relation to 
presidential administrations, considering the unusual nature of the Trump administration 
compared to all previous presidential administrations, an updated analysis would be 
useful. In particular, it would be useful to conduct an analysis of the impact of the Trump 
campaign and administration on White supremacists, White extremists, and new-Nazis, 
as well as on the counter-movement, the Anti-fascists (J. Johnson, 2018; Montgomery, 
2019; R.S. Mueller, 2019; Newman et al., 2018; Perry, 2018; Pham, 2015; Warner & 
Neville-Shepard, 2014). 
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Further research may also seek to employ examining the rational choice, 
backlash, and deterrence theories with regards to the impact that these specific U.S. 
counterterrorism policies have had on domestic terrorism broken down into similar 
ideological/motivational categories, target types, and in relation to opposing groups. For 
example, it may be useful to identify if a highly-publicized domestic terrorist attack 
perpetrated by a particular racial, ethnic, and/or religious group is followed by retaliatory 
attacks by domestic terrorists that oppose those groups (e.g., White supremacist activity 
following the September 11, 2001 attacks or anti-government activity following the 
incidents at Waco and Ruby Ridge).  
Furthermore, by breaking down domestic terrorism further, the DHS, FBI, and 
DOD could get a better sense of which groups or ideologies are sensitive to federal 
counterterrorism policy. Such research may also result in providing policy makers and 
law enforcement with expectations of potential retaliation in response to attacks, the 
potential for copycats, areas in need of additional hardening of targets, and areas in need 
of additional surveillance and/or police presence. If such retaliatory and/or copycat 
actions occur, such research could be used to better inform the media to report more 
responsibly about terrorist attacks.   
It would be very useful to examine how the series hazard model or another model 
may be used to evaluate policy when policy periods overlap. It would be useful to 
identify a control variable for the overlapping impact of multiple policies. While the one-
year time frame was possible for LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009), it was not feasible in 
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the present study. One potential approach to addressing overlapping policy effects could 
be the use of multilevel models (B.D. Johnson, 2017, LaFree & Bersani, 2014). 
Finally, there should be more investigation into how the series hazard model can 
be used as an evidence-based, non-partisan, non-political, quantitative measure of 
terrorist threat. As long as the assumptions and criteria for the series hazard model are 
met (viz., Dugan, 2011), it shows great promise in aiding counterterrorism agencies 
including the DHS and FBI in identifying, preventing, and responding to threats, as well 
as to policy makers in justifying costly counterterrorism spending and in the development 
of future counterterrorism policy. This final recommendation will be elaborated on in the 
next section.  
Implications 
The present study offers an evidence-based method for evaluating U.S. 
counterterrorism policy and its impact on domestic terrorism which was the purpose of 
this study. This is an important step as prior attempts to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism 
policy have varied greatly in approach, data, and results. In addition, the series hazard 
model provides a mechanism by which the threat of terrorism can be quantified, which 
was an unanticipated benefit of this study. By utilizing empirical data, the present study 
offers a stronger evaluation of U.S. counterterrorism policy than those restricted to 
theoretical assertions. Not only is this method useful for policy makers, the DHS, and the 
FBI, but the results themselves inform these stakeholders as to what the counterterrorism 
priorities should be in relation to the actual terrorist threat. 
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As U.S. counterterrorism policies that focus on international terrorist threats come 
up for renewal or challenge, the data from this study can be used as support for the 
development and enactment of policy focusing on the threat of domestic terrorism. This 
is especially important considering the costs of countering the terrorist threat and 
justifying increasing spending to protect against the rare event of international terrorism, 
rather than the more frequent event of domestic terrorism (Bjelopera, 2017; Kunreuther, 
2002; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014). In addition, the series hazard  model allows for the 
consideration of the impact of a range of other contextual or control variables such as 
other policy initiatives, time elapse, the impact of successful attacks, the impact of time 
since the last attack, and others. It is those factors specifically that lend its use to 
quantifying the threat of terrorism.   
Terrorists are comprised of a spectrum of sociodemographic characteristics and 
by focusing on a foreign threat, while making it easier to profile international terrorists, it 
does not make the country safer. Creating additional labels that separate and disconnect 
the breadth of motivations and actions of terrorists undermines the safety of the nation. 
Terrorism, extremism, hate, cults, and other labels are not mutually exclusive categories 
and there needs to be a more systematic examination of how these terms are used to 
frame the threat, and how criminal prosecution follows from terrorist events, planned or 
executed (Bjelopera, 2017). By establishing an empirical, evidence-based method for 
evaluating counterterrorism policy and by offering an evidence-based, non-partisan, non-
political method of quantifying the terrorist threat, policy makers will have easier access 
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to the evidence that should inform counterterrorism policy and counterterrorism 
operations.   
Policy makers need to be aware that terrorism is a social construction and a 
complex social problem that requires a complex analysis. The political stream, policy 
entrepreneurs, and the media would also benefit from such elucidation. The series hazard 
model provides a complex analysis for evaluating policy and other interventions that may 
be aimed at countering the terrorist threat, and it removes the partisan and political 
influences in defining and prosecuting domestic terrorism.  
For the sake of clarity, I would recommend that policy makers draft a new piece 
of legislation rather than amending existing policies. The new policy should address not 
only the findings from this study but extend the recommendations from Bjelopera (2017) 
and the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018). The following 
should be addressed in this new policy: (a) establishing one systematic definition of 
counterterrorism spending to be utilized by all agencies, (b) establishing accuracy and 
accountability in reporting counterterrorism spending, (c) establishing a public list of 
domestic terrorist organizations, (d) clearly instructing prosecutors regarding charges of 
domestic terrorism versus hate crime, (e) providing a statement of the overlap of 
terrorism, extremism, and hate crime, (f) establishing an evidence-based method of 
defining the terrorist threat (i.e. use of the series hazard model), (g) establishing clear 
procedures for evidence-based evaluation of the effectiveness of existing 
counterterrorism policy along with a reasonable timeline of compliance, and (h) requiring 
all future counterterrorism policy to include an evidence-based evaluation of the 
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effectiveness of future counterterrorism policy. By establishing a new policy that 
specifically addresses issues of accountability and clarity in existing counterterrorism 
policies and for future counterterrorism policies, the media will be provided with a clear 
way of communicating the new policy to the general public. 
 If policy makers intend on making the nation safer, they need to listen to all of 
the academics, researchers, and others among the policy and problem streams, and take to 
heart what the empirical evidence show. Since at least 2011, Bjelopera (2017) has been 
submitting annual reports for members and committees of Congress through the 
Congressional Research Service regarding a range of criminal justice and terrorism 
issues including overviews of domestic terrorism with updates. In the most recent report, 
Bjelopera repeated his argument for the need for better access by policy makers to the 
empirical data, as well as the need for a systematic method for determining the terrorist 
threat. The question becomes whether the power elite are exerting pressure to ignore the 
empirical data, and thus Congress is ignoring the threat and data, or is Congress not 
prioritizing this threat as imminent even though the data show otherwise. We do not need 
to wait for another catastrophic attack in order to act on creating and implementing 
effective counterterrorism policy. The data exist, now is the time to use the data to make 
the nation safer. 
Conclusion 
The United States faces an ongoing struggle with domestic terrorism, yet 
counterterrorism policy does not align with the threat. In addition, efforts to characterize 
domestic terrorism as being mutually exclusive from extremism and hate crime (which it 
242 
 
is not) give the public the illusion that domestic terrorism is not an issue in the United 
States. Yet, according to my results, on average there is a terrorist attack occurring in the 
United States every 11.70 (standard deviation: 19.686) days (see Table 6).  
Without an accurate understanding of the complexity of the social problem that is 
domestic terrorism, and without alignment between actual threat and counterterrorism 
policy, domestic terrorism will continue to thrive and negatively impact lives of U.S. 
citizens and residents, undermining any prospect of approaching a peaceful society. If 
counterterrorism budget priorities continue to focus on the rare event of international 
terrorism, and if those priorities replace other policy initiatives, the United States will 
continue to struggle with the real threat and continue to remain unsafe. As long as 
agencies continue to operate with non-public lists and the lack of systematic definitions, 
U.S. counterterrorism agencies will continue to operate in a reactive rather than proactive 
fashion against domestic terrorism, and prosecutions against domestic terrorists will 
continue in a non-uniform manner, undermining public trust in the criminal justice 
system. 
By offering an evidence-based method of evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy 
based on empirical data, policy makers may make better use of tax-payer money and 
provide greater protection from the harm of a domestic terrorist attack. It is essential to 
note that a complex social problem such as terrorism requires a complex analysis that 
includes a range of factors at various levels of influence. The series hazard model offers 
that complexity while remaining feasible to execute using public data.  
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In addition, the series hazard model allows for an evidence-based, systematic 
method of characterizing the terrorist threat, as long as all of the criteria and assumptions 
of the series hazard model are met (viz., Dugan, 2011). Such a method has remained 
elusive but with this model, those days may be over. This model allows for non-partisan 
and non-political evaluation of the threat of terrorism. By using such a model, the politics 
of how certain entities come to be listed as terrorist organizations or as extremist 
organizations are removed. For example, the Department of State’s list of foreign terrorist 
organizations is a politically-motivated list with notable countries that, while known to 
support terrorism, remain off of the list. An evidence-based, non-partisan, non-political 
method of determining the terrorist threat is especially needed when the Trump 
administration continues to support the ideologies and actions of White supremacists, 
White nationalists, and Neo-Nazis (J. Johnson, 2018; Newman et al., 2018; Pham, 2015; 
Perry, 2018; Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014). 
The results from this study and others that show the strength and benefits of using 
the series hazard model would be especially useful to the DHS and the FBI. Until there is 
a systematic method of examining U.S. counterterrorism policy, the U.S. government, as 
well as U.S. citizens and residents remain distracted from the actual threat and run the 
risk of being surprised by another, catastrophic terrorist attack, this one perpetrated by 
domestic terrorists. While the balance between national security and civil liberties remain 
precarious in countering a terrorist threat, ignoring the threat will not make it go away. 
Action must be sought and that action should be based on empirical data and replicable 
evidence. If the U.S. government and its citizens and residents truly aspire to living in a 
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peaceful democracy, then the U.S. government needs to clearly address the significant 
threat that is domestic terrorism. 
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